What could be done? There were not wanting writers who called upon government to annul the convention. The Romans, they said, would have done so, and have delivered up the generals who signed it, bound and haltered, to the enemy’s discretion. Would it be argued, that to break the treaty would be to break our faith towards the enemy? Why, it was so framed that it could not be fulfilled without breaking our faith towards each and all of our allies! We were the allies of Portugal; and it was a breach of faith towards Portugal, to transport this army of thieves, ravishers, and murderers out of the country in which they had perpetrated their crimes, and from which they had no other possible means of escape. We were the allies of Spain; and it was a breach of faith towards Spain, if four-and-twenty thousand French troops, cut off from all succour and all retreat, should be conveyed, under the British flag, into their own country, with arms and baggage, that they might join the forces with which Buonaparte was preparing to march against the Spaniards. We were the allies of Sweden; and it was a breach of faith towards Sweden to carry Russian sailors through the Swedish fleet for the purpose of manning Russian ships against the Swedes. Were we then to annul this treaty with our enemies, or to betray our friends? for to this alternative our triumvirate of generals had reduced us! No law of nations could justify them in making such stipulations; no law of nations therefore could justify us in performing them. But the French, it was urged, had already fulfilled their part of the convention; they had evacuated the fortified towns, and admitted us into Lisbon. Thus we had already reaped the advantages, and were, in honour, bound to carry into effect the remainder of the treaty, which was advantageous to them. In whatever way we acted, some loss of honour was inevitable; but it was less disgraceful to break the terms than to fulfil them; better that the French should reproach us, than that they should compliment us upon a fidelity which enabled them to injure our allies. The blow, it was affirmed, might have gone far towards deciding the fate of Europe. France had lost one army in Andalusia, and how deeply Buonaparte felt the loss was shown by the anxiety with which he concealed it from the French people. What might not have been the effect of the destruction of a second and larger army, following so close upon that of the former! How would it have encouraged the Portugueze, given new animation to the Spaniards, and raised the hope and the courage of those various states who were suffering under the tyrant’s yoke!
The conditions which had been granted to the Russian Admiral were condemned with the same vehement feeling of disappointment. The intimate connexion which had so lately subsisted between the Courts of London and Petersburgh, and the personal regard which the British Admiral entertained for Admiral Siniavin, had been adduced as reasons why an agreement acceptable to both nations should be concluded. Certainly it became us to manifest every mark of personal respect toward the Russian officers, because, though the false policy of their government had engaged the two countries in war, there existed no angry feelings nor jarring interests between them; and the wishes of both were for a renewal of that long established intercourse which was beneficial to both. It also behoved us especially to show ourselves grateful for the protection which the Russians had afforded to the English and Portugueze refugees, and the facilities which they had given them of effecting their escape. These were personal favours, for which the obvious personal return should have been to have immediately sent home men and officers under an engagement not to serve against us or our allies, and to have shown towards them every courtesy and kindness by which the evils of hostility can be mitigated. But that personal regard should influence the terms of capitulation, was a thing as unheard of as the terms themselves. “Hold in deposit!” The phrase had never before been known in the British navy. They knew what it was to fight their enemies; they knew what it was to beat, capture, sink, burn, and destroy them, according to the spirit and letter of their instructions. This was said by the navy, and by the nation; and the bitter reflection arose, how would Nelson have received such a proposal!
Such language as this arose from a right feeling; but the disappointment of well-founded and high-raised hopes had heated the public mind, and disqualified it for regarding the whole transaction dispassionately. The manner in which the Portugueze had been overlooked in the negotiation was aggravated in England by persons who supported the pretensions of the Junta of Porto; and undue stress was laid upon the neglect of formalities which could not have been overlooked if the Portugueze General had been acting with the British army as he ought. There had been one serious omission affecting the Portugueze, which was, in not insisting upon a stipulation that the troops of that nation who had been sent to serve in Buonaparte’s armies should be restored to their own country; such a stipulation ought to have been required, though it would undoubtedly have been broken. The other oversights which were objected were merely frivolous, and the manner in which, through all the subsequent details, the feelings as well as interests of the Portugueze had been consulted, had already contented them, and made them grateful for the conduct of their allies. There was another cause which exasperated the English people: they compared the treatment of Junot’s army with that of Dupont’s, and were mortified by a comparison which ought rather to have elated them; for looking to what seemed advantageous, and not to what was just, they did not perceive that in deferring to a popular cry the Junta of Seville had broken a solemn engagement. The strong disapprobation with which Sir Hew Dalrymple regarded that breach of faith, acted upon him, perhaps unconsciously, when he allowed the French the utmost which could be claimed upon the most liberal construction of the letter of the treaty in their favour.
