It was part of St. Cyr’s plan that Souham, when he was apprised of the success of these operations, either by the ceasing of the fire, or by any other means, should beat the detachment at Col de S. Cristina, and join him at Villarradoña, when it was hoped that the Spaniards might be driven from all their positions, in utter rout, once more within the walls of Tarragona. To effect this the French commander proceeded with Pino’s division against a body of Spaniards under Brigadier D. Miguel de Iranzo, who occupied ♦Feb. 18.♦ the position of S. Magi. The distance had appeared trifling upon the map: it proved long and difficult, the road during great part of the way being so narrow that the troops, foot as well as horse, could only defile man by man: they did not reach the position till four in the afternoon; the attack lasted till night closed, and the Spaniards then, unable to maintain their ground, retreated under cover of the darkness. Here, however, an unexpected difficulty impeded the conquerors; they were not acquainted with the country, nor had they been able, with all their exertions upon the march, to find any person who could serve them as a guide. From this perplexity they were relieved by a circumstance which would not have occurred if St. Cyr had not deserved and obtained a reputation, most unusual among Buonaparte’s generals in Spain, for observing the humanities of war. A Spanish officer, who had been wounded and taken prisoner in this last affair, relying upon the French commander’s character, entreated that he would let him be carried to Tarragona: St. Cyr not only granted his request, but finding from him that he was able to direct those who bore him, added, that as there were no peasants to be found at S. Magi or in the adjoining parts, he would send him as far as the Convent of the Creus. By this act of compassion the French were extricated from the difficulty in which they had placed themselves. The wounded officer gratefully acknowledged this kindness, little thinking in what manner he was to serve the enemy. On the ♦Feb. 19.♦ morrow accordingly he was sent forward; two or three persons at convenient distances behind observed his way, and the French by their direction followed the unconscious guide. During the whole day they did not fall in with a single person; but in the evening when they drew near the monastery, instead of finding there, as they had expected, good quarters and comfortable stores for the troops, who stood in need of both after four days’ exertions, they discovered that Iranzo had fallen back to this very point, and occupied it in strength. The French immediately saw that the post could not be forced without artillery, and they had none with them; they made, however, a feint of attacking it, with the intention of attempting an escalade, if the Spaniards should betray any want of alacrity in the defence. But the walls of the enclosure, the windows of the buildings, the roof of the church, and the tower, were presently manned; and a fire was opened upon them from two violentos, ... pieces of small artillery, so named from the manner in which they are used; they are fired not less than twelve times in a minute, and the exertion which this requires is so great, that the strongest and most expert artillerymen ♦St. Cyr, 107–111.♦ cannot continue it more than a quarter of an hour.
The French had learnt at Zaragoza what it was to attack the Spaniards where there were walls and buildings to be defended; and St. Cyr was not a man who would throw away the lives of his soldiers. His men, instead of the good quarters and better fare which they had promised themselves, were fain to bivouac upon the heights; and in the morning when the General had determined to cross the Gaya for the purpose of getting into a more open country, and effecting his junction with Souham’s division, they were obliged to defile under a sharp and well-directed fire of musketry from the Convent. When they reached Villarrodoña, to their great disappointment Souham was not there; the dispatches which had been sent to him had been all intercepted, and a day and half were lost in waiting till he arrived from Vendrell. ♦Reding takes the field, and collects his scattered troops.♦ Reding meantime, as soon as he heard that his line had been broken, concluded that nothing now was to be done but to collect as many of the troops as he could, and withdraw them again under the protection of Tarragona; and feeling that this service was of too much importance to be entrusted to any one in whom he had not the most entire confidence, he set out himself on the morning in which St. Cyr marched from his unsuccessful attempt upon the Convent. He took with him only a battalion of Swiss, 300 horse, and six pieces of flying artillery; and as he marched from Pla saw the enemy on his right, where they were employed in sacking and burning Villarrodoña and La Puebla. Reding was not aware that the French Commander-in-chief was with this body of the invaders, nor did St. Cyr know that the Spanish General was passing within sight with such a handful of troops. His force, however, was soon increased with the detachment which had retired from Col de S. Cristina, and with the 1200 men under Iranzo, whom he now recalled. He then proceeded to S. Coloma de Queralt, and there effected his junction with Castro, with the detachment stationed at that place, and with the force which Castro had collected after his defeat. But here he was alarmed by learning that the enemy had entered Valls.
