As soon as the attack was known at head-quarters, Lord William put the army in motion to sustain his advance; but before any reinforcements could reach the spot, the French had carried every point, and it remained for him then either to retreat without loss of time, or give battle to an enemy superior in numbers and flushed with success, upon ground which afforded no advantage of position. He determined therefore upon retiring; Major-General Mackenzie, with the 2d division, covered the retreat during the most difficult part of its execution, to the village of Monjoz; Sarsfield moved to the left of Villafranca, by the hilly and woody country on that side; and the British, Germans, and Sicilians, took the main road by the villages of Monjoz and Arbos. Marshal Suchet expected that Decaen would arrive before Villafranca in time to co-operate with him, and force the allies to an action; but that general had to cross the Llobregat and the Noya, and was delayed also in the defiles by Manso, and by the Calabrese, with whom he fell in when they were making for San Sadurni. His own cuirassiers and dragoons, under General Meyer, pressed with very superior numbers, near Monjoz, upon the cavalry under Lord Frederic Bentinck, who covered the retreat, and some sabre strokes were exchanged between the two leaders. At length a most timely and vigorous charge was made simultaneously by Lord Frederic with the 20th dragoons, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hawker, and the Sicilians, and by Lieutenant-Colonel Schrader with the German hussars, by which the enemy were driven back, and so completely checked, that they made no farther attempt upon the retreating army; so it reached Vendrells that evening, without any loss. During the night it retired to Altafulla, and on the evening following took up its ground in front of Tarragona, as the nearest protecting situation; the Spaniards, under Sarsfield, moving upon Reus. The ruins of Tarragona could have afforded little support if the allies had not been better protected by their own strength, and by the opinion which Suchet had learned to entertain of them. He advanced no farther than Villafranca in pursuit; and after exacting a contribution from the distressed inhabitants, returned to Barcelona.
♦The command devolves upon Sir William Clinton.♦
At this time the uneasy state of affairs in Sicily, and the ill success of political changes there, as premature as they were well intended, rendered it necessary for Lord William Bentinck to repair thither, and the command of the army devolved upon Lieutenant-General Sir William Clinton. That general was left with an inadequate force, and under discouraging circumstances, to attend to objects which were of no inconsiderable importance to the common cause. He had to provide against the likelihood of Suchet’s availing himself of his late success to relieve or to withdraw his garrisons in Valencia or on the Ebro; and he had to occupy the attention of that able commander so as to prevent him from sending any considerable detachment to take part in Soult’s operations against Lord Wellington. It was found impracticable to construct a bridge upon the Ebro as low down as Amposta; and if it had not been so, he could not have spared troops enough from other more important services, to protect it against the sallies of the strong garrison in Tortosa. The best course therefore which he could pursue seemed to be that of repairing the defences of Tarragona, as far as time and means permitted, so as to render it a point of support. Well was it for the Anglo-Sicilian army that, notwithstanding the credit it had lost by Sir John Murray’s precipitate retreat, and the recent loss which it had sustained at Ordal, it had yet impressed Marshal Suchet with a most respectable opinion of its ability in the field; skilful as he was, nothing but that opinion withheld him from acting vigorously against it when he had it so greatly at advantage. His disposable force at this time was not short of 25,000 men, with a large body of cavalry; better troops he could not desire; and their supplies were protected by the possession of several important fortresses, all which were garrisoned well. The Anglo-Sicilian army amounted barely to 12,000 effective men, including a small body of cavalry; about half of these were British and Germans, the remainder Italians and Sicilians in British pay, on whom, though they were not ill-disciplined, the same confidence could not be placed in the presence of an enemy. There were about 11,000 Spanish troops whose services General Clinton might have commanded, if there had been means for rendering them available, but they were in a state almost of destitution; without pay, ill-clothed, and worse fed; and he had no control (as his predecessors had had) over the first Spanish army, which army also was prevented by its wants from taking the field, except occasionally, and then from keeping it, except for a very short time. With the commander of that army, General Copons, and with the other leaders, the best understanding prevailed; nor indeed were there among all the Spaniards better men or more distinguished officers than some of them, ... the names of Manso and Eroles will be held in honour as long as the Catalans retain any of that national spirit by which they are so honourably distinguished. They might be expected to check any movement of the enemy on the side of Lerida, or towards Tarragona; and to interrupt their communication with France along