History of the Peninsular War, Volume 6 (of 6)

by Robert Southey

♦Motion of thanks to the armies.
Sir Francis Burdett.♦

When a motion for thanks to Lord Wellington and his army for the battle of Salamanca was brought forward, Sir Francis Burdett said, he was far from wishing; invidiously to detract from the merits of men who had devoted their exertions to the service of their country, or to withhold from them any recompense that it was in the power of Parliament to bestow: but when he heard the battle of Salamanca represented as having been equal in importance to the battle of Blenheim, and to other great battles which had completely changed the aspect of the whole affairs of Europe, he could not suffer such delusions to go forth uncontradicted, ... delusions which were calculated to plunge the country, under the direction of the same persons, still more deeply in a destructive and ruinous war: for after their boasted and over-praised victories, we were still as far from our object as ever. What! were we to suffer the French troops to recover from the effect of their discomfiture and exhaustion, and to wait until the tide of good fortune which had attended us flowed back on its source? Were we to be satisfied with a retreat? Yet, where now was the Marquis of Wellington? In what direction were we to look for the glorious results of the campaign? In what manner was the diminution of the French power in Spain evinced? Nothing seemed to have resulted from all our advantages but calamity and distress; and it followed, therefore, that either Lord Wellington was not entitled to the praise which the House was called upon to bestow, or that the fault of our failure was attributable to the gross negligence and imbecility of the ministers. Lord Castlereagh, Sir Francis pursued, in the plenitude of his satisfaction, had not confined himself to Spain, but had travelled out of his course, and taken the House to Russia, where in the destruction of from 200,000 to 300,000 human beings, in the burning of Moscow, and in the devastation of an immense tract of Russian territory, he found new causes of congratulation, new sources of national pride and gratitude! Would he be equally inclined to consider it a matter of triumph, if Buonaparte (which in his opinion was more than probable) should extricate himself from his perils, and after having found good winter-quarters, return to the contest with renovated ardour in the spring? Could he believe it possible that Russia could continue such a contest, and undergo a repetition of similar dreadful experiments and sacrifices? Supposing he marched to Petersburgh, which seemed to be his ultimate intention, would the same mode of defence as at Moscow be adopted? Would Russia burn Petersburgh too? He for one could not greatly admire the magnanimity of burning that, the preservation of which ought to have been fought for; nor could he see the shining character of the Emperor Alexander, who was not, like the Emperor of the French, personally sharing in the dangers of the war. He could not subdue the conviction which arose in his mind on viewing all these things, of the utter impossibility of the Emperor of Russia’s feeling any exultation whatever: on the contrary, he thought that unfortunate individual must be oppressed by a view of the irreparable calamities to which himself and his people had been, and were ♦Dec. 7.♦ likely still further to be, exposed. Farther than this, when a grant was moved to the Marquis of Wellington, Sir Francis said, he did not wish to divide the House upon it, but he wished to move, that the consideration of the grant should be deferred till some inquiries had been made into the late extraordinary campaign. Lord Wellington’s victories had none of the characteristics which distinguished those of Marlborough. It had been observed, and by military men too, that he had brought his army into difficulties, but that his men had fought him out of them again; and that in the capture of the fortresses which he had won, a waste of life was to be complained of. The cause of Spain appeared to him infinitely more hopeless than it was at the commencement of the campaign, ... the case of the Peninsula more deplorable than ever.

♦M. Wellesley moves for a committee of inquiry. March 12.♦

Marquis Wellesley moved for a committee to inquire into the conduct of the war in the Peninsula. “My Lords,” said he, “what secret cause amidst the splendid scene that has been exhibited in the Peninsula, ... what malign influence amidst the rejoicings and acclamations of triumph, has counteracted the brilliant successes of our arms, and has converted the glad feelings of a just exultation into the bitterness of regret and disappointment? With an army in discipline and spirit superior to any that had ever been assembled, uniting in itself qualities so various, as never to have entered into the composition of any other such assemblage of force; ... with a general, pronounced by the whole world to be unsurpassed in ancient or modern times; the pride of his country, the refuge and hope of Europe; ... with a cause in which justice vied with policy, combining all that was ardent in the one motive, with all that was sober in the other; ... with the eyes of Europe fixed on our movements; ... with the admiration of the world excited by our achievements: ... how is it that our hopes have been raised only to be frustrated? How is it that we have been allowed to indulge in expectation of an approaching completion of success, only to behold the utter disappointment of our wishes? Why has a system of advance suddenly and inevitably been converted into a system of retreat? When victory actually sprung from the bosom of retreat, why was the glorious victor compelled to relapse into his retrogression? Why has it happened that we have seen the great conqueror who chased the French armies from the plains of Salamanca, pursued in his turn, by those whom he had conquered, over those plains which had been the scene of his former triumphs? Why, in conclusion, has a system of offence shrunk into a system of defence, and what is the reason that our military operations in the Peninsula have ended where they began?

