♦The French armies separate.♦

This movement, therefore, which might have greatly annoyed the enemy, and of which such expectations had been raised, that it was at one time reported and believed Blake had actually entered Seville, ended only in the diminution of the army and of the general’s reputation. But Lord Wellington had taken his measures too wisely to suffer any other evil than that of disappointed hope from this failure. He knew that the enemy could not possibly long continue to subsist their forces when thus concentrated; and accordingly, as he expected, they broke up from the Guadiana about the middle of July, having fortified the old castles of Medellin and Truxillo to strengthen their hold upon Extremadura. Soult returned to Seville; and Marmont, recrossing the Tagus at Almaraz, went again to his command in the north. Lord Wellington then moved his whole army to the left, and cantoned them in Lower Beira, where he remained, waiting till time and opportunity should offer for the blow which he was preparing to strike.


CHAPTER XXXVIII.

MEASURES OF THE FRENCH IN ARAGON. MANRESA BURNT. FIGUERAS SURPRISED BY THE CATALANS. SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF TARRAGONA BY THE ENEMY, AND RECAPTURE OF FIGUERAS. CAMPOVERDE SUPERSEDED BY GENERAL LACY.

♦1811.♦

Both in Portugal and in Andalusia the French had at length encountered a resistance which, with their utmost efforts, they were unable to overcome: but their career of success continued longer in the eastern provinces, where their operations were conducted with more unity of purpose, and where Great Britain afforded only a precarious and inefficient aid to the best and bravest of the Spaniards.

♦Plans of the French in Catalonia.♦

No sooner had Tortosa fallen, than Marshal Macdonald began to prepare at Lerida for laying siege to Tarragona. The arrival at Barcelona of a convoy of ammunition and grain from Toulon relieved him from all anxiety on that point, and left him at leisure to direct his whole attention to this great object, which in a military view would complete the conquest of Catalonia, ... any other Buonaparte was incapable of taking. Tortosa was to be the pivot of the intended operations against Tarragona first, and after its fall, which was not doubted, against Valencia; and to facilitate these operations, Col de Balaguer was put in a state of defence, and Fort Rapita which commanded the mouth of the Ebro. These measures had been taken when General Suchet received orders from Paris to undertake the siege, and was at the same time informed that Lower Catalonia was to be under his command. Early in the preceding year this general had ♦March 19.♦ been told that he must raise in his government of Aragon means both for the pay and subsistence of his troops, France being no longer able to support such an expense; and that while he was to communicate as before with the E’tat-major of the army ♦The Pyrenean provinces administered in Buonaparte’s name.♦ concerning military affairs, he was to receive instructions upon all matters relating to the administration, police, and finances of the country, from the Emperor alone. It was evident, therefore, that Buonaparte was as little disposed to keep faith with his brother, King Joseph, as he had been with his ally Charles IV., and Ferdinand his invited guest, but that it was his intention to extend the frontier of France from the Pyrenees to the Ebro; and in fact from that time all orders of the government in that part of the Peninsula were issued in his name. The faithful Spaniards cared not in which name it was administered, acknowledging neither, and detesting both: if they had any feeling upon the subject, it was a sense of satisfaction that their unworthy countrymen in the Intruder’s service should be deprived of the shallow pretext with which they sought to excuse their treason to their country. At first this change appeared to increase the difficulties of Suchet’s situation, who, while he looked only to a temporary occupation of the province, would without scruple have supplied himself by force, regardless in what condition he might leave it to those who should succeed him, or what sufferings he might bring upon the inhabitants. But regarding himself now as fixed in a permanent command, it behoved him to adopt measures which, ... if any thing could have that effect upon the Aragonese, might gradually reconcile them to subjection, by giving them the benefit of a military government, regularly as well as vigorously administered.

♦State of Aragon.♦