♦Condition of the troops.
The troops were now mustered, and it was then perceived what they had lost in number, and how severely they had suffered during this fearful retreat. From 6000 to 7000 infantry, and about 1500 cavalry, were all that could be brought together; men and horses alike exhausted by fatigue and hunger; many indeed had fallen and perished by the way. Here for the first time they found something like relief, great numbers not having tasted bread for eight days: they had now sufficient food, and there was cloth enough in the manufactory there to supply every man with a poncho, the rude garment of the Indians about Buenos Ayres, which the Spaniards have adopted for its simplicity and convenience. Meantime the French were collecting in their neighbourhood; they occupied Alcala and the adjoining villages, and some skirmishes took place at Meca. Buonaparte had been informed of their movements, and as soon as Madrid capitulated, Bessieres was dispatched to Guadalaxara with a considerable force of horse, and Victor followed with infantry. The first business of Lapeña was to disencumber himself of his superfluous artillery, for they had brought off no fewer than sixty pieces of cannon. Forty of these, to preserve them from the enemy, were sent across the Tagus at Sacedon, and these were safely forwarded to Carthagena. The van, under Venegas, which had saved the army at Buvierca, arrived on the night of the 4th. Its losses had been replaced by drafts; the post of honour and of danger had been assigned it during the whole of this retreat, and it continued to cover the movements of the other divisions. Two of them were leaving Guadalaxara when it arrived, the second and third followed the next noon, in two columns, proceeding by two roads to Santorcaz: this division began to follow them, but before it was out of one gate, the advanced guard of the enemy entered at another.
♦They retire towards the Tagus.♦
Venegas perceived the importance of a position to the south of the city, lying directly between the two roads to Santorcaz, and he immediately, occupied it. The battalions (tercios) of Ledesma and Salamanca, which formed the rear of the third division, perceived his intention, and turned back and joined him; their commanding officers, D. Luis de Lacy and D. Alexandre de Hore, being ambitious of bearing part in the action which they expected. The French were in great force opposite on the right bank of the Henares; some of their detachments forded both on the right and left of the Spaniards’ position; but light troops had been stationed on both the flanks, who skirmished with them, and repelled them till night. The position was judged too formidable in front to be attacked, and the main body of the French halted during the whole evening, not choosing to cross the river. Having thus obtained time for the army to perform its march, which was all he hoped or wanted, Venegas broke up three hours after the darkness had closed, and continued his retreat in good order without the loss of a single man. The Commander now took up a position at Santorcaz, a little village about two leagues east of Alcala, between the rivers Henares and Tajuna. There he learnt the fate of Madrid. The French now evacuated Alcala, and extended themselves along the heights at the back of Meca, and along the banks of the Jarama, pushing their advanced parties to Arganda, Morata, and other places in that neighbourhood. The plan of Lapeña and his officers under these circumstances was, to cross the Tagus at Aranjuez, and take shelter, if necessary, among the mountains of Toledo. With this intent they marched to Villarejo de Salvanes. A few poor soldiers, who dropped behind at Nuevo-Bastan, were sabred by the French with that cruelty which at this time so frequently characterised and disgraced their armies.
♦Passage of the Tagus.♦
On the 6th, when they were about to proceed to Aranjuez, tidings came that the French were in possession of that place, and this was confirmed by an express from General Llamas, who had vainly attempted to resist the enemy there with a few armed peasantry, and a few soldiers who had escaped from Madrid. New difficulties now presented themselves to the remnant of this harassed army. To look towards Toledo was become hopeless: it was equally hopeless to make for Andalusia, for the French General, Ruffin, as soon as he had obtained possession of Aranjuez, crossed the Tagus, and, pushing on as far as Ocaña, cut off their retreat in that direction. Nothing remained but to cross the Tagus by boats at Villamanrique, Fuenteduenas, Estramera, and other places where there were ferries, and make for the Sierras of Cuenca. There it was hoped they might be able to rest, rally the stragglers, and again unite in numbers sufficient to take vengeance for all their sufferings. Hazardous as it was to cross the river in this manner, with an enemy so near at hand, it was effected with rare good fortune; the French had not foreseen the attempt, and not a man nor a gun was lost. Having gained the left bank of the river, they hastened on their retreat, and head-quarters were established on the 7th at Belinchon. The second division, under General Grimanest, which crossed at Villamanrique, was the only one which was endangered. This having effected the passage, took up a position at Santa Cruz, between Aranjuez and Ucles, where it was attacked on the night of the 8th by a corps of Bessieres’ division, under General Montbrun. Finding themselves unable to maintain the position against a force which was superior to their own, they abandoned it before they sustained any loss.
♦Some of the troops mutiny.♦
The first and fourth divisions mutinied on their march to Yedra, where they were to be stationed. This was ascribed to the intrigues of some traitorous agents, as well as to the unprincipled ambition of a few officers, desirous, in these times of insubordination, to exalt themselves by flattering the soldiers and slandering their commanders. It was easy to inflame the men, who imputed all their misfortunes to treason, and were already in a state of great insubordination. They insisted upon marching to Madrid, that they might attack the enemy there; an artillery officer was at their head; and the guns were planted to prevent the troops from proceeding in the direction where they had been ordered. A difference of opinion among themselves prevented the execution of this mad purpose; some were for hastening to Despeñaperros, to take their post in the passes of the Sierra Morena for the defence of Andalusia. This afforded opportunity for the General to reason with them, and pacify them for a while. In consequence of this circumstance, the difficulty which daily increased of subsisting the troops, their increasing wants, and the rapid desertions which were naturally occasioned by privations, want of hope, and total relaxation of discipline, Lapeña assembled his general officers at Alcazar de Huete. The Duque del Infantado, and Llamas, who had joined them at Villarejo, were present at this council, and it was determined, on Lapeña’s proposal, that the ♦Infantado chosen commander. Dec. 9.♦ Duque should take the command. One reason for appointing him was, that he was president of the Council of Castille, and in that character was entitled to require provisions and all things necessary from the people, ... such being the respect paid to the old authorities and established forms, even at a time when necessity might have superseded all laws, as paramount to all.
♦They retire to Cuenca.♦