On the third day after the battle, the Duke moved forward, hoping to surprise the enemy in Salamanca. He crossed at Ledesma on the 23d, and marched all the night of the 24th; at daybreak he reached the heights which command Salamanca to the northward, but the French had retreated during the night to Toro, carrying with them the church plate and all their other plunder. They had remained five days in hope of receiving a reinforcement from Kellermann, who, with a weak corps, occupied the country between Segovia and Burgos; but seeing no succour approach, the loss which they had sustained rendered it necessary for them to retire with all speed, upon the unexpected intelligence that the Spaniards were within three leagues of the city.
♦Marshal Soult appointed Major general.♦
The people of Salamanca did not long enjoy their deliverance. While Kellermann was reinforced with one brigade, another from Dessoles’ division was directed toward that city, preparatory to more important movements; activity having now been given to the French armies, and union, which had long been wanted, by the appointment of Marshal Soult to the rank of Major-General in place of Marshal Jourdan, who was recalled to Paris. This change was highly acceptable to the troops in general, though there prevailed a feeling of personal ill-will toward Soult on the part of some of his fellow marshals which had not existed toward his predecessor; but more confidence was reposed in him, the reputation which Jourdan had obtained in the days of the National Convention not having been supported by his subsequent fortune. The Duque del Parque, perceiving that more serious operations were likely to be directed against him, urged the government to act on the offensive in La Mancha, as a means ♦The Junta resolve on risking a general action.♦ of averting the danger from himself; and the Junta needed little encouragement at this time for measures of the most desperate temerity. The ablest members of that body partook so strongly of the national temper, that they were wholly incapacitated for understanding the real state either of their own armies, or of the allies, or of their enemies. Their infatuation might seem incredible, if it were not proved both by their conduct and by documents which they themselves laid before the nation, stating upon what grounds they had acted. They had persuaded themselves that if Sir Arthur, after Cuesta rejoined him, had given battle to Soult, according to his original intention, the destruction of Soult’s army would have been easy and certain, the annihilation of Victor’s army easy ♦Exposicion de la Junta Central. Ramo Diplomatico, P. 27.♦ as a consequent measure, the recovery of Madrid easy, and the expulsion of the French as far as the Ebro, or even to the Pyrenees. By some fatality, they said, the British General had chosen that line of conduct which was precisely the most prejudicial to the Spanish cause. By some stranger fatality they themselves persisted in believing that the British army had been at all times amply supplied with means of subsistence and of transport, that it was at any time capable of advancing, and (as if themselves incapable of understanding that the British Commander and the British Ambassador meant what they said in their repeated representations) that it would advance if the Spaniards evinced the determination and the ability to act without them. And with this persuasion they deluded their General as well as themselves.
♦Areizaga appointed to the command.♦
Rash as he was, even Cuesta would hardly have been so deluded. Upon his resignation Eguia had only held the command while the government could look about for a successor. Castaños was under a cloud; the inquiry which he demanded had never been granted, and though public opinion was beginning to regard him as his past services and real worth deserved, there was no thought of again employing him. Alburquerque was an object of jealousy; Romana of dislike and fear. Areizaga therefore, who had been highly commended by Blake for his conduct in the battle of Alcañiz, was removed from the command at Lerida to be placed at the head of 50,000 men. Alburquerque, who had from 9000 to 10,000 in Extremadura, was ordered to join Parque, and place himself under his orders; while Areizaga, with the greatest force that they could collect, was instructed ♦State of Madrid.♦ to advance upon Madrid. What they knew concerning the state of that city might well excite their feelings, and raise in them a strong desire of delivering its inhabitants from their bondage; but there was nothing to encourage the extravagant hopes which they entertained. The national feeling existed nowhere in greater strength, though there was no other place wherein so many traitors were collected; all who in other parts of the country had made themselves conspicuous as partizans of Joseph, having fled thither when they could not abide in safety elsewhere. To leave the capital was an enterprise of the utmost danger for those who were willing to sacrifice every thing, and take their chance in the field against the invaders: any one might enter; but in the course of a few hours it was known who the stranger was, whence he came, where he was harboured, what was his business, and who were his connexions, ... every thing which the most vigilant police, and the most active system of espionage could discover. The tradesmen and those whose means of subsistence were not destroyed by the revolution were oppressed by heavy and frequent exactions; the Intruder’s ministers knew the impolicy of this, but nevertheless were compelled to impose these burdens; and after the atrocities which they had sanctioned, they could suffer nothing more either in character or in peace of mind. Otherwise, even in Madrid, where a strong military force kept every thing in order, and where none of the immediate evils of war were felt, there were sights which might have wrung the heart. Men and women, who had been born and bred in opulence, begged in the streets, as soon as evening had closed, ... the feelings of better times preventing them from exposing their misery in the daylight. But what most wounded the Spanish temper was the condition of their clergy, and monks, and friars, who, suffering as it were as confessors under the intrusive government, worked as daily labourers for their support, employing in hard and coarse labour hands which, the Spaniards said, were consecrated by the use of holy oil, and by contact with the Body of our Lord!
