These overtures were made in the customary diplomatic forms; but they were accompanied by a joint letter from the Emperors of France and Russia to the King of England. Having been brought together at Erfurth by the circumstances of the continent, their first thought, they said, had been to yield to the wishes and wants ♦Oct. 12.♦ of every people, and to seek, in a speedy pacification, the remedy for the common miseries of Europe. The long and bloody continental war was at an end, and could not possibly be renewed. Many changes had taken place, many states had been overthrown. The cause was to be found in the evils arising from the stagnation of maritime commerce. Still greater changes might yet occur, and all of them contrary to the policy of the English nation. Peace was their interest, as well as the interest of the continent. We unite, therefore, said they, in intreating your Majesty to listen to the voice of humanity, silencing that of the passions; to seek, with the intention of arriving at that object, how to conciliate all interests, and by that means to preserve the powers which still exist; and to insure the happiness of Europe, and of this generation, at the head of which Providence has placed us. The official notes stated, that Russian plenipotentiaries would be sent to Paris, there to receive the answer of England; and that French plenipotentiaries would repair to any city on the continent, to which the King of Great Britain and his allies should send theirs. It was added, that the King of England must, without doubt, feel the grandeur and sincerity of this conduct on the part of the two Emperors; that their union was beyond the reach of change; and that it was formed for peace as well as for war.
♦Reply to the Russian minister.
In answer to the Russian minister, it was stated, that however desirous his Majesty might be to reply directly to the Emperor Alexander, the unusual manner in which his letter was drawn up deprived it entirely of the character of a private and personal communication, and it was impossible to adopt that mark of respect towards him, without, at the same time, recognizing titles which the King of England never had acknowledged. This was a needless demurral. We had sent ministers to treat with Buonaparte since he had been Emperor of France, ... surely this was, to all intents, an effectual recognition of his title. It was weakening the moral strength of our cause, to rest, even for a moment, upon a point of punctilio. In every other respect, the correspondence on the part of England was worthy of the cause. An immediate assurance that France acknowledged the government of Spain as party to any negotiation, was declared to be absolutely necessary: that such was the intention of the Emperor of Russia, it was added, his Majesty could not doubt. He recollected the lively interest which that Emperor had always manifested for the dignity and welfare of the Spanish monarchy, and wanted no other assurance that he could not have been induced to sanction, by his concurrence, or by his approbation, usurpations, the principles of which were not less unjust than their example was dangerous to all lawful sovereigns.
♦Reply to the overtures.♦
The letter of the two Emperors was fully and most ably answered in an official note. The King’s readiness and desire to negotiate a peace on terms consistent with his own honour, and with the permanent security of Europe, were again declared. If the condition of the continent were one of agitation and of wretchedness, if many states had been overthrown, and many more were still menaced with subversion, it was a consolation to the King to reflect, that no part of those convulsions could be in any degree imputable to him. Most willing was he to acknowledge that all such dreadful changes were indeed contrary to the policy of Great Britain. And if the cause of so much misery was to be found in the stagnation of commercial intercourse, although he could not be expected to hear with unqualified regret that the system devised for the destruction of the commerce of his subjects had recoiled upon its authors or its instruments, yet it was neither in his disposition, nor in the character of the people over whom he reigned, to rejoice in the privations and unhappiness even of the nations which were combined against him. He anxiously desired the termination of the sufferings of the continent. The war in which he was engaged was entered into for the immediate object of national safety; but, in its progress, new obligations had been imposed upon him, in behalf of powers whom the aggressions of a common enemy had compelled to make common cause with him, or who had solicited his assistance and support in the vindication of their national independence. The interests of Portugal and of Sicily were confided to his friendship and protection; and he was connected for peace, as well as for war, with the King of Sweden. To Spain he was not yet bound by any formal instrument, but he had, in the face of the world, contracted with that nation engagements not less sacred, and not less binding upon his mind than the most solemn treaties. He therefore assumed, that, in an overture made to him for entering into negotiations for a general peace, his relations subsisting with the Spanish monarchy had been distinctly taken into consideration, and that the government acting in the name of his Catholic Majesty, Ferdinand VII., was understood to be a party to any negotiation in which he was invited to engage.
♦Reply of the Russian and French ministers. Nov. 8.♦
The answer of the Russian minister was, that the admission of the sovereigns in alliance with England could not be a point of any difficulty; but this principle by no means extended to the necessity of admitting the plenipotentiaries of the Spanish insurgents, and the Emperor Alexander could not admit them. He had already acknowledged King Joseph Napoleon; he was united with the Emperor of the French; and he was resolved not to separate his interests from those of that monarch. But Count Romanzoff added, he saw, with pleasure, that, in this difference of opinion respecting the Spaniards, there was nothing which could either prevent or delay the opening of a congress; because his Britannic Majesty had himself admitted, that he was bound to no positive engagement with those who had taken up arms in Spain. Count Romanzoff did not intend to insult a British King, by telling him he might violate his word and honour, because he was not bound to keep them by any formal instrument; ... but M. Champagny’s reply was intentionally insulting. “How,” said he, “is it possible for the French government to entertain the proposal which has been made to it, of admitting the Spanish insurgents to the negotiation? What would the English government have said, had it been proposed to them to admit the Catholic insurgents of Ireland? France, without having any treaties with them, has been in communication with them, has made them promises, and has frequently sent them succours.” The writer did not perceive what warning this utterly irrelevant argument held out to the disaffected in Ireland, by thus plainly informing them, that however Buonaparte might promise them support, he was at all times ready to abandon them, whenever it might suit his views. Menacing language was then introduced. England, we were told, would find herself under a strange mistake, if, contrary to the experience of the past, she still entertained the idea of contending successfully, upon the continent, against the armies of France. What hope could she have, especially when France was irrevocably united with Russia? France and Russia could carry on the war till the court of London recurred to just and equitable dispositions; they were resolved to do so; and the English were admonished not to lose sight of the inevitable results of the force of states.
♦Dec. 9.