If, however, Mr. Frere said, this view of the subject should not appear sufficiently clear or conclusive to the Commander-in-chief, to induce him to take this step, which he, the Ambassador, was well convinced would meet with the approbation of his Majesty’s government, he would venture to recommend retaining the position of Astorga. A retreat from thence to Coruña (as far, said he, as an unmilitary man may be allowed to judge of a country which he has travelled over) would be less difficult than through Portugal to Lisbon; and we ought in that position to wait for the reinforcements of cavalry from England: the army would thus be enabled to act in the flat country, which opens immediately from that point, and extends through the whole of Leon and Old Castille.... Before this letter arrived, the General’s resolution had been taken, in consequence of the news of Castaños’s defeat. It was not shaken by the reasoning of the Ambassador, whose opinion he had asked, and he waited only for the junction of General Hope, to commence his retreat on Portugal.
♦1808.
December.
The Junta had wished it had been possible for Sir John Moore to have conferred personally with them at Aranjuez, or with the military council at Madrid, and he himself had formed the same wish, believing that unless prompt and efficacious measures were taken, the defeat of the Spanish armies and the ruin of their cause were inevitable. But as this could not be, the Captain-General of Granada, with another officer, selected for his reputation and military experience, were deputed to consult with him at Salamanca. These Generals, in representing the resources of the Spaniards, enumerated the force under San Juan, and relied upon the pass of Somosierra; but Colonel Graham had just arrived before them with news that the pass had been won; and Sir John considered them personally as weak old men, and officially as having no information upon which any plan could be concerted. Mistaking, as he did, the spirit of the nation, and undervaluing its strength, he gave no ear to their urgent desire that he would form a junction with Romana, and thereby draw off the enemy from Madrid, nor to their declaration that his retreat, if he persisted in that intention, would immediately occasion the destruction of Spain.
♦Morla and the Military Junta urge him to advance.♦
On the 5th of December, a dispatch arrived from Castelfranco and Morla, informing him that about 25,000 men, of the central army, were falling back on Madrid; that 10,000 from Somosierra were coming thither; and that nearly 40,000 would join them. With that number of troops, the French army, which had presented itself, was not to be feared. But the Junta, apprehending an increase of the hostile forces, hoped he would be able to unite with their army, or fall on the rear of the enemy; and they did not doubt that the rapidity of his movements would be such as the interests of both countries required. This letter was written on the second, and the men who signed it had then determined to betray their country, ... but though they might have wished and designed to draw on the British army to its destruction, the proposal that it should advance came not from them alone, but from the civil and military Junta also, and was such as true Spaniards would have given. While Sir John was considering this letter, Colonel Charmilly, a French emigrant in the British service, and denizened in England, arrived, with dispatches from Mr. Frere. Colonel Charmilly was in Madrid on the night of the first, when the inhabitants were working by torch-light at the trenches, breaking up the streets, and barricading the houses. He had seen the Duque del Infantado, who told him there were provisions and ammunition in Madrid; that more than 30,000 men had that day enlisted themselves as volunteers; and that it was of material importance to the common cause that the British commander should make a diversion, which would compel the French to divide their forces, and thus afford some relief to Madrid. This he requested Charmilly to communicate to Sir John Moore, as he himself had been an eye-witness of the spirit of the people, and the preparations which they were making for resistance. By another Grandee he was requested to say to Sir John Moore, that he must make use of this moment to save Spain, by making conditions with the Junta for a better government; but especially that he should require the Spanish army to be put under the orders of the British Commander-in-chief for the time being, as it had been under Lord Peterborough.
♦Col. Charmilly sent to Sir John Moore by the Duque del Infantado and Mr. Frere.♦
When Charmilly reached Talavera, on his way, he found that Mr. Frere had just arrived there, following the Central Junta, who were retiring from Aranjuez to Badajoz. To him he communicated what had passed with the Duque del Infantado; and the Ambassador requested him, as a colonel in the British service, to take charge of a letter to Sir John Moore, urging him to suspend his retreat, as a measure which would have the worst effect upon the Spanish cause, and be of the greatest injury both to Spain and England. But thinking that, having begun the retreat, Sir John might suppose himself engaged to go on with it, Mr. Frere entrusted Colonel Charmilly with a second letter, to be delivered in case the General persisted in his determination. The purport of this letter was to request that the bearer might be examined before a council of war; and the reason for this measure was, that the decision of a council of war would exonerate the Commander-in-chief from the responsibility by which he might otherwise feel himself fettered. Charmilly reached Salamanca while Sir John was deliberating upon the dispatch from Morla and Castelfranco. He delivered the Ambassador’s first letter. The state of Madrid, Mr. Frere said, so much exceeded every thing which he had ventured to say of the spirit and resolution of the people, that he could not forbear representing to the General, in the strongest manner, the propriety, not to say the necessity, of supporting the Spanish people by all the means which had been entrusted to him for that purpose. “I have no hesitation,” he added, “in taking upon myself any degree of responsibility which may attach itself to this advice, as I consider the fate of Spain as depending absolutely, for the present, upon the decision which you may adopt. I say, for the present; for such is the spirit and character of the country, that, even if abandoned by the British, I should by no means despair of their ultimate success.” Having read this letter, and heard Charmilly’s communication, Sir John Moore gave him no reason to suppose that the intention of retreating would be given up. He retired, however, to reflect upon what he had heard. His instructions directed him to receive the representations both of the Spanish government and the British Ambassador with the utmost deference and attention: ... both deprecated his retreat. Charmilly had been an eye-witness of the preparations which were making in Madrid, and accounts confirming his report came from various quarters. He was persuaded that a great improvement in the public affairs had taken place, and that it was not becoming him to fly at such a time; and he wrote, that night, to Sir David Baird, telling him to suspend his retrograde march till he heard again, and to make arrangements for returning to Astorga, should it be necessary.
♦Sir John Moore resolves to advance.♦
Still the rooted feeling of his heart was despondency. In this very letter he expressed his fear that the spirit of resistance had arisen too late, and that the French were now too strong to be resisted in that manner. All this, he said, appeared to him very strange and unsteady; yet if the spirit of enthusiasm did arise, and the people would be martyrs, there was no saying, in that case, what a British force might do. In the morning he wrote a second letter, ordering Sir David to return to Astorga. “We must be at hand,” said he, “to aid and take advantage of whatever happens. The wishes of our country and our duty demand this of us, with whatever risk it may be attended.” But he added, “I mean to proceed bridle in hand; for if the bubble bursts, and Madrid falls, we shall have a run for it.” These were ominous words. It was apparent that he had no confidence in the patriotism of the Spaniards, nor in his own means of resisting the French, however strong the country; it was apparent also, that, while these impressions weighed upon him, he looked on with apprehension to the opinion of the English public, and that in deference to that opinion he was sacrificing his own.