the inland road, by which their supplies were principally brought; but direct co-operation was not to be looked for where there was no unity of command, and ... on the one part ... all but a total want of means. Even the troops in British pay suffered great privations, their communication with the depôts at Malta and Gibraltar being interrupted because of the plague. But the tide of the enemy’s fortunes had now turned; and all difficulties were met cheerfully by the allies, in the sure hope that their perseverance would soon be crowned with success. As soon as arrangements were made for restoring the works at Tarragona, and for supplying as far as possible the Spaniards who were attached to the Anglo-Sicilian army, head-quarters were established at Villafranca; the troops which had been cantoned at Reus, Valls, and other places in the environs of Tarragona, were ordered to occupy an advanced line of cantonments: a force, consisting of cavalry, with some field artillery, and Sarsfield’s Spanish division of about 5000 infantry, were stationed at Villafranca; the enemy’s movements on the Llobregat were narrowly observed; and the remainder of the allied troops (with the exception of those who carried on the works at Tarragona) were so distributed, that, upon any emergency, they could be assembled at Villafranca in four-and-twenty hours.
Meantime, on the opposite side of the peninsula, an ♦Position of the armies on the Pyrenean frontier.♦ interval of seeming inactivity had followed the capture of S. Sebastian’s; but the time, though marked by no military movements, was busily employed in preparing for them, by closing up the troops, replacing the ammunition, and re-organizing those divisions which had suffered most. The opposing armies were in sight of each other. There was something mournful as well as impressive to a thoughtful mind in the contrast between the stupendous scenery of the Pyrenees and the diminutive appearance of field-works, and large armies upon such a theatre: “the little huts, and the less beings who inhabited them,” might have been overlooked as mere specks in the prospect, had it not been for the more mournful knowledge that these tens of thousands were collected there for life or for death; one party having been sent thither by the wicked will of an individual drunk with ambition, and the other brought there by the duty and necessity of resisting his lust of power. The troops who covered the blockade of Pamplona suffered severely from wet and cold, and were unavoidably subject to privations from which their more fortunate comrades near the coast were exempt. When the clouds opened they could see the fertile country of the enemy beneath them, in sunshine. During the weeks of hard, irksome duty, passed thus in a situation where exertion and enterprise were not required, but in their stead continual vigilance and patience, desertions became frequent; they were most numerous, as might be expected, among the Spaniards, because they were in their own country; and least, in a remarkable degree, among[2] the Portugueze.
It was now no longer in Buonaparte’s power to allot conscripts by the hundred thousand for the consumption ♦Levy ordered in France for Soult’s army.♦ of his war in the Peninsula. A levy of 30,000 was all that could be ordered to reinforce Soult’s army; “the armies of Spain, it was admitted, having been compelled to yield before ♦Speech of M. Regnaud.♦ superior numbers, and the advantages which the enemy drew from their maritime communications, needed reinforcement; for England, while in the north of Europe it lavished its intrigues and its promises, was not less lavish in the south of its resources and sacrifices. The proposed levy, however, raised in the departments adjacent to the Pyrenees, would suffice to stop the successes upon which the enemy were congratulating themselves too soon; it would suffice for resuming the attitude which became France, and for preparing the moment when England should no longer dispose of the treasures of Mexico, for the devastation of both the Spains!” This was the language of M. Regnaud de St. Jean d’Angely in an official speech; and the senator, M. le Comte de Beurnonville, making a report in the name of a special commission, spake in the same strain, ... a strain that becomes doubly curious when compared with the events which were so soon to follow. “England,” said he, “who intrigues much and hazards little, has not dared to compromise her land forces by sending them to combat in the north of Germany, and uniting them with the Russian and Prussian phalanxes; she feared reverses which she could not but foresee, and which for her would be irreparable. In this thorny conjuncture, and that it might have the air of doing something for the powers whom it had set to play, the cabinet of London had preferred mingling the English troops with the Spanish and Portugueze bands, being sure that it could withdraw them without inconvenience, according to its interest. Hence that sudden augmentation of its force, which had determined our armies to a retrograde movement; and these bands, encouraged by some ephemeral successes, have carried their audacity so far as to invest the places of S. Sebastian’s and Pamplona.” ... Buonaparte’s ministers never thought proper to inform the senate that these bands soon carried their audacity a little farther, and took them both. “The proposed levy,” it was added, “would enable the French armies of the Peninsula to resume their ancient attitude.”