♦He is advised to retreat.♦
St. Cyr on his part was not without some anxiety concerning Reding’s intention. The movement which that General had made from his right upon his centre, led him to apprehend a purpose of re-establishing the line of communication with his left beyond the Noya, in which case the French detachment at Igualada would be in danger. That thought had passed across Reding’s mind. He had supposed that the object of the French, by occupying Valls, was to cut off his retreat to Tarragona, and intercept his communications with that fortress; and his first impulse was to move upon Igualada, and then upon Montbuy, to cut off the enemy at both places. But it was his fate never to decide resolutely and act with promptitude: a council of war was held; the Deputy Veri was for retreating, with the view of covering the plain of Tarragona. Accordingly they set out from S. Coloma, with the intent of leaving Valls on the right. That day they reached Montblanch. A party of French appeared in their rear, reconnoitred them, and then turned by the Col de Cabra toward Pla and Valls. As it was thus made certain that the enemy was observing them, a second council was held on the following morning, at which Marti was present, who had been summoned from Tarragona, where he had been left with the command. The force which Reding had with him consisted at this time of 10,000 men, who were in a better state than any body of troops which the Spaniards had yet brought into the field in that quarter. The question was asked, Where the French were posted, and in what numbers? The General could only answer that they were supposed to be in Valls, and that he estimated them at from 5000 to 6000, without artillery. Marti’s opinion was, that as the object was to save the army and protect the plain of Tarragona, where Reus and the other towns would otherwise be at the mercy of the enemy, it was not advisable to risk an action with a foe whom they knew to be superior in cavalry, and who, they had reason to conclude, had other troops near enough at hand to be brought together and overpower them if a battle should be ventured. He advised, therefore, that a few light troops and Miquelets should make a demonstration by the Col de Lilla against Valls in the morning, and make their way afterwards as they could, either to join the corps on the Llobregat, or to Lerida; ♦Cabañes, c. 15.♦ that their guns should be sent to that fortress, and that the troops should defile during the night by Prades and a mountain path impracticable for artillery to Constanti, where the whole army might be collected safely in a position that would cover the plain.
General Doyle, who, after the most anxious endeavours to effect something for the relief of Zaragoza, had joined the Catalan army that day on its march, was for hope and enterprise. The troops were in good condition and in good heart, and the opportunity favourable, when they were within reach of a force inferior in number. Reding, perplexed by these jarring opinions, and never venturing to decide at once upon his own responsibility, took a middle course. He thought it derogatory to steal as it were away through a mountain path like a guerilla chief; and moreover Marti was one of the persons on whom his suspicions had fixed. The course on which he determined had neither the prospect of advantage, nor the certainty of safety. It was to retreat with his artillery and baggage by the Col de Riba and the banks of the Francoli; to begin the march that evening; not to seek the enemy, but not to refuse battle if a favourable opportunity should be offered. Marti represented that to take this line was not only seeking the enemy, but putting it in their power to bring on an action upon ground advantageous to themselves. But Reding certainly had not come to this determination in the view of bringing on a battle, without incurring the responsibility of such a measure. He suffered some provision carts to be cut off by a reconnoitring party almost under his eyes, without permitting his troops to resent the insult; ... they were tired, he said, and he would not weaken the main body by sending ♦Cabañes, c. 15.♦ out any detachments. Nor could Doyle prevail upon him to make his retreat by day. It was commenced at seven in the evening, in good order and with all possible silence.
