The Junta replied, not to this traitor himself, but to Cuesta. “They had not forgotten,” they said, “the character with which they were invested, and the oath which they had taken, in unison with the wishes of the nation. If Sotelo were the bearer of powers sufficiently extensive to treat for the restitution of their King, and for the immediate evacuation of the Spanish territory by the French troops, let him publish them in the usual form, and they would be announced to the allies of Spain. The Junta had no authority to listen to any treaty, or terminate any transaction, which was not founded on the basis of eternal justice. Any other principle of negotiation, without benefiting the empire, would only tend to degrade the Junta, which had entered into the most awful engagements to bury itself beneath the ruins of the monarchy, rather than sanction any proposition which should diminish the honour and independence of the Spanish people.” This answer they desired Cuesta to transmit to the Intruder’s agent, and they published the proposal and the reply. Perceiving, however, of what importance the safety of the government was to the national cause, and the danger therefore of associating it in the minds of the people with any particular place of residence, in times when no place was secure, they published a decree upon this subject. It began by an avowal, that in their anxiety to provide immediate remedy for the calamities which had befallen the armies of La Mancha and ♦April 18.♦ Extremadura, they had imprudently hazarded their own safety by remaining at Seville. But having provided for the reinforcement and equipment of the troops, and furnished all the supplies which were requisite for the defence of Andalusia, they had in cool consideration reflected, that their security was inseparable from that of the state; that the preserval of the deposit of the sovereignty entrusted into their hands was the first of their obligations; and that they could not again expose it to the danger of being destroyed, without doing wrong to the nation which had confided it to them. The Speed with which the tyrant of Europe advanced against Madrid in November, and sent troops towards Aranjuez, made it apparent that a principal object of his policy was to strike a blow at the government, and, seizing the body which administered it, cut all the bonds of political association, and thus throw the nation into confusion. These were still his objects: trusting more to his cunning than his force, he still pursued the government, hoping to get its members in his power, and then renew the infamous scenes of Bayonne, by compelling them to authorize his usurpation, or sacrificing them to his rage if they resisted his seductions and his menaces. Thus to degrade the government in the eyes of the nation itself would, he thought, be the best means of degrading the nation also, and reducing it to that servitude, which, in the insolence of his fortune, this tyrant designed to inflict upon Spain. To frustrate these aims, they decreed, that, whenever the place of their residence might be threatened, or when any other reason should convince them of the utility of so doing, they would transfer the seat of government elsewhere, where they might preserve the august deposit of the sovereignty, and watch over the defence, the well-being, and the prosperity of the nation. And they declared, that, whatever the accidents of the war might be, the Junta would never abandon the continent of Spain, while a single spot could be found in it where they could establish themselves for defending the country against the force and fraud of its perfidious enemy, as they had solemnly sworn to do.
♦Measures for securing Badajoz.♦
When the news of Cuesta’s defeat at Medellin reached Paris, it was affirmed in the Moniteur, that by this battle Seville was laid open to the French armies, and that probably by that time Lisbon also was once more in their possession, ... so confident was the French government of speedy and complete success. In the same confidence, and with the hope of subduing the spirit of the Aragoneze, the French Governor of Zaragoza ordered mass to be celebrated in the Church of the Pillar, for the capture of Lisbon and Seville, as events which had taken place. Soult would undoubtedly have advanced upon the Portugueze capital, if he could have relied upon Victor’s movements; but that General found that the battle of Medellin had rather raised the hopes of the Spaniards than depressed them. His views were upon Badajoz. Aware of this, the Government, with that promptitude which characterised all their measures at this crisis, supplied the place with money and arms, and addressed public letters to the Junta of that city and the Governor, reminding them that Zaragoza had held out two months not against the enemy alone, but against hunger and pestilence; and that her defenders would be held in grateful and everlasting remembrance, while the names of those who had so basely delivered up Coruña would be handed down for lasting infamy from generation to generation. To the General, D. Antonio Arce, they said, that true glory was to be gained by overcoming great dangers, and an opportunity for such glory was now afforded him. The Extremadurans were not less brave than the Aragoneze, and Badajoz possessed a defence in her fortifications which had not existed at Zaragoza. The soldier fought with best hope, and sacrificed himself with most alacrity, when he saw his commander set the example; and such an example would not be wanting in one whose ancestors filled a distinguished place in the annals of their country. At all times Extremadura had produced heroes. There had the Pizarros, and there had Cortes been born, to be examples now for their countrymen.
♦A crusade proclaimed there against the invaders.♦
Marshal Victor sent to summon Badajoz, though he was not prepared to lay siege to it; but the pitiable state of the country rendered it always possible that a governor might be found weak enough in principle or in mind to betray his trust. A spirit however such as the time required prevailed there, and the parties which he sent out in that direction were attacked at advantage and driven back with loss. The Junta informed the Government, that, in consideration of the sacrileges which the enemy committed wherever they went, they were enlisting the peasantry under the banner of the Crusade with which the misbelievers in old times had been pursued and conquered. The Government approved this measure, saying that if their forefathers had proclaimed crusades for the recovery of the Holy Land, with much more reason now might they have recourse to the same means for defending their religion in the bosom of their own country against profanations more impious than had been heard of in the darkest ages or among the most barbarous people. And they directed that the persons who should be embodied in these new corps should be distinguished by wearing a red cross on the breast. The Central Junta entertained a thought that this might be extended with good effect; but it did not spread; the feeling and the enthusiasm denoted by such a badge would not have been partaken by the officers, and it might have raised a temper in the men unfavourable to any expected co-operation with their British allies.
♦Regulations concerning the ejected Religioners.♦
Another measure which the Government adopted at this time was intended to lessen the ill effect that the dispersion of so many monks and friars was likely to produce. The same calamities which had set them loose in every part of the country which the enemy had overrun, deprived them also of their accustomed means of subsistence; and it was but too probable that among those who took arms, as was very generally done by those who were able to bear them, the licence of a military life might lead to scandals which on every account it was desirable to prevent. A Junta therefore was formed of persons holding high stations in the different Religious Orders, the Prior of Zamora, who was one of the members of the Government, being appointed President. The business of this Junta was to dispose of those Religioners who, having been driven from their cloisters (the edict said), were crying night and day before the throne of a terrible God to revenge the blood of their innocent brethren, which had so wantonly been shed. They were to be distributed in towns, hospitals, and armies, as they might be deemed most qualified; and the Generals were instructed not to receive any persons of their profession unless they produced credentials or commissions from this board.
♦Plans of the Intrusive Government.♦
Six thousand men had been detached from La Mancha to reinforce Victor after the battle ♦April 9.♦ of Medellin. His instructions were to remain between Merida and Badajoz till he should receive advices of Soult’s movements, and till Lapisse should join him. The Intrusive Government persuaded themselves that the struggle would soon be over, and Joseph waited only to hear from Marshal Ney of the total destruction of Romana’s army, to give orders for marching against Valencia. But the tide had now turned in Galicia; there came no intelligence from Ney but what was disastrous; and Soult could neither communicate with Victor nor with Lapisse, neither could they at this time communicate with each other. Soult’s communication was cut off by Silveira on the Tamega, by Trant on the Vouga, ... and Sir Robert Wilson, by his position at Ciudad Rodrigo, cut off Lapisse equally from co-operating with his countrymen in Portugal or in Extremadura.
♦Sir Robert Wilson’s conduct at Ciudad Rodrigo.♦