“The signing of the Treaty of Peace with Russia,” writes Lord Malmesbury
THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA.
on the 30th of March, “was announced by the firing of cannon from the Tower and Horse Guards. Numbers collected in the streets, but no enthusiasm was shown.”[274] In fact, when the terms became known there was much popular disappointment, and the Sun newspaper actually appeared in deep mourning over our national humiliation. On the next morning a great crowd assembled in front of the Mansion House. At ten o’clock the Lord Mayor, attended by the Sheriffs, the Sword-bearer, Mace-bearer, and City Marshal, advanced to the stone balcony, and amidst loud cheers read a despatch from the Home Secretary informing him that the Treaty was signed. At noon the Lord Mayor proceeded in state to the Royal Exchange, where a great number of ladies had mingled with the crowd, and read the despatch again.
THE CONFERENCE OF PARIS, 1856.
And what were the terms of peace? The Powers admitted Turkey to participate in all the advantages of the public law of Europe, and they agreed that in any future dispute with the Porte, the matter must be submitted to arbitration before force was used by either side. The Sultan was bound by the Treaty to communicate to the Powers a firman improving the condition of his Christian subjects, but this instrument, it was stipulated, gave the Powers no collective or individual right to interfere between Turkey and her Christian subjects. The Black Sea was neutralised—i.e., all ships of war were excluded from it, and the establishment of arsenals on its coasts was prohibited. But the Euxine was declared free to the trading vessels of all nations, and the Powers were at liberty to keep a few armed ships of light draught for police duty on the neutralised sea. The navigation of the Danube was declared free. Russia ceded Bessarabia to Turkey. The privileges and immunities of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia were guaranteed, but the Sultan was permitted to garrison the latter province. Russia and Turkey were bound to restore to each other the conquests they had respectively made in Asia. On the invitation of France the Congress was asked to consider the position of Greece, the Roman States, and the two Sicilies. It was also asked to condemn the licence of the Belgian Press, and to formulate new rules for maritime warfare. These discussions came to naught, but it was agreed by the “Declarations of Paris” that privateering should be abolished; that, with the exception of contraband, an enemy’s goods must be free from capture under a neutral flag, a neutral’s goods being also respected under an enemy’s flag; and that “paper blockades” should not be recognised, i.e., a blockade to be effective must in future be maintained by a force strong enough to cut off access to the coasts of an enemy.[275] It will be observed that there was nothing in this instrument to provide means for punishing Russia if she broke it. Hence, on the 15th of April, France, Austria, and England signed what was called the Tripartite Treaty, binding each other jointly or severally to go to war against any Power that violated the Treaty of Paris. This compact was treated like a dead letter when Russia attacked Turkey in 1877. “The peace,” said Prince Albert in a letter to Stockmar, “is not such as we could have wished, still infinitely to be preferred to the prosecution of the war, with the present complication of general policy.” That was in truth the verdict of the country. Comparing the terms with those which we might have obtained at Vienna in 1855, it was a humiliating settlement for England, in no way justifying the continuance of the war after the battle of Inkermann. Comparing them with the terms which the Czar might have obtained before the invasion of the Crimea, the settlement was humiliating to Russia.
In Parliament the debates on the Treaty were on the whole favourable to the Government. Complaint was, however, made that no effective steps had been taken to protect Turkey from Russian aggression in Asia Minor; that the Circassians had been abandoned; that Lord Clarendon in the Congress had not protested with enough warmth against the attacks made on the Belgian Press; that no definite provision had been made to prevent Russia from building war-ships at Nicolaieff; that the government of the Principalities had been left an open question; and that by the Declarations rights of search at sea, which were extremely useful to a naval power during war, were surrendered. It is true that, by agreeing to abolish privateering, England sacrificed what may be called her right of fighting with naval volunteers; and it seems as if the American doctrine—namely, that to the merchant whose ships are plundered, it matters little whether the mischief is done by a man-of-war or a privateer—is sensible. On the other hand, it was obvious that England could not carry on a naval war for a year on the principle that free ships did not make free goods, without coming into collision with every neutral State in the world. But to all objections there was, of course, one answer. No better terms could be got unless England was prepared to carry on the war alone. Yet, as a matter of fact, Russia had suffered so severely during the winter, that it is probable she might have been more complaisant at Paris, had Lord Clarendon been firmer, and had Napoleon III. not perfidiously played into her hands.