♦October.Lord Wellington’s orders upon entering France.♦
The orator, and the special commission for whom he spake, were mistaken: it was England who resumed her ancient attitude, ... who re-asserted and resumed her military superiority upon that ground where her Plantagenets had displayed it. Her victorious armies were at this time preparing to plant their banners in France, leading thus the way to the general invasion of what the French in the pride of their military strength had called the sacred territory. As soon, indeed, as the enemy had been driven beyond the Pyrenees, the army had looked forward to this with all the pride of the military spirit, and of excited national feeling: the Spaniards and Portugueze talked of retribution and revenge; and among the British, the question was discussed whether or not they were to be freebooters. That question was answered by Lord Wellington in the general order which he issued as soon as the troops encamped among the Pyrenees. “The commander of the forces,” said he, “is anxious to draw the attention of the officers of the army to the difference of the situation in which they have been hitherto, among the people of Portugal and Spain, and that in which they may hereafter find themselves, among those of the frontiers of France.” After observing that every military endeavour must thenceforth be used for obtaining intelligence, and preventing surprise, he proceeded to say that, notwithstanding the utmost precautions were absolutely necessary, as the country in front of the army was the enemy’s, he was particularly desirous that the inhabitants should be well treated, and private property respected, as it had been till that time. The officers and soldiers of the army, said he, must recollect, that their nations are at war with France solely because the Ruler of the French nation will not allow them to be at peace, and is desirous of forcing them to submit to his yoke; and they must not forget that the worst of the evils suffered by the enemy in his profligate invasion of Spain and Portugal have been occasioned by the irregularities of the soldiers and their cruelties, authorized and encouraged by their chiefs, towards the unfortunate and peaceful inhabitants of the country. To revenge this conduct on the peaceable inhabitants of France would be unmanly and unworthy of the nations to whom the commander of the forces now addresses himself; and at all events would be the occasion of similar and worse evils to the army at large, than those which ♦General orders, July 9, 1813.♦ the enemy’s army have suffered in the Peninsula, and would eventually prove highly injurious to the public interest.
♦Passage of the Bidassoa.♦
Though it was not possible to act on the offensive upon a great scale, till Pamplona should have surrendered, Lord Wellington determined with the left wing of his army to cross the Bidassoa, and dislodge the enemy from some strong ground which they occupied on the right of that river as an advanced position; the key to it being the high steep mountain called La Rhune, which fronts the passes of Vera and Etchalar. Mount La Rhune is a remarkable spot; and its possession had been obstinately contested in the campaign of 1794, because its summit served as a watch-tower from whence the whole country between Bayonne and the Pyrenees might be observed. The mountain itself is within the French territory, but there is a chapel, or, in Romish language, a hermitage, on its summit, which used to be supported at the joint expense of the villages of Vera in Spain, and of Sarré, Ascain, and Urogne, in France; people of different nations, and hostile feelings, being there drawn together by the bond of their common faith.... The right of the army being at Roncesvalles and Maya, could at any time descend from its commanding situation into France.
♦The Bidassoa.♦