♦Board of Inquiry appointed.♦
Meetings were convened in most parts of England to express the indignation of the people at the convention, and call for the punishment of those by whom it had been negotiated. The Common Council presented an address to the same purport, and were told in reply that it was inconsistent with the principles of British justice to pronounce judgement without previous investigation, and that their interposition was not necessary for inducing the King to institute a due inquiry into a transaction which had disappointed the hopes and expectations of the nation. Accordingly the three Generals were recalled, and a Board of Inquiry was appointed, composed of the Earl of Moira, General Craig, Lord Heathfield, the Earl of Pembroke, Sir George Nugent, and Lieutenant-General Nicolls, with Sir David Dundas for president. Their decision, after a long and full investigation, was, that they could not pronounce, with confidence, whether the victory of Vimeiro ought to have been pursued or not; but, considering the extraordinary circumstances under which two new commanders arrived from the ocean, and joined the army, (the one during, and the other immediately after the battle, and these successively superseding each other, and both the original commander, within the space of twenty-four hours,) it was not surprising that the army was not carried forward until the second day after the action, from the necessity of the generals’ being acquainted with the actual state of things, and proceeding accordingly. On a consideration of all circumstances, they were of opinion, that no farther proceeding was necessary; and, however some of them might differ respecting the fitness of the convention, it was their unanimous declaration, that unquestionable zeal and firmness had been exhibited by all the three generals.
As this was, in fact, delivering no opinion at all, the board was called upon, by the Duke of York, as commander-in-chief, to resume its consideration of the armistice and convention, and pronounce decidedly whether they thought them adviseable. The armistice was disapproved by Earl Moira; the convention by the same nobleman, by the Earl of Pembroke, and General Nicolls: thus, six of the seven members approved the armistice, and four approved the convention. The dissentient members delivered in their reasons for the opinion which they gave. General Nicolls and Earl Pembroke confined themselves to a military point of view. Earl Moira took a wider scope, and argued ably against the moral and political effects of the treaty. The proceedings ♦Jan. 18, 1809.♦ were concluded by a declaration from the King, adopting the unanimous opinion of the board, that no farther proceeding was necessary; but expressing his disapprobation of those articles of the convention in which stipulations were made, directly affecting the interests or feelings of the Spanish and Portugueze nations. That disapprobation his Majesty had signified to Sir Hew Dalrymple when the treaty was first laid before him, and he repeated it, deeming it necessary that his sentiments should be clearly understood, as to the impropriety and danger of the unauthorised admission, into military conventions, of articles of such a description. Nor could he forbear observing, that Sir Hew’s delaying to transmit the armistice concluded on the 22d of August, till the 4th of September, when the ratified convention was transmitted at the same time, was calculated to produce great public inconvenience, and that such inconvenience had, in fact, resulted therefrom. The King abstained from any observations upon other parts of the convention.
Thus the whole censure fell upon Sir Hew Dalrymple. But it was seen by the people that the great error of judgement had been committed at home, in not providing that the General by whom the campaign was planned should carry it to the end. And how often may it be observed in history, as in private life, that the course of events is better directed to the end desired, than if the persons most interested in the success could themselves have ordered it! So it was in this campaign, which at the time so severely disappointed the nation. A more splendid triumph might have been obtained in the field, a higher tone might have been taken in the negotiation; but in either of these cases Almeida and Elvas would have been left in possession of the enemy; and whatever efforts might have been made for reducing them, they could easily have held out till the dispersion of the Spanish armies. It would then have been a great object with the French to relieve the garrisons, and this would have brought them to Lisbon at a time when there were neither preparations nor means for resistance there.
CHAPTER XII.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA. OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA. EMBARRASSMENTS AND MOVEMENTS OF THE SPANISH ARMIES. ESCAPE OF THE SPANISH TROOPS FROM DENMARK.