♦Hopes and expectations of the French.♦
Boastful as the French commander was, and confident in his own fortune, and in the hitherto unchecked prosperity of the Emperor Napoleon, the battle of Busaco made him apprehend that the enterprise in which he had engaged was not so easy as he had imagined, nor so free from all risk of disasters. There were not fewer than 5000 sick and wounded whom it was necessary to leave at Coimbra; as many more had been left at Busaco dead on the field, or abandoned there because their condition was hopeless, or for want of means to remove them. But a loss of 10,000 men upon his march, without any commensurate diminution of the allies, had not been allowed for in his calculations; and he found himself unable to leave a guard of sufficient strength at Coimbra, without weakening his army too much. He thought therefore that the surest course by which he could secure his sick and wounded was to pursue the English with all his force, and drive them out of the country, for he still persuaded himself that they were flying to their ships. This opinion he expressed in dispatches which were intercepted. The other generals partook the same delusion; they no longer despised the British troops, but they had not yet been taught to respect the councils of the British government, and the nature of its policy they could neither believe nor comprehend; for it appeared to them incredible that any government should act upon principles of integrity and honour. They supposed that Lord Wellington would embark as soon as he reached Lisbon, and that it was his intention to carry off as many of the Portugueze youth as he could get on board, by way of securing some compensation for the expenses of the war!
♦Confusion at Condeixa.♦
With these expectations they followed the retreating army, not with the ardour of pursuit, but ready to avail themselves of any opportunity that might present itself, and cautious how they offered any to an enemy whom they no longer affected to despise. The single occasion which occurred in their favour they were not near enough to seize. It was at Condeixa (the Conimbrica of the Romans); the town is built on the ridge of the hill, and the road passes through it along a narrow street; the people of the vicinity crowded in simultaneously with the troops, and the inhabitants at the same time hurried to join in a retreat which they had delayed till the last minute. They were in great alarm, the way was blocked up by some of the country carts, and had it not been for the good discipline which the troops observed in this scene of confusion, and the exertions of the officers, the enemy might have obtained no inconsiderable advantage. But they were not near enough to profit by the favourable opportunity: order was restored in time; and this was the only moment of serious danger during the whole retreat. Massena pushed forward to this town, without halting at Coimbra; but he found it necessary to remain here three days, for the purpose of resting his troops and collecting such provisions as the inhabitants had not been able to remove, and the retreating army had left untouched. As the enemy advanced, the allies retired a march or two before them; the infantry proceeded with as little molestation as if they had been marching through a country which was in peace; the cavalry covered the retreat, and no stragglers were to be seen.
♦Leiria forsaken.♦
Some skirmishing took place near Pombal, with trifling loss on the part of the allies, and more on that of the enemy. Ney and Junot took this line of march, while Regnier advanced ♦Oct. 5.♦ upon the road to Thomar. Leiria was forsaken by its whole population: a city thus deserted offered such temptation, that discipline could not be maintained in the retreating army without some examples of severity, and one British and one native soldier were punished with death for breaking into a chapel and plundering it. Here the allied army divided, one part taking the road to Alcobaça, the other to Rio Mayor. ♦Alcobaça forsaken by the monks.♦ The monks of Alcobaça performed on this occasion toward the British officers their last act of hospitality. Most of them had already departed from the magnificent and ancient abode, where the greater part of their lives had been spent peacefully and inoffensively, to seek an asylum where they could; the few who remained prepared dinner for their guests in the great hall and in the apartments reserved for strangers, after which they brought them the keys, and desired them to take whatever they liked, ... for they expected that every thing would be destroyed by the French. Means were afforded them, through General Mackinnon’s kindness, for saving some things which they could not otherwise have removed; and then the most venerable edifice in Portugal for its antiquity, its history, its literary treasures, and the tombs which it contained, was abandoned to an invader who delighted in defiling whatever was held sacred, and in destroying whatever a generous enemy, from the impulse of feeling and the sense of honour, would carefully have preserved.
♦Surprise at Alcoentre.♦
The rains now commenced, and set in with their accustomed severity in that country. By this time the infantry had reached their positions; but the cavalry who covered the rear were exposed to the whole severity of the weather, bivouacking every night, because the enemy were so close that it would have been imprudent for them to occupy a village. Sir Stapleton Cotton, however, having reached the little town of Alcoentre, took up his quarters there; the French, expecting that in this heavy and incessant rain the English would apprehend no enterprise on their part, took advantage of the weather, and endeavoured to surprise him there; his piquets were driven in; and almost as soon as the alarm could be given, they were in the town, and in possession of six guns. A squadron from the 16th came down in time, charged them in the street, recovered the guns, and drove them to the other end of the town. Some severe skirmishing occurred on the following day, in which the 3d regiment of French hussars behaved most gallantly. At daybreak on the 10th the enemy had lost sight of the allies, and when they reached Moinho do Cubo, where the roads to Alenquer and Lisbon divide, they knew not which course to take. Two peasants were brought in by their detachments, and were asked which way the English had retreated, and where their lines were, ... for by this time Massena had found cause to doubt whether a general who retreated so deliberately had no other intention than to embark and fly as soon as he reached Lisbon. The men answered that they could give no information on either point, because they knew nothing; military punishment was immediately inflicted upon them, to extort what they were determined not to disclose, and they both endured it till they fainted, thus giving the French another proof of national resolution, and of the feeling of the Portugueze towards them. Being thus disappointed of the intelligence which they expected, the French vanguard, which consisted of 10,000 men, divided. The division which took the Alenquer road came in sight of a column of the allies on ♦The French discover the lines of the allies.♦ the heights beyond that town; on the following day this column retreated in good order to Sobral, and was driven out of it: the French were pursuing their advantage when a peasant fell into their hands, who, unlike his countrymen, answered without hesitation all the interrogatories which were put to him; he told the commander that they were close upon the British lines, and pointed out to him where the batteries were, in constructing which he had himself laboured. Had it not been for his warning, this ♦Investigador Portuguez, t. vi. 64.♦ body of the enemy would presently have been in a situation from which it could hardly have escaped. They halted instantly, and fell back; Massena was informed of the discovery which had been made; and three days elapsed before the invaders again approached the works of the allies so nearly.
♦Feelings of the army.♦
The army had commenced their retrograde movement from the frontiers with an impression that the cause wherein they were engaged had become hopeless, and that when they reached Lisbon they should be embarked, and abandon Portugal. This opinion had been altered by the course of events during the retreat, and by the manner in which that retreat had been conducted. There had been no alarm, no confusion, no precipitance upon the march. Nothing could have been conducted with greater ease to the troops; not a straggler had been taken, not a gun abandoned, not an article of baggage lost; the infantry had never even been seen by the enemy, except at Busaco, where they gave them battle, and signally defeated them: and the cavalry had taken on the way more prisoners from the enemy than the allies lost, a circumstance which probably never occurred in any former retreat. The troops, therefore, became confident that their commander had no thought of abandoning the contest; and that an embarkation was not his object, but that he was acting upon some settled plan, which he was well able to carry to the end. But when they entered the lines which they were to occupy, their surprise was hardly less than that of Massena and his army, at the foresight which they there saw displayed, and the skill with which a strong position had been rendered impregnable.