Overlooking all impediments in the way of their desires, the Junta calculated so surely upon delivering the capital, that they fixed upon a captain-general, a governor, and a corregidor, who were to enter upon their functions as soon ♦Jovellanos, § 103.♦ as it should be recovered; and they charged Jovellanos and Riquelme to draw up provisional ♦1809.
November.♦ regulations for securing tranquillity there when the enemy should withdraw. This confidence arose from a national character which repeated disasters could neither subdue nor correct. The rashness with which they determined to bring on a general action, at whatever risk, appeared to them a prudent resolution. Now that the continental war was terminated, and Buonaparte had no other employment for his armies, it was certain that more troops than had been withdrawn from Spain would be marched into it, for the purpose of effecting its subjugation; they thought it therefore the best and surest policy to make a great effort before the numbers of the enemy should be thus formidably increased. Former failures had neither disheartened nor instructed them; and they furthered the equipment of the army with a zeal which, if it had been excited two months before in providing for their allies, might have realized the hopes wherein they now indulged.
♦Condition of the British army.♦
The new commander partook the blind confidence of his government. In some degree he appears to have been deceived by them; for he was neither informed of Lord Wellington’s determination not to advance, nor of the condition of the British army, which was such at that time as to render an advance impossible. From causes which physiologists have not yet been able to ascertain, the country where they were quartered, upon the Guadiana, is peculiarly unhealthy during the dry season, when that river ceases to be a stream, and, like its feeders, is reduced to a succession of detached pools in the deeper parts of its course. The troops suffered so much more than the natives, partly because the disease laid stronger hold on constitutions which were not accustomed to it, and partly from the peculiar liableness of men, when congregated in camps, to receive and communicate endemic maladies, that more than a third of their whole number were on the sick list; and the inhabitants of the country, aware as they were that this plague belonged to it, ascribed its greater prevalence and malignity among the strangers to their having eaten mushrooms, holding the whole tribe themselves in abhorrence, and not thinking the ordinary causes of the disease could account for the effects which they witnessed. Areizaga was ignorant of all this, and the government allowed him to advance with an expectation that the British army was to follow and support him.
♦Disposition of the French troops.♦
Knowing the condition of that army, it seems almost incredible that the Junta could have deceived themselves when they thus deceived their general. But unlikely as it was that they should have given orders for a forward movement of such importance, without such co-operation, they hoped perhaps to deceive the enemy, by reports that Lord Wellington and Alburquerque would advance along the valley of the Tagus. The French were never able to obtain good intelligence of the English plans; they could, however, to a certain point, foresee them, as a skilful chess-player apprehends the scheme of an opponent who is not less expert than himself at the game; they had learnt to respect the British army in the field, but they thought the British Commander was more likely from caution to let pass an opportunity of success, than to afford the enemy one by rashness. This opinion they had formed from the events of the late campaign, being fully aware of the danger to which they had been exposed, and unacquainted with the difficulties which had frustrated Sir Arthur’s plans, ... difficulties indeed which they who were accustomed always to take whatever was needful for their armies either from friend or foe, without any other consideration than that of supplying their own immediate wants, would have regarded with astonishment, if not contempt. When Marshal Soult therefore prepared at this time to act against the Spaniards, the English force hardly entered into his calculations. He had 70,000 men available for immediate service in one direction. One corps of these, under Laborde, watched the Tagus, with an eye to Alburquerque’s movements. Victor observed the roads from Andalusia to Toledo and Aranjuez, having his cavalry in advance at Madrilejos and Consuegra; Sebastiani, with the fourth corps, was in the rear of Victor, securing the capital, from which neighbourhood a division had been sent to support Marchand after his defeat at Tamames. The reserve, under Mortier, was at Talavera; Gazan occupied Toledo with two weak regiments; and Joseph was with his guards at Aranjuez, relying upon the fortune of Napoleon, and now, when the Continent was effectually subdued, and reinforcements had already begun to enter the Peninsula, believing himself in secure possession of the crown of Spain.