The mystery of space

by Robert T. Browne

Signs of the dawn of the elaborative stage, also called the stage of freedom, have been manifest now for upwards of three centuries and it is, therefore, in its beginnings. It is not fully upon us. Not yet can we fully realize what it may mean, nor can we unerringly forecast its ultimate outcome; but we feel that it is even now here in all the glories of its matutinal freshness. And the mind is beginning to be free from the grinding necessities of the constructive period having already freed itself from the restrictive handicaps of the primeval formulation period. Already the upgrowing rejuvenescences so common at the beginning of a new period are commencing to show themselves in every department of human activity in the almost universal desire for greater freedom. And this is particularly noticeable in the many political upheavals which, from time to time, are coming to the surface as well as in the countless other aspects of the wide-spread renaissance. Perhaps the time may come, never quite fully, when there will be no longer any necessity to provide against the external exigencies of life; perhaps, the time will never be when the mind shall no more be bound by the law of self-preservation, not even when it has attained unto the immortality of absolute knowledge; yet, it is intuitively felt that it must come to pass that the mind shall be vastly freer than it is to-day. And with this new freedom must come liberation from the necessities of the elementary problems of mere physical existence.

The inference is, therefore, drawn that the fourth dimensional concept, and all that it connotes of hyperspace or spaces of n-dimensionality are some of the evidences that this stage of freedom is dawning. And the mind, joyous at the prospect of unbounded liberty which these concepts offer, cannot restrain itself but has already begun to revel in the sunlit glories of a newer day. What the end shall be; what effect this new liberty will have on man's spiritual and economic life; and what it may mean in the upward strivings of the Thinker for that sublime perpetuity which is always the property of immediate knowledge no one can hope, at the present time, to fathom. It is, however, believed with Keyser that "it is by the creation of hyperspaces that the rational spirit secures release from limitation"; for, as he says, "in them it lives ever joyously, sustained by an unfailing sense of infinite freedom."

The elevating influence of abstract thinking, such as excogitation upon problems dealing with entities inhabiting the domain of mathesis is, without doubt, incalculable in view of the fact that it is only through this kind of thought that the spirit is enabled to reach its highest possibilities. This is undoubtedly the philosophy of those religious and occult exercises known as "meditations," and this perhaps was the main idea in the mind of the Hebrew poet when he exclaimed: "Let the words of my mouth and the meditation of my heart be acceptable in thy sight, O Lord, my strength and my Redeemer." The principal, if not the only, value possessed by the "summitless hierarchies of hyperspaces" which the mathematician constructs in the world of pure thought is the enrichening and ennobling influence which they exert upon the mind. But admittedly this unbounded domain of mathetic territory which he explores and which he finds "peopled with ideas, ensembles, propositions, relations and implications in endless variety and multiplicity" is quite real to him and subsists under a reign of law the penalties of which, while not as austere and unreasonable as some which we find in our tridimensional world, are nevertheless quite as palpable and as much to be feared. For the orthodoxy of mathematics is as cold and intolerant as ever the religious fanatic can be. But the reality and even the actuality which may be imputed to the domain of mathesis is of an entirely different quality from that which we experience in our world of triune dimensionality and it is a regrettable error of judgment to identify them. It ought, therefore, never be expected, nor is it logically reasonable to assume that the entities which inhabit the mathetic realm of the analyst should be submissive to the laws of sensible space; nor that the conditions which may be found therein can ever be made conformable to the conditions which exist in perceptual space.

It was Plato's belief that ideas alone possessed reality and what we regard as actual and real is on account of its ephemerality and evanescence not real but illusionary. This view has been shared by a number of eminent thinkers who followed, with some ostentation, the lead established by Plato. For a considerable period of time this school of thinkers had many adherents; but the principles at length fell into disrepute owing to the absurdities indulged in by some of the less careful followers. The realism, or for that matter, the actuality of ideas cannot be denied; yet it is a realism which is neither to be compared with the physical reality of sense-impressions nor its phenomena. The character and peculiarity of ideas are in a class apart from similar notions of perceptual space content. It is as if we were considering the potentialities of the spirit world and the entities therein in connection with incarnate entities which in the very nature of the case is not allowable. Furthermore, it is unreasonable to suppose that the conditions on a higher plane than the physical can be made responsible to a similar set of conditions on the physical plane.

