The mystery of space

by Robert T. Browne

There is no doubt but that the original impulse which resulted in the creation of the faculty of perceptibility in the Thinker also marked out the metes and bounds of our entire range of perceivability which includes not only the intuitional but something higher still. There is no doubting either the obvious fact that these metes and bounds cannot have been other than rudimentary or general lines of denotation, and that the work of their further elaboration and refinement is a matter of evolutionary detail. For if we assume that the general principles of evolution are true we immediately recognize the cogency of this view. That which we now call the hand has not always been the perfect instrument that it is nor has the ear always been so keenly adjusted as at present. It has required undoubtedly many million of years for the eye to reach its present degree of complexity and adaptability. Yet in all these cases the different organs existed in potentiality from the beginning; the metes and bounds of the hand, the ear and the eye were laid out primordially. Evolution has specialized and adjusted them to environments and needs. Thus it will be seen that while the intuitional faculty was designed for manifestation from the beginning it has nevertheless required ages for its appearance even in the most rudimentary fashion.

Almost the entire content of human knowledge is based upon assumptions or hypotheses; in fact, is but a mass of these, and especially is this true of mathematics, science and philosophy. Of course, there are certain minor observable facts which by reason of the seeming permanence of their existence have been eliminated from the category of assumptions. But even this elimination when it is traced to its depths may be found to be erroneous, and perhaps after all, when we have really begun to know something of the reality of things, may have again to be placed in this category. And then, too, the hypothetical nature of our knowledge is due largely to the Thinker's method of contacting the objective world which is the subject of his knowledge. It is because it is necessary for him to interpret the neurographical symbols which sense-impressions make in the brain matter according to a psychic code that renders his knowledge of things in general hypothetical. His interpretations are based upon an assumed value which experience has taught him to give to each neurogram. But even when his interpretations leave nothing to be desired in respect to their accuracy of apprehension of what the neurographical vibration implies there is that further barrier to his cognition of reality which is due to his remote removal from the object itself and the consequent extreme difficulty, if not present impossibility, of identifying his consciousness with the essence of the objects which he contemplates.

When the Thinker's consciousness is presented with a neurograph of say, a cube, it is not the cube itself which he contemplates or observes; it is the neurograph or psychic symbol which the sense-impressions make in the brain. His consciousness deals not with the object but with the symbols. It is true that when he verifies one neurograph by another, as the scopographic or sight impressions by the tactographic or touch impressions it is found that the delivery thus determined is a true enough representation. It is also true that the Thinker, as a rule, does not accept a neurograph as valid until it has been verified by at least one or more presentations through his outer sense organs. It occurs, therefore, that all such deliveries are verified and corrected by one or more sense witnesses before final acceptance by the Thinker; but even then it cannot be said that his notions thus gained are in all respects correct and true to the standards set up by the brain-consciousness not to mention higher forms of consciousness. And then, when we consider that in addition to the numerous chances for error which naturally inhere in this method of cognition it must also be apparent that the Thinker's approach to the reality of things is much impeded by his separation therefrom, the unreliability of our ordinary methods of cognition is much emphasized.

But aside from the egoic or brain-consciousness there is the higher consciousness of the Thinker himself. For the brain-consciousness is merely his method of regarding and comprehending the neurographical deliveries, the psychic code by which he systematizes and organizes his cognitions or impressions of the sensible world. This higher consciousness constitutes the faculty a priori for the Thinker on a higher plane of existence, and because it deals with elements altogether unlike those which make up the data of brain-consciousness is, accordingly, less liable to error in its judgments of the supersensuous presentations than is the objective or brain-mind. In fact, it is difficult to conceive of a state or conditions wherein, supported as this view contemplates, the intuition should err in judgment. Viewed from the standpoint of external impedimenta, this condition may be said to be due to the absence of sensuous barriers which would otherwise prevent the near approach of the Thinker's consciousness to the essence of things which is the object of his consciousness on this higher plane. Directly, however, it is undoubtedly due to the fact that, following the lead of life itself, yea, as the veritable handmaid of life, it cannot err where life is concerned. When dealing with notions a priori or intuitograms the Thinker is relieved of the onerous necessities and limitations incident to the examination and determination of neurographic symbols registered in the brain cortex and so is free to study, to examine and judge at first hand the impressions which are received from his own plane of intuition. The difference is about the same as that which should exist between the methods of communication between two telegraphic operators when in one instance they would have to depend upon the deliveries conveyed over the wires, while in the other, when they stood face to face with each other, they could communicate by direct conversation. In the one case the method of communication is direct and simple, while in the other it is indirect, circuitous and complex. It can, therefore, be readily seen that in all cases where the approach is made in a direct, simple manner the probability of error is much less than in cases where the intellectual approach is less direct and more complicated. Hence in drawing conclusions as to the relative importance of the two mechanisms of consciousness, the a posterioristic and the a priori, it is necessary to bear in mind the comparative superiority of the one over the other as a means of cognition. It matters little that the intuitional faculty is not so well developed as the tuitional because it is but natural that inasmuch as the Thinker's needs are subserved in the sensuous realm by the tuitional consciousness it should, from more active use, gain somewhat over the intuitional in facility of expression and general utility. And the more so, because the two faculties serve different purposes; one is attuned to receive impressions from a subtler plane while the other is fitted for contact with the phenomenal universe; one is related to the conceptual while the other is related to the perceptual. They differ not only in function, but in nature as well. There is, of course, a natural barrier consisting of the inherent limitations of each faculty which prevents the full mergence or unification of the two states of consciousness so that there exists a state of consciousness the data of which the brain-mind is unaware, it being able only at rare intervals even to receive so much as slight impressions from it in the nature of intuitional flashes or inspirations and the like. Viewed in this light it would appear that the cognitions which are most truthworthy are those which are presented by the intuitional faculty because they are nearer to the essential reality of things; they have to do more specifically with the nature of that which appears while the tuitional mind can only regard that which is the appearance. Herein lies the whole difference.

The natural outcome of this division of labor between the tuitional and the intuitional is the establishment of the fact of man's relationship both to the phenomenal and the real; that in his psychic nature must reside the faculty of apprehending the real and that he shall one day awaken into activity this now latent faculty whereby he may make a direct and naked contact with reality.

If it be true that, as Plato said, God does geometrize, and that the divine geometry, as will appear, is based upon a system, an alphabet which taken together are the point . , the line ——,

, the square

, and the circle