OBJECTIONS TO THE CALVINISTIC DOCTRINE OF ELECTION.
(1.) We object, in the first place, to the Calvinistic doctrine of election, because it is absurd to call it election. The advocates of the three views of election mentioned stoutly maintain that the persons chosen are chosen unconditionally; in other words, they are chosen not on account of any mental or moral quality in them. It is on this account designated unconditional. There is nothing whatever in the persons chosen on which to ground the choice. Supposing this to be the case, can there be any choice, election? Mr. Robinson has put the case thus: “What is election? Is it possible to choose one of two things, excepting for reasons to be found in the things themselves? Ask a friend which of a number of oranges he will take. If he sees nothing in them to determine selection, he says, ‘I have no choice.’ Ask a blind man which of two oranges, that are out of his reach, he prefers, and you mock him by proposing an impossibility. If they are put near him, that he may feel them or smell them, or if by any other means he can judge between them, he can choose, otherwise he cannot choose. If they lie far from him, he may say, ‘Give me the one that lies to the east, or the west;’ but that is a lottery, an accident, chance, certainly no choice. Therefore, to assert that the cause of election is not in anything in the person chosen, is really to deny that there is any election. And it is a curious fact that the most vehement predestinarians, while they flatter themselves that they are the honoured advocates of the Divine decrees, by sequence set aside election altogether. Their hypothesis annihilates the very doctrine for which they are most zealous, and, if it may be said without irreverence, introduces the dice box into the counsels of heaven” (Bible Studies, p. 192). If we look into life, we always find that when we elect or choose, we do so because of something in the person or thing elected. It is so as regards food, drink, dress, houses, pictures, statues, books; it is so, too, as regards members of Parliament, ministers for pastorates, and in marriage. We are, indeed, so constituted that we cannot conceive of choice or election except upon the grounds of freedom in the elector, and something to differentiate the object chosen from others of like nature. The Confession of Faith says, however, that those who are predestinated unto life are chosen “without any foresight of faith or good works, or perseverance in either of them, or any other thing in the creation, as conditions or causes moving Him thereunto, and all to the praise of His glorious grace” (Con., chap. iii.) Yet the Bible says expressly, “But know that the Lord hath set apart him that is godly for himself” (Ps. iv. 3); “Hath not God chosen the poor in this world rich in faith?” (Jas. ii. 5.) There is a setting apart, or choosing, but it is not unconditional, as these verses show.
No doubt, the motive of those who hold unconditional election is good, arising from a desire to give all the glory of salvation to God, and from the frequency of the term “grace” in regard to our deliverance. But the great object of giving all the glory to God may be, and is accomplished, without doing violence to Scripture, or trampling upon common sense. The principle or system of Syenergism does this. It simply means that man is active in his own conversion. It was advocated in his later years by Melancthon. We have not, however, to do with the motive of our friends, but with the philosophy of the subject; and to assert that men are chosen to salvation apart from condition, is only assertion, and an absurd assertion, too. Try it in regard to anything, and its folly will be apparent. Why, then, insist upon it in religion? Are we to throw reason to the dogs when we speak on scriptural subjects?
(2.) In the second place, we object to the Calvinistic theory of election, because it [ignores and tramples upon a primary principle of philosophy]. The principle is this: “That a plurality of principles are not to be assumed when the phenomena can possibly be explained by one” (Hamilton’s Reid, p. 751).
