♦Catalonia, 1808.♦
After the fall of Madrid there was yet one quarter to which the Junta might look with reasonable hope, amid the disasters that crowded upon them. If Barcelona could be recovered, the acquisition of that most important place would balance the worst reverses which they had yet sustained. But ill fortune every where pursued them, and there was this to aggravate the disappointment, that their losses in Catalonia were more imputable to misconduct than to any want of strength. A force had been collected there fully equal both in numbers and discipline (had it been directed with common prudence) to the services expected from it. After the arrival of the troops from Portugal and Majorca, and the Granadan army, it consisted of about 28,000 regular troops, and 1600 cavalry, besides the garrisons of Rosas, Hostalrich, and Gerona, who were nearly 6000. The sea being commanded by their allies, was open to them along the whole line of coast, except at Barcelona; and the people, who have always been eminently distinguished for their activity, industry, hardihood, and invincible spirit of independence, were ready to make any sacrifices and any exertions for the deliverance of their native land. The province too was full of fortified places, and even in so defensible a country as Spain peculiarly strong by nature. But to counterbalance these advantages, there were the confusion and perplexity, as well as the distance of the Central Junta; the inexperience and rashness of those who had taken upon themselves the local government; want of science, of decision, and of ability in the generals; want of authority every where; the fearful spirit of insubordination, which on the slightest occasion was ready to break out; ... and, above all, that reckless and unreasonable confidence which had now become part of the Spanish character.
♦Siege of Barcelona.♦
There was some excuse for this confidence in the Catalans; they knew their own temper and the strength of their country; and they had obtained some signal successes before any regular troops came to their assistance. But this remembrance, and the knowledge that so large a regular force was in the field, induced a fatal belief that the difficulties of the struggle were over, and that nothing remained to complete their triumph but the recovery of Barcelona. And this, they said, might easily be effected: the enemy there were weak, in want of provisions, sickly, dispirited by defeat and desertion; the English squadron at hand to assist in an attack upon Monjuich and the citadel; and the inhabitants ready upon the first appearance of success to rise upon their invaders and open the gates. Among the French and Italians themselves, there were some, they affirmed, who would gladly forsake the wicked cause wherein they were engaged, and by contributing to deliver up these places atone for the treachery in which they had been compelled to bear a part. This was the cry of the people; and these representations were strengthened by some of the citizens, who were perpetually proposing plans contradictory to each other, and alike impracticable: the Supreme Junta represented the people but too faithfully, partaking their inexperience, their impatience, and their errors; and General Vives, surrounded by ignorant advisers, controlled if not intimidated by popular opinion, and himself altogether incompetent to the station which he filled, wasted the precious weeks in a vain display before Barcelona; not perceiving or not regarding that the possession of the city would have been useless to him while the French possessed the citadel and Montjuich; that he had no means for besieging those strong places; ... and above all, that if the French were prevented from relieving them, they must inevitably soon fall into his hands without a blow.
♦St. Cyr appointed to command the French in Catalonia.♦
Duhesme, in fact, had announced to his government that his provisions would not hold out beyond the month of December; and to throw in supplies by sea was impossible. Buonaparte was well aware of the danger, and saw in part what consequences might be apprehended from it. He knew how Barcelona had been defended in the Succession war, and had calculated that if it were now to be recovered by the Spaniards it would cost him not less than fourscore thousand lives to regain possession of it. Such a sacrifice he would have made without one compunctious feeling; but that blood might have been expended without effecting the purchase, ... for if such a siege had been undertaken, England must and would have made exertions commensurate to the occasion. That these consequences did not follow was owing to the errors and incapacity of his opponents, not to his own measures. In other cases the force which he prepared was always fully equal to the service for which it was designed; in the present, it was so inadequate, as to excite in the General, Gouvion Saint Cyr, a suspicion that failure on his part would be more agreeable to the Emperor than success. That General had belonged to the army of the Rhine, which was an original sin in Buonaparte’s eyes; and having a command in Naples he had refused to obtain addresses from the troops soliciting the First Consul to take upon himself the imperial dignity; ... an irremissible offence. Moreover, great commander as Buonaparte was, he was jealous of any victories which were not obtained when he was in the field, so that the renown might redound to himself. Indulging at once this littleness of mind, and his personal or political dislike, it was his wish that Gouvion St. Cyr should not distinguish himself by any brilliant success; at the same time he knew the miserable state of the Spanish armies, and still more of the counsels by which they were directed, well enough to rely upon his relieving Barcelona. His instructions were to effect that object, to collect considerable magazines in Figueras at the enemy’s expense; to subdue the valleys, making ♦St. Cyr, 26. 42. Do.
