even condemned the policy of the Treaty as unsound.[61] The Queen was not sanguine about the matter, and the Prince Consort saw in the Treaty only a device for giving France the supply of coal and iron which she needed to compete with England in the markets of the world, whereas England surrendered valuable sources of revenue, without any adequate compensation. The strongest point against the Treaty was made by Lord Derby. He complained in the House of Lords that though the arrangement was based on the assumption that there would be peace between France and England, the general policy of the Cabinet, as tested by Mr. Gladstone’s estimates, assumed that war between the two nations was imminent. On a motion in the House of Commons asserting that it was not expedient to diminish sources of revenue or add a penny to the Income Tax, the whole policy of the Treaty and the Budget was challenged, and the opposition to both defeated by a majority of 116. The theoretical objections to commercial treaties generally were overcome by Mr. Gladstone’s argument that by making a small sacrifice of revenue England gained a vast extension of her export trade. But the real difficulty, of course, lay in fixing the limits of the duties under the 13th Article of the Treaty. A Commission was sent to Paris, on which Mr. Cobden agreed to serve, for the purpose of beating down the duties from the thirty per cent. maximum to a minimum of as nearly as possible ten per cent., and it was while this Commission was haggling with the French Commissioners that Cobden found himself thwarted by the secret hostility of the Foreign Office, and embarrassed by the bellicose policy of the Cabinet, which naturally produced ill feeling in France. He resented this action so bitterly, that he could not bring himself to accept from the Government the slightest reward for his services as a negotiator after he had carried out his mission with triumphant success.[62]
At the same time, it is only fair to say that the conduct of Napoleon at the time was singularly indiscreet. He made it plain that he was about to annex Nice and Savoy, although when he went to war in Italy he had protested that he did not seek for extension of territory. The Central Italian States, however, by voting through their assemblies in favour of annexation to Sardinia, furnished the French Emperor with an excuse for annexations, which were only necessary to recompense France for her expenditure of blood and treasure in the war with Austria. It was obvious that a great Italian kingdom would now be created in North Italy, and the Emperor held that he could not leave in its hands the passes by which France might be invaded. To secure his Alpine frontier, then, the Emperor insisted on taking Savoy and Nice. The provoking matter was this: the suggestion that the Central States should by a new vote in their Assemblies declare their intentions as to their future came from England. “We are asked,” wrote the Queen, in a sharp letter to Lord John Russell, “to make proposals about Italy, ‘to lay the basis for a mutual agreement with France, upon that question, and to enable the Emperor to release himself from his engagements with Austria.’ In an evil hour the proposal is made, and is now pleaded as the reason for France seizing on Savoy.... Sardinia is being aggrandised at the expense of Austria and the House of Lorraine, and France is to be compensated. If the passes of the Alps are dangerous to a neighbour, the weaker power must give them up to the stronger!”[63] The Queen, in fact, feared that on the same pretext the French Emperor might be led to demand a rectification of his Rhenish frontier, a demand which she knew must lead straight to a disastrous European war. A discussion raised by Lord Normanby in the House of Lords on the 7th of February stirred up the forces of public opinion against France. As for Cavour, he was helpless. The consent of France to the enlargement of Sardinia could not be bought save by the cession of Nice and Savoy, and so they were ceded to France, despite Cavour’s reluctance, on the 24th of March.
But the Commercial Treaty was not the only project of the Government which English mistrust of France imperilled. The Ministry was pledged to bring in a Reform Bill, and at a time when folk were brooding over the growing restlessness of France, there was little chance of carrying it. On the 1st of March Lord John Russell expounded his scheme to the House of Commons for reducing the franchise from £10 to £6, and taking twenty-five seats from small constituencies returning two members, and giving them to large constituencies deserving increased representation. The scheme fell flat in the House of Commons and in the country. It was cautiously attacked by Mr. Disraeli, who, though he declined to oppose the Second Reading, suggested that the Bill should be withdrawn. The supporters of the Ministry had no love for the measure, because if passed it involved a dissolution. The Second Reading was taken without a division, but before the stage of Committee was reached Lord John Russell withdrew the measure, and thus the question of Reform was shelved for several years to come. Lord John at last admitted that he had been mistaken in supposing that there was any widespread enthusiasm for Reform in the country. He, however, failed to see that the withdrawal of the Bill rendered Palmerston’s tenure of office a little precarious, for the party of Reform, knowing it could expect no more from him, had no strong motive for supporting him any further against the Tories.
In the meantime France was beginning to hint that Prussia should play the part of Sardinia in Germany. The consent of France, of course, could be obtained on the same terms as those which Cavour paid for it—the cession to France of territory on the Rhine. Clearly, it was argued, Napoleon would give Europe no rest till he had rectified the frontier assigned to France in 1815, after the fall of the First Empire. Very soon it became necessary to proclaim that England had no part in these schemes, and when, on the 26th of March, Lord John Russell declared in the House of Commons that there was no longer an exclusive alliance with France, the Queen congratulated him on what was really the triumph of her own policy. According to her view, a belief that this alliance existed made the European Powers at all times chary of cooperating with England. Unfortunately, Lord John Russell’s speech irritated
GENERAL GARIBALDI.
public opinion in France, and the recriminations of the Press in both countries caused Persigny to warn Palmerston that war between them would soon be inevitable. Count Flahault and Lord Palmerston held a conversation on the subject, in which they discussed the chances of war in the frankest manner—each vaunting the undeniable superiority of his country in battle.[64] Count Flahault is supposed to have been impressed with Palmerston’s demonstration that victory in such a struggle must rest on English banners, and to have succeeded in soothing down the angry feeling against England, which then raged at the French Court. The real reason why all danger of a rupture passed away was that Persigny’s favourite argument—namely, that war with England meant the
