If severe measures could have restored discipline, they were not wanting; and they were used with such effect as for a time to stop desertion. ♦Reforms in the Spanish army.♦ One essential reform was introduced. All the infantry officers were till this time mounted, and this practice occasioned a great consumption of forage when forage could hardly be obtained for the cavalry; it led also to these farther inconveniences, that the march of the columns was never conducted as it ought, for want of the immediate presence and attention of the officers; and that in case of retreat the mounted officer had a facility for expediting his escape which might operate as a dangerous temptation upon such officers in such times. No general could have ventured upon this needful reformation without drawing upon himself the ill-will of those whom it affected; the Junta, however, sent orders that no person in the infantry under the rank of major (except the adjutant) should be allowed a horse. This was done by British advice; and if there had been no more jealousy of the British in inferior agents than existed in the Central Junta, the cordial co-operation of the two nations would have met with no obstruction.
♦The Duque de Alburquerque.♦
The most efficient arm of Cartaojal’s force was the cavalry. It had been under the Marquez de Palacios, who had the reputation of being the best cavalry officer in Spain, and was at this time commanded by the Duque de Alburquerque, D. Jose Maria de la Cueva. This nobleman, then in his thirty-fifth year, united in his own person many of those names which are most illustrious in Spanish history, and he had inherited also in no diminished portion the best and noblest qualities of that proud ancestry. His education had been neglected, so that his mind was not stored like Romana’s, neither was it equally under self-government. But his military talents were such as to impress upon all who knew him the belief that if experience and opportunity had been afforded, he would have ranked among the great captains of the age: for he was ardent without being incautious, capable alike of planning with clear forethought and executing with celerity, far-sighted, prompt in decision, and above all endowed with that true and rare nobility of soul which is essential to true greatness.
♦He proposes offensive operations.♦
A man of this stamp wins the love of the soldiery as certainly as he obtains their confidence. Hope became their ruling passion when Alburquerque was present; and their success in some enterprises, and the skill with which their commander baffled the movements of the enemy in others, gave the fairest prospect of success if the system of enterprise were persevered in. In pursuance of that system, and with the intention of making a diversion in favour of Cuesta, against whom there was reason to believe that the French were preparing a serious attack, the Duke proposed to advance upon Toledo, where they had 4000 foot and 1500 horse, with 12,000 or 15,000 infantry, 4000 horse, and twenty pieces of horse artillery; and perceiving but too well that his reputation and popularity were regarded with jealous eyes, he advised that the expedition should be not under his own command, but that of a superior officer; and he represented to Cartaojal that the object of forming and disciplining the raw troops would be carried on more certainly and securely while that part of the army which was fit for service occupied the enemy by harassing and keeping them on the alarm. The plan was too bold for one of Cartaojal’s temper; he saw the necessity of training the army, and did not consider that enterprise is the best training, and the only, that can be carried on within reach of an active enemy. He ordered him, however, to advance with 2000 horse and four pieces of artillery; and the Duke felt that, as an attempt made with such a force could only end in a precipitate retreat, the intention must be to wreck his reputation by exposing him to certain failure.
♦They are undertaken when too late.♦
His representations, however, to the Junta were so well seconded, that instructions came for advancing upon Toledo with all the disposable force of the army. But when Cartaojal communicated this to the Duke, he ordered him to deliver up the command of the vanguard to D. Juan Bernuy, and march himself immediately with Bassecourt’s and Echavarri’s divisions of 3500 men and 200 cavalry for Guadalupe, to reinforce Cuesta. It was sufficiently mortifying ♦The Duke sent to join Cuesta.♦ for the Duke to be removed from the cavalry which had acquired credit and confidence while he was at their head, and this too at the moment when the measure which he had so strenuously urged was about to be undertaken; but it was more painful to know that the attempt had been delayed till there was no longer any reasonable prospect of success. With the little body of new-raised infantry which was now placed under his command he began his march for Extremadura, and the ill-fated army of La Carolina commenced its operations at a moment when it was thus deprived of the only General who possessed its confidence.
♦Cartaojal advances against the French.♦
The head-quarters of that army were at Ciudad Real, the cavalry occupying a line from Manzanares to that city through Damiel, Torralva, and Carrion, and the infantry in the towns to the left and in the rear of Valdepenas. Cartaojal thought this a most advantageous position, having the Sierra Morena behind him as a sure refuge if he were defeated, whereas the enemy, were they to be repulsed in an attack, would be exposed in the open plains, and have to cross the Zeucara and the Guadiana in their flight. Having advanced to Yebenes, and found the French ready to advance themselves, Cartaojal retreated upon Consuegra; that place, to his surprise, was occupied by the enemy in great strength: he fell back, therefore, to his former position, in the advantage of which he trusted, ... and there, eight and forty hours after he had commenced this useless and harassing movement, the French appeared in pursuit, drove in his cavalry, and prepared to attack him in force on the following morning. They were commanded by General Sebastiani, who had superseded Marshal Lefebvre. The action which ♦Rout of the Carolina army at Ciudad Real.♦ ensued is, even upon their own accounts, disgraceful to both parties; to the Spaniards, because ♦March 17.♦ they were successively driven from every point where they attempted to stand, and pursued to the entrance of the Sierra; to the conquerors, because Sebastiani stated in his official report that the Spaniards fled on the first charge without resistance, and that he had sabred more than 3000 of them in their flight. Eighteen pieces of cannon, and 4000 prisoners, including nearly 200 officers, were, according to the same report, taken. The fugitives felt a confidence in the Sierra which they had not done in their General, and collected in considerable numbers at Despeñaperros, Venta Quemada, and Montizon; head-quarters were established in the village of S. Elena, two leagues in advance of Carolina, and the French, without pursuing them into the mountains, halted at Santa Cruz, awaiting there the success of Victor’s operations against Cuesta.
♦Operations of Marshal Victor.♦