He says:

"The a priori is identical with the purely formal which originates in our mind by abstraction. When we limit our attention to the purely relational, dropping all other features out of sight, we produce a field of abstraction in which we can construct purely formal combination, such as numbers, or the ideas of types and species. Thus we create a world of pure thought which has the advantage of being applicable to any purely formal consideration and we work out systems of numbers which, when counting, we can use as standards of reference for our experience in practical life."

Thus Carus definitely links up the a priori to a factor which is nothing more nor less than a mental by-product. For such is the category in which would be placed both the process of abstraction and its results. It is therefore exceedingly difficult to understand why so cursory a consideration should have been given to the principle of apriority than which no other element of mind is more essentially a part of the mind itself.

The formal is symbolic. It signifies an informing quantity. Pure form itself is but a negation of that which formerly filled it. Then, too, the formal is purely artificial because it is a mental construction. Essentially there is as much difference between the purely formal and the a priori as between creator and creature, as between potter and clay. The one is the builder, the other is the material; the one the knower and the other the known. Thus, the only reason that the formal is found to be answerable to the a priori at all is due to the fact that it is construable only upon the basis of the a priori. But being so is not sufficient warrant for its identification with the a priori. The formal merely represents the totality of possibilities in the universe as viewed by the mind; but as the number of possibilities open to the mind is, on account of its nature and purpose limited, it is not to be supposed that it (the mind) shall measure up to all the possibilities offered by the formal. Moreover, it is certain that no sane mind cherishes the hope that there shall ever be found in the universe of life and form a congruence for all of the possibilities held out by the purely formal.

As an eternal principle of mind, the a priori is in agreement with the divine mind of the kosmos. In its aposteriority the mind is of diverse tendences, qualities and characteristics. Apriorily, it acts in unison with the eternal purpose of life and the universal mind. In its aposteriority, it often goes awry. In its apriority it can never be insane; insanity is a symptom of the morbid a posteriori.

The mind in man acts the same as mind in the vegetal and lower animal kingdoms. Metabolism and katabolism, indeed all cell-activity, are a priori performances of the mind. Growth and all its phenomena, the cyclicism of natural processes, and every activity connected therewith belong to the category of the a priori. Cells multiply, divide, build up and tear down tissues and they do it intuitively. Most certainly these functions are performed without any assistance from the intellect. All the myriad activities in nature with which the intellect in man has not the slightest concern, truly acting in accord with some primordial impetus, are activities a priori.

Now what is the attitude of the intellect, in the light of the a priori, towards space and the question of dimensionality? It is evident that no matter what this attitude may be it is in agreement with the constitution of things and of the universe. And if so, it is right and without illusion. It is also evident that whatever notion a posteriori the intellect may entertain with respect to these questions is unavoidably liable to the illusionary drawbacks common to conclusions based upon limited experience. The geometric view of space belongs to the category of the a posteriori. Hence it is subject to the usual imposition of error.

Tersely stated, Kant's view of space is that it is a form of intuition, a form a priori, a transcendental form. As such he considered it to be a native form of perception not belonging to the category of sense-deliveries. Accordingly, space is a form of intuition arising out of and inhering in the constitution of mind. It is a notion which constitutes the universal and eternal prerequisite of mind and is, therefore, intrinsically necessary to all phases of mentation. Now, this being true just what may be said to be the relation of dimensionality to this a priori form of space which is found to exist in the mind as an eternal aspect of its nature? Does the mind intuitively measure its contents or its operations by the empirical standard of space-measurement known as dimension? Is the attitude of the mind towards the objectively real one of discrimination a priori as to the direction or dimension in which a percept may originate? In other words, does the mind habitually and intuitively refer its data to a system of coördinates for final determination? There is no other answer but that the mind makes no such reference and is dependent upon no kind of coördinate system in any of its operations a priori. As a form of intuition, the space notion is present in the mind as a scope of existence, of motility, of being and of sheer roominess. The notion of direction or dimension, being an artificial construction, does not enter into this form of intuition at all. It is only when the mind comes to elaborate upon its perceptive performances and possibilities that the questions of relations, positions and directions arise. But this latter is a matter separate and distinct from the state of awareness which embodies the notion of space.

Dimension is an arbitrary norm constructed by the mind for the determination of various positions in space. It is an accident or by-product of the process of elaborative cognition, a convenient and appropriate means of measurement for objects in space and their space-relations. But it is no more a priori than a foot rule or a square. But being purely an empirical product it may be said to be an aspect of psychogenesis because it relates to the evolutionary aspect of mind. The assumption may therefore be allowed that the mind may, in the course of its evolution, find it convenient and appropriate to devise an additional ordinate or dimension to satisfy the necessities of its more complex ramifications into the nature of things and to determine their greatly increased space-relations. It may be even possible for the mind to function normally in a space of four dimensions. But this would simply be a new adjustment, not a change in the essential nature of mind. It would be like the series of adjustments to environments which man has made in the onward movement of civilization. There has been no serious change in the manhood per se of man. That has remained the same; there has been merely a complication of environmental influences. Similarly, in the acquisition of four-dimensional powers, granting that such an acquisition is possible, there is nothing to be added to the aprioriness of mind itself. Is it not, therefore, logical to assume that the discovery of a fourth coördinate and the consequent conceptualization of the same, point to the development in the mind of a greatly extended faculty, more keenly penetrative powers of cognition and a further diversification of its environments than it has hitherto enjoyed? Indeed, it seems so.