Thus because it is found that the entire volume of a cube is actually comprehended within the directions indicated by the lines ab, bc and db it is determined that the three coördinates of the point b are necessary and sufficient to establish the dimensions of the cube and consequently of the space in which it rests. The conception may be stated in this way: If a collection of elements, say points or lines, be of such a nature or order that it is sufficient to know a certain definite number of facts about it in order to be able to distinguish every one of the elements from all the others, then the assemblage or collection of elements is said to be of the same number of dimensions as there are elements necessary to its determination. In the above figure there are three elements, namely, the lines ab, bc, and db, which are necessary and sufficient for the determination of the position of the point b. In this way geometers have determined that our space is tridimensional; but it is obvious that this conclusion is based not upon any examination of space itself but upon the measurement of bodies in space. Upon this view it is seen that conclusions based upon such a procedure render our notion of the extension of bodies in space identical with the notion of spatial extensity. In other words, we take bodies in space and by examining their characteristics and properties arrive at an alleged apodeictic judgment of space. It is by means of this conventional norm of geometric knowledge that various other spaces, notably the one-, two-, four-and n-space, have been devised. It would appear that if some more absolute standard of measurement or definition of space were adopted the confusion which now clings to the conception of dimension could be obviated. For if it be true that three and only three elements are necessary to determine a point-position in our space and that in this determination we also find the number of dimensions of space, then it may also be true that n-coördinates would just as truly determine the dimensionality of an n-space, which is granted. But then the n-space would be just as legitimate as the three-space; for it is determined by exactly the same standards. It is both quantitatively and qualitatively the same. If, however, on account of the exigencies that might arise, we are forced to seek solace in the notion of an n-space whither shall we turn for it? It cannot be found; for it is imperceptible, uninhabitable, non-existent, and therefore, absolutely and purely an abstraction. Consequently, there must be something radically wrong with the definition of space or with its determinants.

The purely arbitrary character of dimensionality is very aptly described by Cassius Jackson Keyser, who says:

"... The dimensionality of a given space is not unique, but depends upon the choice of the geometric entity for primary or generating element. A space being given, its dimensionality is not therewith determined, but depends upon the will of the investigator who by a proper choice of generating element endows the space with any dimensionality he pleases. That fact is of cardinal significance for science and philosophy."[11]

It is a fact of "cardinal significance" for science; because it emphasizes the necessity for some more rational procedure than that of the geometrician in arriving at an absolutely unique method of determining the dimension and essential nature of real space. Its significance for philosophy lies in the need of a logical, rigidly exclusive and absolutely peculiar standard of space definition. The definition of perceptual space should be such as rigorously inhibits its inclusion as a particular in any general class. The necessity for this is warranted by its universality and uniqueness.

The lines of demarkation between what is recognized as perceptual space and what has been called geometric or conceptual space should be very sharply drawn. So that when reference is made to either there will be no doubt as to which is meant. And then, too, conceptual space is no space at all, properly speaking. It is merely a system of space-measurement. And as such has no logical right to be put in the same category as perceptual space.

Real space is unique. Geometric space belongs to a class whose members are capable of indefinite multiplication. It is certainly most illogical to identify them. Perceptual space, figuratively speaking, is a quantity; analytic space is the foot-rule, the yard-stick, the kilometer, by which it is measured and apportioned. It is logically impossible to predicate the same conclusion for both of them. That is, to do so causes a profound fracture of the fundamental norms of logic. Such conclusions being thus illegitimate it is rather surprising that an error of this nature should have been made. It is perhaps accountable for on the grounds of the geometer's complete insouciance as to how his postulates shall stand in their relation to things in the phenomenal world.

It is agreed that as convenient as is Euclid's system of space-measurement it is not by any means congruent with the extension of real space objects. It does, however, approximate congruity with these objects as nearly as possible. How then could it be expected that a system of space-measurement so far removed from this primary congruence as the non-Euclidean system is should exhibit more obvious signs of correspondence? But the advocates of the n-dimensionality of space have illatively asserted the identity of space and its dimensions. Accordingly, there is not recognized any distinction between their conception of space itself and its qualitative peculiarities. They use the terms interchangeably. So that dimension means space and vice versa. In this lack of discrimination may be found the source of much of the confusion which attaches to the conception of space.

If it were arguable that the relation between space and its dimensions is the same as that between matter and its properties then the restriction of this relation to three and only three directions of extent would be disallowed; for the reason that if, as is commonly done, dimension be made to mean direction of extent, there would be an unlimited number of directions of extent and they would all be perceptible. But this is really another fundamental fault. Non-Euclideans have stretched the meaning of the term dimension so that it not only includes the idea of direction but an entirely new class of qualities—the fourth dimension. And despite this reformation of the original conception, they demand that it shall be called space.

We have just shown that the generic concept of dimensionality is that three and only three coördinates are necessary and sufficient for its determination. Granting that this is true, are we not compelled consequently to see that we have, by adding a fourth or n-dimensions, involved ourselves into a more complex situation than before? For by postulating a fourth dimension either we have created a new world whose dimensions are four in number or we have explicitly admitted that the three dimensions have a fourth. Aside from the logical difficulties which beset these conclusions there is also set up a condition which is at variance with the most elementary requirements of common sense.

Thus far mathematical thought has not served to clarify our notions of space nor to shed any new light upon the vital processes which are alleged to have their explanation in the new discovery. Simply stated, metageometricians have brought us to the place where we must either recognize that the fourth dimension is another sphere lying dangerously near the earth in which space extends in four primary directions and in which four coördinates are necessary for its determination or we are driven to the other horn of the dilemma where we are brought face to face with the conclusion that the three perceptual space dimensions have in common a hitherto unknown property or extension in virtue of which it may be viewed as having an unlimited number of dimensions. To accept the latter view is equivalent to saying that, in the above figure, the three lines ab, bc and db have formed a triple entente by which they have mutually and severally acquired a new domain, hyperspace, and in which, because of the vast resources of the region, they are able to perform wondrous things.