♦Battle of Valls.♦
St. Cyr, who was at this time with Pino’s division at Pla, had ordered Souham never to lose sight of Reding’s movements. That General occupied Valls; he had entered it on a market day, and supplied his hungry troops with the corn brought thither from Aragon and the plain of Urgel, as if there had been no enemy to fear! His advanced guard was to the north of that town, having its left upon the Francoli; his right was in the direction of Pla, and he had a post at Picamoxons, the point at which Reding must debouche upon the plain of Valls, if he went either by the valley of Montblanch or the Col de Lilla. At this point Souham’s orders were to give him battle; though some apprehension was entertained that he might pass by the Col de Cabra, with the view of cutting off the French from Barcelona. No such thought had ever entered Reding’s mind[20]. The narrowness of the passes and the badness of the road made the night march slower than had been calculated; at five in the morning, however, the vanguard under Castro and half the centre had passed Valls, leaving the enemy’s camp-fires on the left. They were proceeding ♦Feb. 25.♦ silently and in the best order, and no advanced post of the enemy had yet been discovered, when, as the General was passing a little bridge, a volley of musketry opened upon him within pistol shot. This unexpected attack occasioned a momentary disorder: measures, however, were immediately taken to prevent the enemy from cutting off that half of the army which had not yet come up; the troops took their station with alacrity and precision; the artillery on both sides began to play: the French descended from the heights of Valls in several columns; they were met by the Spaniards, and attacked so vigorously, that notwithstanding the advantage of the ground, they were driven back.
All the information which Reding had previously obtained concerning the enemy agreed in affirming that they had no artillery. It was therefore not without surprise that he had found two batteries open upon him. They had been silenced, however; the Spaniards had behaved even to his wish, and a manifest advantage had been gained. But when the French had been driven to the heights, reinforcements arrived which enabled them to make a stand, and Reding perceived by their smoke-signals and their rockets, that they were communicating with a fresh body of troops. It was now noon; his own men had been marching all night, and having been several hours in action, they began to feel exhausted. He therefore concentrated them, sent off the whole of the baggage, and determined to continue his retreat, as soon as they should have taken food or rest. The position which he had chosen was a good one, behind the bridge of Goy, on the right bank of the Francoli, and covered by that river. But time for rest was not allowed them. Pino’s division had now come up, and St. Cyr himself had arrived. That General, who was desirous of gaining such a victory as should give the French the utmost confidence in what was called their moral superiority, forbade his artillery to fire; though the opportunity for firing with advantage was such, that the commandant feigned not to understand the order, and when after a third discharge it was repeated to him in the most formal manner, expressed the unwillingness with which he obeyed. That of the Spaniards was well served; and when, having crossed the river and ascended the height, the French proceeded with the bayonet to the attack, they advanced under a fire of musketry which could not have been more regular at a review. The ♦St. Cyr, 125.♦ right wing of the Spaniards was threatened, but the main attack was made upon the left, and this the enemy succeeded in breaking between four and five in the evening, about an hour after the action had been renewed. The Spaniards then began to retreat in good order for the next half hour, ... but then as usual fear and insubordination prevailed as soon as hope was lost. Reding himself, when it was no longer possible to perform the part of a general, was distinguished for his personal bravery. A body of French dragoons surrounded him and some of his staff: two of his aide-de-camps were killed, and he himself received five sabre wounds from a French Colonel, with whom he was personally engaged. The cavalry rendered little service in covering the retreat; but the infantry of the right and centre, and part of the left, retired ♦Cabañes, c. 15.
St. Cyr, 117, 126.♦ through the vineyards, where the horse could not pursue them. The other part of the broken wing took to the mountains, and made their way to Tortosa.
♦The French received at Reus.♦
The French estimated their own loss in this action at about a thousand men, that of the Spaniards at four; ... the Spaniards supposed it to be about two thousand on either side. In fact the evening was so far advanced, that they suffered comparatively little in their flight. Reding reached Tarragona that night; ... that city was only three leagues from the scene of action, and thither the greater part of the dispersed troops found their way before morning, some corps in good order, others in small parties. Some made for Reus, and from thence to Cambrils and Col de Balaguer. The artillery and baggage fell into the enemy’s hands. On the following day Souham entered Reus, a rich commercial city, second only in size and importance to Barcelona. The inhabitants had not, as had every where till now been done, forsaken it; on the contrary the municipality went out to receive the conquerors, and agreed to raise a contribution for the use of the army. Their wealth may explain a conduct which, in the then state of public feeling, surprised the French[21] themselves. This supply came at a time when the paymaster had not a single sous in the chest. Resources of every kind were also found here, and here were some thousand of sick or wounded Spaniards in the hospital, whom St. Cyr sent to ♦Arrangement concerning the wounded.♦ Tarragona. This measure led to a negotiation with Reding, by which it was agreed that in future whatever patients might be found in the hospitals should not be regarded as prisoners, ♦St. Cyr, 127–8.♦ but allowed to remain where they were, and to rejoin their respective armies upon their recovery.