The Duke had acquired some reputation in the former war with France when serving as Colonel of a regiment which he had raised himself. He had now given the highest proof of devotion to his country, in accepting a command under circumstances which rendered success absolutely impossible, and yet where any disaster would compromise his reputation, and expose him to the suspicion and fury of his own soldiers. In endeavouring to restore order among the troops, and to obtain food and clothing for them, he was indefatigable; no man could have exerted himself with greater activity and zeal. The condition of his army indeed, officers as well as men, was pitiable. The military chest having been taken to Zaragoza, they were without pay; and a great proportion of those who had endured the fatigue and sufferings of the retreat were now sinking under the effects. They lay upon straw, half-naked, in that severe season, and in the keen climate of that high country, ... hundreds were perishing thus. The Duke established hospitals, collected beds from the city and from all the places within reach, appointed officers to the sole charge of seeing that the sick were supplied, and ordered the friars to attend upon them. His authority was exerted as far as it would extend, and when that failed, he begged for their support. These exertions were not without effect; the progress of disease was ♦Infantado, 42–44.♦ stopped, men and stores were obtained, subordination was restored, and with little efficient strength there was the appearance as well as the name of an army.
♦Dreams of offensive operations.♦
The Spaniards were not sensible how low they had fallen as a military people. Remembering what they had been, no lessons, however severe, could make them see themselves as they were; and this error was not confined to the multitude; it was partaken by all ranks, and seemed, indeed, inherent in the national character. It was an error which exposed their armies always to defeat, and yet as a nation rendered them invincible; ... the French could have invaded no people whom it would have been so easy to rout, none whom it was so impossible to subdue. Infantado had his full share of this delusion; he planned extensive and combined operations, such as required good troops, intelligent officers, and ready means; ... he thought of relieving Zaragoza, ... of recovering Madrid; or of pursuing the left wing of that army which was then employed against the English; ... and this with men and leaders whose incapacity was manifest upon every occasion. Upon intelligence that about 1500 French cavalry were scouring the country on both sides of the Tagus, and plundering great part of the provinces of Cuenca and La Mancha, he concerted a scheme for surprising them at Aranjuez and ♦Movement against the French at Tarancon frustrated.♦ Tarancon, sending Venegas with 4000 foot and 800 horse to attack them in the latter place, while D. Antonio de Senra, with an equal force of foot and 1000 horse, was to fall upon Aranjuez, overcome the enemy there, and intercept those who would retreat thither in their endeavour to escape from Tarancon. The attempt failed, wholly through mismanagement. Senra stopped short at El Horcajo, in fear of a detachment of French cavalry at Villanueva del Cardete, though that force had been calculated upon in the combinations of Infantado. The division with Venegas lost their way in the night and the snow; some went in one direction, some in another, ... the cavalry who were thus separated had no directions how to act; and the infantry, instead of surprising the enemy in Tarancon, were themselves surprised ♦Infantado, 45–55.♦ by them. There were, however, some good troops among them, who stood firm, and the ♦Dec. 25.♦ French, being very inferior in number, retreated with some loss to Aranjuez.
♦Venegas falls back from Tarancon to Ucles.♦
This failure had the ill effect of creating discord among the Spaniards. Infantado blamed the commanders; they reproached the officers under them; and both were willing to excuse themselves by supposing that what had failed in the execution had been planned unskilfully. Yet, as some advantage had been gained, the Duke resolved to pursue it.... The left bank being now cleared as far as Aranjuez, he hoped to take possession of that point and of Ocaña, and as in that rainy season the Tagus was nowhere fordable, his purpose was to remove the boats, break down the bridges, and place himself at Toledo. Venegas therefore was ordered to canton his troops in Tarancon, Ucles, and the neighbouring villages, preparatory to this movement, and his force was increased to 8000 foot and 1900 horse, ... the commander-in-chief retaining with himself about 10,000, of whom a third part were without arms, and a considerable number otherwise unfit for service. This ♦1809.♦ was their position at the beginning of the year. Of what was passing in other parts they were ill-informed, and the false reports which abound in such times were always on the favourable side. They believed the French in Madrid were in hourly fear that this army would appear before the capital; and that Romana had entirely destroyed the enemy at Guadarama. Some movements, however, on the part of the French about Aranjuez made Venegas resolve to fall back from Tarancon upon Ucles. He apprehended that it was their intention to attack the part of his force which was stationed at this latter place, and he resolved therefore to march his troops thither as a better position than Tarancon, and one where he might cover the army.
♦1809.
January.
Ucles is a decayed town, where the Knights of Santiago had their chief convent in the bright ages of that military order: here their banner was kept which Gregory XI. had blessed, and which the Kings of Spain delivered to every new master on his appointment: hither the knights from all the other provinces resorted when their services were required, and from hence they had set forth for the conquest of Cordoba, and Seville, and Jaen, and Murcia. To a Spaniard of these times it was a melancholy place, for the proud as well as the mournful recollections which it recalled; for here Alonso VI. had lost his only son, in the most disastrous defeat that the Christians had ever suffered from the Moors since the destruction of the kingdom of the Goths. He fell in battle with the Almoravides; and because seven Counts had died bravely in defending the Infante, the African fanatics, in their insolent triumph, called the spot where they fell the Place of the Seven Swine. This ill-omened ground was now to become the scene of an action disgraceful to the Spaniards for the facility with which they were routed, and infamous to the French for the enormous wickedness with which they abused their victory.
Venegas supposed that the French were bringing forces against him across the Tagus, by the ferry at Villamanrique. His danger was from a different quarter. Victor had marched from Toledo against Infantado’s army, knowing as little of the Spaniards’ movements as they did of his, but with such troops, that his only anxiety was to find the enemy, and bring them to action wherever they might be found. Victor himself, with General Ruffin’s division, went by way of Alcazar, and General Villate, taking the direction of Ucles, discovered the Spaniards there on the morning of the 13th. Venegas apprehended an attack on his right, or in the rear; but the French crossed the brook, and fell upon the left wing of the Spaniards, who were stationed upon some high and broken ground, commanding the convent and the town. If the general erred in not strengthening this position, the troops allowed him no time for remedying his error; they retreated precipitately to the town, and when orders came to occupy the convent it was too late; ... the enemy were within the enclosure, and fired from thence, as under cover of a parapet. The panic presently spread, the raw levies disordered those who would have done their duty, and many officers made a brave but vain sacrifice of their own lives in endeavouring to rally and encourage the men. The fugitives in one direction came upon the enemy’s artillery, under General Cenarmont, and were cut down with grape-shot; in another they fell in with Victor and the remaining part of the French army. One body, under D. Pedro Agustin Giron, seeing that all was lost, made their way desperately through the enemy in good order, and got to Carrascosa, where they found the Duke. It was a series of errors on the part of the Spaniards, and the consequences were as disastrous as they could be. The French boasted of having taken 300 officers and 12,000 men, ... the whole force, however, which Venegas had with him did not amount to this, but the loss was very great. The prisoners were marched to ♦Rocca, p. 79.♦ Madrid, and such as fell by the way from hunger and exhaustion were shot by their inhuman captors.
♦Cruelties committed there by the French.♦