There are certain astronomers who base their speculations as to the habitability of other planets upon the absurd hypothesis that the conditions of life upon all planets must be the same as those on the earth, forgetting that the extent of the universe and the scope of motility of life itself are of such a nature as to admit of endless variations and adaptations. There is a realism of ideas and a realism of perceptual space. Yet this is no reason why the two should be identified. On the other hand, owing to the diversity in the universe, every consideration would naturally lead to the assumption that they are dissimilar. To invest ideas, notions, implications and inferences with a reality need not logically or otherwise affect the reality of a stone, a fig, or even of a sense-impression.

To a being on the spirit levels our grossest realities must appear as non-existent. They are neither palpable nor contactable in any manner within the ordinary range of physical possibilities. For us his gravest experiences can have no reality whatsoever; for no matter how real an experience may be to him it is altogether beyond our powers of perception, and therefore, to us non-existent also. It should, however, be stated that the state of our knowledge about a given condition can in no way affect its existence. It merely establishes the fact that two or more realities may exist independent of one another and further that the gamut of realism in the universe is infinite and approaches a final state when its occlusion into absolute being follows as a logical sequence.

Recurring to the consideration of the reality of spirit-realms as compared with that of sensible space, it comes to view that our idealism, that is, the idealism which is a quality of conceptualization, may be regarded as identical with their realism, at least as being on the same plane as it. Stated differently, the things that are ideal to us and which constitute the data of our consciousness may be as real to them as the commonest object of sense-knowledge is to us. What, therefore, appears to us as the most ethereal and idealistic may have quite a realistic character for them.

Ultimately, however, and in the final deeps of analysis it will be found undoubtedly that both our realism and our idealism as well as similar qualities of the spirit world are in all essential considerations quite illusionary. All knowledge gained in a condition short of divinity itself is sadly relative. Even mathematical knowledge falls far short of the absolute, the fondest claims of the orthodox mathematician to the contrary notwithstanding. It has been said frequently that a mathematical fact is an absolute fact and that its verity, necessity and certainty cannot be questioned anywhere in the universe whether on Jupiter, Neptune, Fomalhaut, Canopus or Spica. But having so declared, the fact of the sheer relativity of our knowledge is not disturbed thereby nor controverted. Happily, neither distance nor a lack of distance can in any way affect the quality of human knowledge, mathematical knowledge not excepted. That can only be affected by conditions which cause it to approach perfection and nothing but evolution can do that.

In the light of results obtained in analytic investigations the question of the flexibility of mathematical applications becomes evident and one instead of being convinced of the vaunted invariability of the laws obtaining in the world of mathesis is, on the other hand, made aware of the remarkable and seemingly unrestrained facility with which these laws may be made to apply to any conditions or set of assumptions within the range of the mind's powers of conception. Mathematicians have deified the definition and endowed it with omnific powers imputing unto it all the attributes of divinity—immutability, invariance, and sempiternity. In this they have erred grievously although, perhaps, necessarily. Mathetic conclusions are entirely conditional and depend for their certainty upon the imputed certitude of other propositions which in turn are dependent, in ever increasing and endlessly complex relations, upon previously assumed postulates. These facts make it exceedingly difficult to understand the attitude of mind which has obscured the utter mutability and consequent ultimate unreliability of the fine-spun theories of analytic machinations.

The apriority of all mathematical knowledge is open to serious questioning. And although there is no hesitancy in admitting the basic agreement of the most primary facts of mathematical knowledge with the essential character of the intellect the existence of well-defined limits for such congruence cannot be gainsaid. The subjunctive quality of geometric and analytical propositions is made apparent by an examination of the possibilities falling within the scope of permissibility offered by mathetic license. For instance, privileged to proceed according to the analytic method it is allowable to reconstruct the sequence of values in our ordinary system of enumeration so as to admit of the specification of a new value for say, the entire series of odd numbers. This value might be assumed to be a plus-or-minus one, dependent upon its posture in the series. That is, all odd numbers in the series beginning with the digit 3, and continuing, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, ... n, could be assumed to have only a place value which might be regarded as a constant-variable. The series of even numbers, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, ... n, may be assumed to retain their present sequence values. Under this system the digit 1 would have an absolute value; all other odd numbers would have a constant-variable value; constant, because always no more nor less than 1 dependent upon their place in the operations and whether their values were to be applied by addition or subtraction to or from one of the values in the even number series; variable, because their values would be determinable by their application and algebraic use.