Mr. Canning also declared, that considering Sir John Moore’s advance in a military point, in his poor judgement he could not but think it a wise measure; but in every view which ennobles ♦1809.
May.♦ military objects by exalting military character, he was sure it was so. With all its consequences and disasters, he preferred it to a retreat at that time. Of those disasters he would not say a word: the battle of Coruña covered every thing; but the retreat itself, and the precipitancy of it, he could never cease to regret. This single expression was the only hint even of censure as to the conduct of the retreat which was heard in Parliament. In the course of the debate an extraordinary confession was made ♦May 9.♦ by Mr. Canning. “During the whole time,” he said, “that these events were passing, government had no means of arguing from the past: the occasion was without precedent, and such as it was impossible to lay their hand on any period of history to parallel, either from its importance with regard to individuals, to this happy country and to Europe, or the difficulty that arose from there being so little knowledge to guide their steps in the actual scene of their operations. Why should government be ashamed to say they wanted that knowledge of the interior of Spain, which they found no one possessed? With every other part of the continent we had had more intercourse: of the situation of Spain we had every thing to learn.” With what contemptuous satisfaction must Buonaparte and the French politicians have heard such a confession from the British secretary of state for foreign affairs! With whatever feelings the government might make this avowal, it was heard with astonishment by the thoughtful part of the people, and not without indignation. To them it was a mournful thing thus to be told that their rulers laid in no stock of knowledge, but lived, as it were, from hand to mouth, upon what they happened to meet with! Is there a country or a province in Europe, it was asked; is there a European possession in any part of the world, of which the French government does not possess maps, plans, and the most ample accounts of whatever may guide its politics, and facilitate its invasion? Even respecting Spanish America, such a confession would have been disgraceful, because it would have betrayed an inexcusable negligence in seeking for information; but as regarding Spain itself, it became almost incredible. Did there not exist faithful and copious accounts of that kingdom, both by foreign and native writers? Had we not still living, diplomatists who had resided for years at the Spanish court; consuls and merchants who had been domesticated, and almost naturalized in Spain; and travellers who, either for their pleasure, or on their commercial pursuits, had traversed every province and every part of the Peninsula? Was not information always to be found, if it were wisely and[12] perseveringly sought?
The truth was, that though we had means adequate to any emergency, troops equal to any service, and generals worthy to command them, Government had the art of war to learn: it had been forgotten in the cabinet since the days of Marlborough and Godolphin. The minds of men expand with the sphere in which they act, and that of our statesmen had long been deplorably contracted. The nation, contented with its maritime supremacy, hardly considered itself as a military power; and had well nigh acquiesced in what the French insultingly proclaimed, and the enemies of the Government sedulously repeated, that we had ceased to be so. We had been sinking into a feeble, selfish policy, which would have withered the root of our strength; its avowed principle being to fix our attention exclusively upon what were called British objects; in other words, to pursue what was gainful, and be satisfied with present safety, regardless of honour, and of the certain ruin which that regardlessness must bring on. The events in Spain had roused the country from a lethargy which otherwise might have proved fatal; and ministers, as undoubtedly the better ♦1809.♦ part of their opponents would have done had they been then in office, heartily participated the national feeling: but when vigorous measures were required, they found themselves without precedent and without system. They had entered, however, into the contest generously and magnanimously, with a spirit which, if it were sustained, would rectify the errors of inexperience, and work its way through all difficulties.
♦Earl Grey.
Earl Grey took occasion in one of his speeches to notice an opinion, that it was of no consequence by which party the administration of affairs was directed. “How can it,” he asked, “be seriously urged, that it is the same thing whether the government be entrusted to incapable persons, or able statesmen? I am really astonished at the absurd extravagance of the doctrine into which men of general good sense and good intentions have been recently betrayed upon this subject.” But no person had ever pretended that it was the same thing whether the government were administered by weak heads or by wise ones. What had been maintained was, that the party out of place was in no respect better than the party in, and in many respects worse: that they did not possess the slightest superiority in talents; that a comparison of principles was wholly to their disadvantage; and that the language respecting the present contest held, even by those among them whose attachment to the institutions of their country could not be doubted, was such as left no hope for the honour of England if it were committed to their hands. The existing ministry acted upon braver and wiser principles, and, whatever errors they committed in the management of the war, to the latest ages it will be remembered for their praise, that in the worst times they never despaired of a good cause, nor shrunk from any responsibility that the emergency required.
♦Expedition to the Scheldt.♦
An error, and one most grievous in its consequences, they committed at this time, by dividing their force, and sending a great expedition against the Isle of Walcheren, as a diversion in aid of Austria, instead of bringing all their strength to bear upon the Peninsula. It was a wise saying of Charles V. that counsels are to be approved or condemned for their causes, not for their consequences. When the causes which led to this unhappy resolution are considered, it will appear imputable in part to the conduct of the Spanish government, still more to that of the opposition in England. By refusing to put us in possession of Cadiz as a point of retreat and safe depôt, the Spaniards afforded their enemies in England an argument in support of their favourite position, that these allies had no confidence in us. The opposition writers did not fail to urge this as an additional proof that they were unworthy of our assistance; and the impression which they laboured to produce was strengthened by persons whose hearts were with their country, but who thought by heaping obloquy upon the Spaniards, and making their very misfortunes matter of accusation against them, to excuse the manner of Sir John Moore’s retreat. To the effect which had been thus produced on public opinion ministers in some degree deferred. They deferred still more to the pitiful maxim that the British government ought to direct its efforts towards the attainment of what were called purely British objects: now there were ships at Antwerp and at Flushing, and it was deemed a British object to destroy the naval resources of the enemy.
Men in England regarded the commencement of the Austrian war with widely different feelings, each party expecting a result in conformity to its own system of opinions. Those journalists who taught as the first political commandment that Buonaparte was Almighty, and that Europe should have none other Lord but him, as from the commencement of the troubles in Spain they had represented the cause of the Spaniards to be hopeless, so they predicted now that that resistless conqueror was only called a while from his career of conquest in the Peninsula to win new victories upon the Danube, after which he would return to the Guadalquivir and the Tagus, and bear down every thing before him there. Others, who had too sanguinely expected immediate success from the Spaniards, with equal but less excusable credulity rested their hopes now upon Austria, ... there, they said, the battle was to be fought, and the fate of Spain as well as of Germany depended upon the issue. The wiser few looked for little from the continental governments, though they knew that much was possible from the people; but from the beginning of this new contest, it appeared to them important chiefly because it effected a diversion in favour of the Spaniards; especially they hoped that England would seize the opportunity, and by meeting the enemy upon that ground with equal numbers, secure a certain and decisive victory.
♦Troops sent to Portugal.♦