History of the Peninsular War, Volume 6 (of 6)

by Robert Southey

♦Col de Balaguer taken by the Anglo-Sicilian army.♦

By the end of May the expedition, consisting of 700 cavalry, and 14,600 infantry, including Whittingham’s division of 5000, and above 4000 Italians, had embarked, and on the last day of that month the fleet, commanded by Rear-Admiral Hallowell, sailed from Alicante. It was seen from Valencia; and the French troops from the side of Tortosa were instructed to be ready for moving whithersoever the debarkation might call them. After a very favourable passage, the fleet anchored on the evening of the 2nd in the port of Salon, within sight of Tarragona. The soldiers who had been ordered to hold themselves in readiness to land were put into the boats, but the surf ran so high that Admiral Hallowell pronounced the attempt too dangerous, and therefore they returned to the ships. But before the fleet came to anchor a brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Prevost, was judiciously detached to get possession of the fort at Col de Balaguer, that point commanding the only road by which artillery could be brought to the relief of Tarragona. General Copons, who had been apprized of the expedition, occupied Reus at that time, and sent two battalions, at first, to co-operate in the attack upon this fort, and afterwards two more in consequence of some movements from Tortosa. The attack was vigorously pressed. On the 5th the place was battered in breach; on the 7th a magazine exploded; the garrison, consisting of 80 men, were intimidated by this, and the commandant capitulated. On this side, therefore, no succours could now reach Tarragona, which is about six leagues from Col de Balaguer, except by a circuitous march of three days, through a very difficult country: there was a pass indeed by which the place might be approached, but it was not practicable for artillery.

♦The expedition lands near Tarragona.♦

Meantime the debarkation had been effected on the 3rd, in broad day, and with an order, a precision, and a rapidity, peculiar to the English in their naval operations. Having reconnoitred the fortress, Sir John Murray determined upon ♦M. Suchet’s Mem. 2, 311.♦ attacking it on the western side, which was the weakest, and that on which stores might most conveniently be brought up to the batteries. General Bertoletti, who commanded in Tarragona, did not confine himself within the walls; he occupied the Fuerte Real, and the ruins of the bastion of St. Carlos, which, though, like all the external works, it had been demolished, presented still an imposing appearance; and great exertions were made for repairing it. These works were between 350 and 400 yards from the body of the place, to the southward, and nearer the sea, the approach being exceedingly difficult, and covered by the fire of the town. But they were thought to be the key of the place, and that if the besiegers could establish themselves there, Tarragona must fall in three days. Accordingly two batteries were begun on the evening of the 4th, and on the morning of the 6th they opened their fire with good effect; another was erected during the night, and on the morning of the 8th the commanding engineer reported that a practicable breach in the Fuerte Real had been made; but he requested that it might not be stormed, because its immediate possession could be turned to no account, and to retain it would cost the lives of many men. The fire therefore was continued only to prevent its re-establishment. Meantime, when the weather would permit, the artillery and engineer horses, and the cavalry and artillery stores, were landed, and the operations of the engineers were so far advanced that two heavy batteries were constructed to enfilade the place. The city was then summoned to surrender; but as none of the batteries were as yet within 500 yards of the place, and the fire of the besieged had been very superior to that of the besiegers, General Bertoletti would not listen to the summons. On the 11th, the commanding officer of engineers reported that he was perfectly prepared to push the siege with vigour; and according to Sir John Murray’s order, Major-General Sir William Clinton, who had that day been left in temporary command of the siege, resolved to storm the Fuerte Real at nine that night. Accordingly a disposition for the assault was made, and arrangements for distracting the enemy’s attention by a simultaneous show of attack along the whole of his front, aided from the side of the sea by the bomb-vessels and gun-boats.

Marshal Suchet meantime, leaving General Harispe with the command on the Xucar, had made for ♦Suchet’s movement for the relief of Tarragona.♦ Tortosa by forced marches with one division, his reserve, and a brigade of cavalry: and before his arrival he had dispatched orders for the garrison of that place to secure the Col de Balaguer; but the fort there was taken before any attempt to succour it was made, and he could therefore bring with him no artillery in his attempt to raise the siege of Tarragona. He had directed also Generals Decaen and Maurice Mathieu to march for the relief of the place. On the side of Tortosa all due precautions had been taken, by getting possession of the fort which absolutely commanded that singular pass. On the other side, Sir John Murray had ordered General Whittingham to see if the road could by any means be broken up or impeded, ... but in an open country this was found impracticable in any part, except at a point near the sea, and within two miles of Tarragona. When Whittingham was at Torre de Embarra upon this investigation, Manso, who had 2000 men at Vendrell, came there to inform him that Decaen, from Hostalric and the country beyond it, would arrive that night at Barcelona, where there would then be a force of 12,000 foot and 400 horse, disposable for the relief of Tarragona. This information General Whittingham communicated to Sir John Murray on the 9th, observing that the enemy might advance to succour that place, in two columns, one by the road along the coast, the other by the heights, upon the left of the besieging army; the Spanish division, which formed the left, would thus be exposed in flank to a superior force, and in a position that was commanded by the heights, and had the fortified city in its rear: and he suggested to Sir John that he should leave General Copons with the Catalan army to cover the siege, while he, with the British troops and the Majorcan division, marched immediately upon Villa Franca to attack Decaen; that General would have advanced beyond Villa Franca; victory, considering the number and the quality of the allied troops, would not be doubtful, and it would decide the contest in Catalonia; and after driving him from Molins de Rey, and destroying the stone bridge over the Llobregat, by which bridge alone artillery could be brought across that river, there would be time to return and encounter Marshal Suchet.