It is what is known as the law of parsimony. The three views of election referred to have bound up with them, as an integral portion of the system, the theory of irresistible grace. Take this away, and they fall to pieces as a rope of sand. A man who has hitherto lived an ungodly life becomes converted, and the question arises—how are we to account for this moral phenomenon? Our friends from whom we differ account for it in this way: In the past eternity God saw that the man would come upon the stage of time, and determined to visit his soul with an irresistible influence, under the operation of which he became converted. Now this is to them a very satisfactory way of accounting for the conversion. But may not this change in the man take place without this tertiam quid, or third something? If it may, then to import it into the controversy is to violate the law of parsimony or maxim of philosophy, that it is wrong to multiply causes beyond what are necessary. But let us look at life: let us enter the sphere of human experience. We find men, for instance, who in politics were at one period pronounced Radicals, like Burdett, becoming Conservative in their opinions; and men, like the Peelites, changing from the Conservative side to that of the Liberals. In accounting for this we do not call in a mysterious and occult influence to solve the matter. It is explainable without this. Take the case of medicine. We find men educated in the allopathic system changing, and becoming disciples of Habnemann. Ask them how it came about, and they answer at once, that it was by considering the results. Take a case of intemperance, An old inebriate attends a temperance lecture, listens attentively, becomes persuaded of the value of abstinence, signs the pledge, and spends the remainder of his life a sober man. He loved the drink, and now he hates it. Ask him how it came about? He tells you at once that the facts and arguments of the lecture convinced him of the evil of the drink, and led him to abandon it for ever. A great change has been effected, but in perfect harmony with the known laws of mind. Let us now look at religion. Paul arrives at Corinth, and preaches the Gospel to the inhabitants of that degenerate city. They listened to the wondrous story of redeeming love, and became changed through means of it. Was there anything in the nature of the truth preached to them and believed by them fitted to do this? We think that there was. They had sins—were guilty. Paul told them of a Saviour who died for them. This met their case. They were degraded, foul; the religion Paul preached appealed to their sense of right, to their gratitude, to their fears and their hopes; and believing it, they became regenerated in their moral nature. They had been won to God by the “Gospel” (1 Cor. iv. 15). As temperance truth revolutionises the drunkard, so does Gospel truth the sinner (1 Peter i. 23, 25). The apostle was the agent employed by the Holy Spirit, and believing the message he brought, they were believing the Spirit (See 1 Samuel viii. 7). Since, then, the truth believed is a sufficient reason for the change, why introduce the theory of irresistible grace? It may be replied that this kind of grace is used to get the sinner to attend to the message.
But attention to any subject is brought about by considering motives. Man has the power over his attention. It is the possession of this power which is a main item in constituting him a responsible being. He may or may not attend to the voice of God. If he attends to it he lives; if not, he dies. If God used force in this matter, why reason with men and appeal to them as He does?
We appeal to Christian consciousness. Let any Christian give a reason of the hope that is in him—and it is all perfectly reasonable. All through, in the great matter of conversion, he acted freely. He attended to the Divine message—but there was no compulsion. Why, then, insist upon irresistibility when it is repudiated by Christian consciousness? We know no reason for it but the exigencies of the system. If you are waiting for it you are being deceived.
(3.) We object, in the third place, to the Calvinistic view of election, because it makes God a [respecter of persons]. What is it to be a respecter of persons? Literally, it means “an accepter of faces.” According to the Imperial Dictionary, it signifies “a person who regards the external circumstances of others in his judgment, and suffers his opinion to be biased by them, to the prejudice of candour, justice, and equity.” It is to act with partiality. It is of the utmost moment that respect of persons should not be shown in the domestic circle, on the bench; or in the church. If a father shows favouritism to one son less worthy, say, than the others, he lays himself open to the charge of partiality, unevenness in his procedure, and it tends to alienate the affections of his other children. To show it on the bench is to sully the ermine, and bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Whoever else may exhibit it, the church is required to have clean hands in the matter (James ii.)
We are so constituted that we cannot love or hate by a mere fiat of the will. Before we can love one another with complacency, there must be the perception of excellence. And it is the same as regards God. Hence it is of the last importance that to our mental view He should be pure, holy, impartial, good. To love Him if we thought Him otherwise, would be impossible. Now God has abundantly shown, both in providence and in the Bible, that He is not a respecter of persons. He executes His laws indiscriminately—upon all alike. Fire burns, poison kills, water drowns all and sundry. If the laws of health are broken, the penalty is enforced on each transgressor according to the measure of his transgression. It is the same with moral penalties. If a man lies, or steals, or is mean, or selfish, he will suffer moral deterioration, which will pass through his moral being as a leprosy. Our physical, mental, and moral natures are thus under their respective laws, and whosoever breaks these laws God executes the penalty on the transgressor. There is in this respect no favouritism—no respect of persons.