“I should be lost to every feeling of honour, and to every sense of duty to the country, if I did not state that the effect of this campaign altogether has been not to approximate you towards your object, but to remove you from it; and that this calamity has arisen from the insufficiency of those means which, by a small addition, might have been rendered effective. I maintain, that the object we had in view, (the only honest object ... the only great object ... which we could pursue, or hope to obtain by our operations in Spain,) was the expulsion of the French, or, at least, a considerable diminution of their power, with a view to the freedom of the people, and the independence of the Spanish monarchy. This was, certainly, the main object which we ought to have contemplated; the ultimate object of the British nation was, certainly, by the deliverance of the peninsula of Spain, to lay a solid foundation for the establishment of a permanent and honourable peace.

“What I have contended is, that the efforts we have made have not been equal to the resources of the country; that they have not been such as the magnitude, the infinite importance of the cause demanded, and as the favourableness of the opportunity particularly called for; that we have not made even a faint approximation to the object of the war, the expulsion of the French from the Peninsula; but that the French have been enabled, by our reverses, to consolidate their power in Spain, and to systematize the moral and military subjugation of the country. We ought to have called forth all our resources, ... and we have made no extraordinary sacrifices; we ought to have strained every nerve at this momentous crisis, ... and we have remained little better than idle spectators of the fate of Spain. We have been deterred by petty objections; by calculations of expense, which are but as dust in the balance.”

♦Earl Grey.♦

Earl Grey supported the motion for a committee, saying, that the great objects of the campaign had not been realized, but that, on the contrary, there had been a complete failure, ... a great and lamentable failure; and that it was one of the most important duties of that house, in cases of ill success, to vindicate the interests of the country, by visiting with its severest censure the causers of the misfortune. Aware as the ministers were, he said, of the state of Europe, and knowing, as they must have known, the effect that at such a crisis would have been produced by a vigorous and decisive effort in the Peninsula, it was their bounden duty to have provided Lord Wellington with ample means for carrying through his enterprising projects, and crowning them with brilliant and unqualified success. Nothing had happened which induced him to repent of his opinion, that the efforts of the Spanish people could alone enable them to withstand the overwhelming power of France. This sentiment he had uttered under the supposition that no other power would stand up against the French Emperor, and that that Emperor would not depart from the unity of council and of action, by which his greatest successes had been achieved. And, indeed, if with such a commander and such an army as ours, and at a time when the army of France in the north had met with disasters, greater than which never fell upon a host assembled for the purposes of injustice and ambition, ... if under these circumstances we had achieved so little in Spain, what would have been the issue, if one-tenth only of the forces employed against Russia had been turned against us? The time had called for exertion, and the exertions had failed, ... failed almost entirely as to their great object: the French were left in possession of the best parts of Spain; and we had not advanced in any degree, considering the effects of the last campaign upon the minds of the Spaniards, to the accomplishment of our object. Such was the case, and it called loudly for inquiry.

♦The Earl of Liverpool.♦

To these assertions the Earl of Liverpool replied, that the campaign which had been thus represented as a failure and a defeat, was, in fact, the most brilliant that had been achieved by British arms in any period of our history. They had been seeking as a great object, that the whole force of Spain should be placed under the command of Lord Wellington, and that object had at length been accomplished. Every exertion that could be made had been made, for sending out troops to the Peninsula and for supplying them there, and the success of the war was indisputable. Portugal had been rescued from the enemy, and placed in a state of security, and now one-third of Spain was relieved from their presence. Spain and Portugal had set the example which Russia had followed, with the great advantage of having a government in full activity to direct all its strength. The example thus set and thus followed would have an effect among the other nations of Europe, would rouse their spirit, animate their exertions, and teach them in what manner to resist oppression, ... teach them that an united nation, determined to resist an invader, could not ♦Earl Bathurst.♦ be conquered! ... Earl Bathurst argued to the same purpose, saying, that something had been effected, if the views of England were what Marquis Wellesley had powerfully described them to be at the beginning of the war in Spain, ... first, to create a diversion in favour of our allies; secondly, to encourage resistance in other countries, by showing its effects in Spain; and thirdly, to prevent the commercial and military means of that country from falling into the hands of our enemy. Those had been the views of England, those were the views of the present Government, and those views had been forwarded by the last campaign. And Lord Wellington was satisfied with the conduct of the administration during that campaign, ... a declaration which had not been sought for by the ministers, but which he had voluntarily made.