♦Sir John Murray raises the siege.♦

To this suggestion Sir John paid no regard; but late in the evening of the 11th, when every thing was ready for an immediate assault upon the Fuerte Real, he received intelligence that Suchet was advancing with 12,000 men from the side of Tortosa, and Decaen with 8000 from Barcelona; upon which he determined immediately to raise the siege, and with such haste as to abandon all the heavy artillery, ammunition, and stores that had been landed. He thought it would have been an useless waste of the lives of British soldiers to assault a work which, if carried, must, in his opinion, have been abandoned the next day: he placed no reliance upon the Spaniards under Copons, who had not more than 8500 disposable men, and those without pay, discipline, artillery, or means of subsisting, and whom he considered totally incapable of acting in the field. He distrusted his own foreign troops, who worked slowly at the siege, with great unwillingness, and with so little steadiness, that it had required an additional party of 200 British soldiers to carry to the batteries the ammunition which one of their parties threw away when they came under fire. The French too, he thought, had all advantages; they had fortresses in every direction to furnish them supplies, to retire upon if they wished to avoid an action till they could bring together more troops, or to cover them if they were defeated; whereas he was in the open field, without any point of support, or of retreat, except to the ships: and how serious an operation would it be to embark an army in an open bay, and on a beach where he had learned by experience that it was impossible to disembark in any but the lightest boats! Three days at least would be required to complete this re-embarkation. He decided, therefore, upon beginning it without delay.

Admiral Hallowell strongly remonstrated against abandoning the artillery, and engaged to bring off every thing, if Sir John would only give him the night from the 12th to the 13th; but that commander gave ear to less hopeful counsels, most unfortunately for himself. For public opinion loudly condemned his conduct; it became the subject of a court-martial; and though the sentence acquitted him upon all other charges, it pronounced that he had committed an error of judgment in abandoning his artillery, when it might have been brought off. The embarkation was commenced at daybreak. At first some of the valuable stores were sent off, but orders were given to abandon them. Great part of the infantry were put on board during the day in full view of the besieged, who crowded on the ramparts to behold what they were unable to understand. Sir John himself embarked early in the evening; but it was not till near midnight that the 1st division, under Sir William Clinton, who was left in command of the troops on shore, moved to the beach; and so completely were the enemy deceived as to its movements, by the piquets of this division having been kept at their advanced stations till darkness had closed, that not a man ventured without the walls, and not a shot was fired during the night, except from the ramparts, nor did any enemy show himself to molest the embarkation. The cavalry of the Majorcan division were embarked on the morning of the 13th, by means of a mole constructed for the purpose, about two leagues from the town; but the other cavalry and a great part of the field artillery were ordered by land to the Col de Balaguer, whither Sir John Murray repaired in the Bristol early on the 13th, and where the whole armament was directed to assemble.

♦Suchet approaches Col de Balaguer, and retires again.♦

While the allies were thus re-embarking with discreditable precipitance, two other armies thought it necessary in consequence of this movement to retreat also, in equal haste, ... General Copons from the vicinity of Reus to the mountains, lest he should be exposed to a combined attack from Decaen and the garrison of Tarragona; and Decaen himself to Barcelona, apprehending that the allies had raised the siege for the purpose of bringing him to action. On the evening of the 13th an enemy’s detachment was seen advancing by the piquets in front of the fort at Col de Balaguer, and judging that this might be the advance of Suchet’s force, Sir John ordered part of the infantry to be re-landed as it arrived from Tarragona, in order to cover the embarkation of the cavalry and field-artillery, which had reached that point in the course of the day. He was not mistaken in this judgment, ... Marshal Suchet having found the way by the mountains impracticable, thought to force his way by the Col, expecting to reduce the fort with as little difficulty as the allies had done; and on the 14th he presented himself there on the road from Tortosa with the main body of his army. He found a battalion in position covering the fort; but, to his astonishment, he also discovered the British fleet at anchor between the Col and Hospitalet. His light troops and skirmishers extended themselves along the hills, and approached within cannon-shot of the fort. But he found it impossible to advance, so completely was the road on that side commanded by the fort and by the judicious station taken by the ships of war, which could anchor there close to the shore; and it was equally impossible for an army to remain there many hours, there being no water within many miles. He found it necessary, therefore, to retire the same evening to the village of Perillo, not knowing what had occurred at Tarragona, alarmed as well as surprised at what he had seen, and holding himself prepared to follow the movements of the fleet.