Much, however, was done for Portugal, ... enough to be ever remembered by that country with gratitude, and by Great Britain with a generous and ennobling pride. An English commissariat, scrupulously exact in all its dealings, relieved the farmers in great measure from the oppression of their own government. The soldiers learnt to respect their officers and themselves; they rapidly improved in discipline; they acquired confidence, and became proud of their profession. The government itself found it necessary to alter its old system of secrecy and delusion; the dispatches of Lord Wellington and Marshal Beresford were published in the Lisbon Gazette, and the people of Portugal were officially informed of the real circumstances of the war, as fairly and as fully as they had been in the War of the Acclamation.

CHAPTER XXX.
SIEGE OF HOSTALRICH. ATTEMPT UPON VALENCIA. CAPTURE OF LERIDA. OPERATIONS BEFORE CADIZ.

♦1810.♦

If proof had been wanting that men of any country may be made good soldiers under good discipline, it might have been seen at this time in Buonaparte’s armies, where the Italians, who in their own country ran like sheep before the French, were now embodied with them, and approved themselves in every respect equal to their former conquerors. These men, who were taken by the conscription to bear part in a war wherein they had no concern, who had no national character to support, nothing but the spirit of their profession to animate them, were nevertheless equal to any service required from them, and needed no other excitement than that they were fighting for pay, and plunder, and life. Was it then to be doubted, that if the same care were bestowed in training, the same results would be seen in the Spaniards and Portugueze, who were under the influence of every passion and every principle which can strengthen and elevate the heart of man, ... both people too being alike remarkable for national feeling, and for patience under difficulties and privations, docility to their superiors, and faithful attachment to those in whom they trust? It was not indeed to be expected that the Spaniards would so far acknowledge their military degradation as to put themselves under the tuition of an ally; Spain had not abated sufficiently of its old pretensions, thus to humiliate itself. Neither indeed was that degradation so complete as it had been in Portugal. The Spanish artillery was most respectable; and there were officers in the army who had studied their profession, and whose talents might have raised them to distinction in the proudest age of Spanish history. But the Portugueze were conscious of their weakness, and in this knowledge they found their strength: for when that brave and generous people, in the extremity of their fortune, submitted implicitly to the direction of their old hereditary ally, ... when they offered hands and hearts for the common cause, and asked for assistance and instruction, the ultimate success of that cause became as certain as any thing can possibly be deemed by human foresight. With Portugal for the scene of action, and her population ready for every sacrifice that duty might require, it remained only for Great Britain to feel and understand its own strength, and employ its inexhaustible resources in exertions adequate to the occasion.

But Great Britain as yet hardly understood its strength. The cold poison which was continually instilled by party writers into the public ear had produced some effect even upon the sound part of the nation. From the commencement of the war it had been proclaimed as a truth too certain to be disputed, that England could no longer as a military power compete with France, consequently that we must rely upon our insular situation, and husband our resources. These opinions had been so long repeated, that they had acquired something like the authority of prescription; the government itself seemed to distrust the national power, and in the fear of hazarding too much, apportioned always for every service the smallest possible force that could be supposed adequate to the object, instead of placing at the general’s disposal such ample means as might ensure success. The first departure from this over-cautious system was in the expedition to Walcheren, where a great armament was worse than wasted. That miserable enterprise weakened the government, and in some degree disheartened it; and Lord Wellington, in addition to the other difficulties of his situation, had long to struggle with insufficient means. But the exertions and the experience of the last year had not been lost: the British army had acquired a reputation which, however successfully Buonaparte concealed it from the French people, was felt by his soldiers and his generals: time had been gained for training the Portugueze troops, and preparing for the defence of Portugal; and the British Commander having proved both his enemies and his allies, had clearly foreseen the course which the war would take, and determined upon his own measures with the calmness of a mind that knew how to make the best advantage of the events it could not control.

♦O’Donnell appointed to the command in Catalonia.♦

While both parties were preparing for a campaign in Portugal, in which the enemy expected to complete the conquest of the Peninsula, and Lord Wellington felt assured that the tide of their fortune would be turned; while the war before Cadiz was pursued with little exertion or enterprise on either side, and the cities of Andalusia were occupied without a struggle by the invaders; in Catalonia the contest was carried on with renewed vigour. The fall of Gerona enabled the besieging army to undertake farther operations; but the Catalans, as well as the French, had changed their commander. Upon Blake’s recall to the south, D. Juan de Henestrosa had succeeded to the command; the provincial Junta however, in accord with the general wish of the people and of the troops, appointed O’Donnell in his stead, and this nomination was ♦Garcia Conde made governor of Lerida.♦ confirmed by the Regency. It gave offence to Garcia Conde, who was an older officer, and had also distinguished himself during the siege of ♦Von Staff, 246.♦ Gerona. He resigned the command of the first division in disgust: this act of intemperance, however, was overlooked, and he was made governor of Lerida, a post of great importance at that time, but to which his services and his character seemed fairly to entitle him. The Duque del Parque had more reason for displeasure at O’Donnell’s promotion; in the belief that he was to have the command in Catalonia by the express desire of the Catalan people, he had taken leave of his own army, and Romana had been appointed to succeed him.

♦Rapid promotion in the Spanish armies.♦

If heroes who carry victory with their single presence were to be produced as if by miracle, according to Lord Holland’s supposition, by democratic institutions, during such struggles as that in which the Spaniards were engaged, fairer opportunities for their appearance could not have been afforded under the most democratic forms than were given both by the Central Junta and by the Regency. There had been a flagrant exception in the case of Alburquerque; the union of high rank, deserved popularity, and great military talents in his person, had excited unworthy jealousies in some, and worse passions in others: but in every other instance, promotion had rapidly followed upon desert; a rash and even ruinous confidence had been shown where any promise of ability appeared; and men were raised so rapidly, that they became giddy with their sudden elevation. But Henrique O’Donnell justified the expectations which had been formed of him. While the French proclaimed in their official accounts, that now Gerona had been taken, little more was required for the complete subjugation of Catalonia; that the Ampurdam was already reduced; that the peasants, as they were taken in arms, were hung up in great numbers upon the trees along the road side, and that the French communications had at length been rendered secure, the fall of Gerona, like that of Zaragoza, had animated the Spaniards, not discouraged them: they looked to the spirit which the garrison and the inhabitants had displayed, not to the surrender which famine had rendered inevitable, and in the religious and heroic endurance which had there been manifested, found cause for more ennobling pride and surer hope than a victory in the field would have given them. Eroles was charged by the superior Junta to enforce the decree for embodying every fifth man. He called upon the Catalans in language suited to the times, reminding them of their forefathers who spread terror through the Greek empire; and referring to those regiments of the Gerona garrison, which but a little while before the siege had been filled up with men thus levied, as having exemplified not less illustriously the powerful effects of discipline. By this means the army was recruited, and the men hoping for change of fortune with every change of commander, entered cheerfully upon the service under O’Donnell, who had hitherto only been known by his adventurous exploits and his success.