Pièces Justificatives, No. 7.♦ them feel the whole weight of the war, and in fine to crush the enemy: having these objects in view, every thing was left to his own discretion.
When St. Cyr arrived at Perpignan, at the end of August, the town was full of sick and wounded, for whose relief no preparation had been made, so little had any reverses been expected. He found there some Tuscan regiments, the poor Queen of Etruria’s guards, and a battalion from the Valais ... for even that country was called upon to contribute from its recesses to this insatiable tyrant’s demand for human life. These troops had been sent back from Figueras by General Reille as being quite unable to take the field, not for want of discipline only, but of equipments, arms, and even necessary clothing. So miserable was their condition, that it was deemed prudent to quarter them in remote places, and train them out of sight, lest they should excite indignation as well as commiseration in the people, who in the south of France had always been ill affected toward Buonaparte, and suffering at this time from the loss of their trade with Spain, detested the injustice of the war, and were in a temper which might have ♦St. Cyr, 19. 34.♦ produced formidable consequences if any serious invasion had been attempted on that side. During the autumn troops continued to arrive there, mostly consisting of conscripts from Genoa, Naples, and other parts of Italy: under good training they soon became good soldiers, and only less to be trusted than the French because they were more inclined to desert. These forces when collected amounted to 18,000 men. Reille had 4000 at Figueras, and 8000 were with Duhesme in Barcelona.
♦He determines upon besieging Rosas.♦
Early in November St. Cyr received orders to enter Spain, and he determined to commence his operations with the siege of Rosas. While the fine roadstead which that fortress commands was open to the English, there was scarcely a chance of throwing supplies into Barcelona by sea; to escort them by land was not possible while Gerona and Hostalrich were in possession of the Spaniards; and if those places had been taken they could not be provisioned unless Rosas also were held by the French. Rosas is situated four leagues east of Figueras, in the bottom of the bay, where the plain of Ampurdan touches ♦1808.
November.♦ the skirts of the Pyrenees. The town, containing then about 1200 inhabitants, is built along the shore, and completely commanded by the fortress; the fortress, which is an irregular pentangle, the town, and a smaller fort, called, after a custom too prevalent in Catholic countries, Fuerte de la Trinidad, forming a semi-circle round the bay. This place had sustained a most gallant siege of ten weeks in 1795 after Figueras, strong as it was, had been surrendered without defence; and when the commander, D. Domingo Yzquierdo, could maintain the almost demolished works no longer, he succeeded in embarking the remains of his garrison. ♦Marcillac. 299–313.♦ During the peace nothing had been done to repair the works, as if no future war was to be apprehended. Even after the present struggle had commenced, six months, in that supineness which belongs to the Spanish character, had been suffered to elapse without taking any measures for strengthening and securing a place of such evident importance. There were many persons, and even some members of the nearest Juntas, who were acquainted with the details of the last siege, and knew what repairs were necessary, and also what the points were which it was most material to strengthen. But their attention was wholly engrossed by local and immediate interests, and the pressing representations which the commandant of engineers repeatedly addressed to the higher authorities produced no effect. Nothing could rouse them from their dream of recovering Barcelona by force of arms.
♦Dilapidated state of that fortress.♦