The year 1864 gives one a vivid illustration of the stagnant condition of politics in England under Lord Palmerston. The mind of the country was absorbed in one question, and one only, namely, whether England should make war in Prussia and Austria to maintain the integrity of Denmark and uphold the Treaty of London. Ten years before, England had rushed headlong into war for a cause that was more shameful, and for “British interests” that were much more visionary than those which were now at stake. But great progress had been made during these ten years. The disasters and disgrace which had fallen on the nation during the Crimean struggle had not been endured for nothing. Englishmen had no longer boundless confidence in the aristocratic war party, whose clumsy diplomacy and military incapacity had involved the country in the inglorious contest with Russia. Moreover, while the Court was neutral in that struggle, latterly leaning, if to any side, to the side of the war party, in 1864 the Queen was obstinately determined to keep out of war, and Palmerston found in her a much more formidable antagonist than either Mr. Cobden or Mr. Bright. Mr. Morley, in his “Life of Cobden,” asserts that it was his (Cobden’s) influence, and the pressure brought to bear on the Ministry by Lancashire, that thwarted Palmerston at the end of the struggle. Count Vitzthum, on the other hand, credits the Queen with the honour of defeating the Premier. The truth is that neither the Queen nor Mr. Cobden, acting alone, could have saved their country from a fate as melancholy as that which smote Austria to the dust at Sadowa. [179]
But, acting together, though quite independently of each other, they represented a combination of social and political forces, which would have crushed not only Palmerston, but his Cabinet, had he continued to resist them with blind oppugnancy.
At the beginning of the year the Danes, acting on English advice, had withdrawn from Holstein, where Prussia and Austria had put in Federal execution on behalf of the Diet. Danish and German troops therefore faced each other on the Eider, which divided Sleswig from Holstein, and Europe waited with almost breathless excitement for the first shot that would kindle the far-darting flames of war. Councils of moderation had been pressed by Lord Russell on the Danish Government, but in vain. They were urged by Lord Wodehouse, who had been sent on a special mission to Copenhagen, to withdraw the Constitution of November which had provoked the intervention of Germany. His mission was a failure. Politicians at home and abroad were alarmed by an extraordinary essay known to be from the pen of Lord Robert Cecil, which appeared in the Quarterly Review, advocating war against Germany on behalf of Denmark, and it was supposed to represent the policy of the Tory Party. It, however, did not represent the views of Mr. Disraeli, who, in a confidential conversation with Count Vitzthum, disowned it, and as for Lord Derby, he had no well-defined views on the subject. Had it been otherwise, Lord Palmerston could have easily frightened his Cabinet into war. “Any doubt,” writes Count Vitzthum, “as to the validity of the Treaty of 1852 offended so deeply the amour propre of the Prime Minister that he was capable of going any lengths. The plan which he devised, to save his work, was to attack with one portion of the British ironclad fleet the North Sea and Baltic coasts of Germany, and with another portion, Trieste and Venice, to support with English gold Mazzini and Garibaldi in Italy, and Kossuth in Hungary, and thus kindle a general conflagration.”[180] This might have been Palmerston’s plan at the beginning of the year. A few week’s reflection, however, toned it down, for in a private letter to Lord Russell, dated the 13th of February, it seems that, though his animus against Germany had not abated, he was of opinion that “it would be best for us to wait a while before taking any strong step; though,” he adds, “it is very useful to remind the Austrians and the Prussians privately of the danger they were running at home.”[181] A few days after that, in a private letter to the Duke of Somerset, Palmerston’s plan is found to be still further modified, but this time in a mischievous direction. It now took the form of sending the Fleet to Danish waters, with orders to prevent the Germans from attacking Zealand and Copenhagen.[182] Every word spoken and every line written on the Sleswig-Holstein Question by Palmerston and Russell at this juncture, deluded the Danes into the belief that the British Government were prepared to defend by force of arms the integrity of Denmark as a British interest. But for this delusion Denmark would not have obstinately resisted even the most moderate demands which were made for concessions to the Germans in Sleswig-Holstein.
KRONBORG CASTLE, ELSINORE.
The case against Austria, Prussia, and the Diet was capable of easy statement in a popular form. Hence it is not surprising that the large class of Englishmen who act on what may be called the public schoolboy theory of high politics took the side of the Danes. Denmark was a small Power, whereas Austria and Prussia were two large Powers, who were “bullying” Denmark. Austria, Prussia, and most of the minor States of Germany did not come into court with clean hands. They had individually sanctioned the Treaty of London, to which they now objected, because the German Diet, of which they were members, had not ratified it. They refused to be bound by it because Denmark had violated antecedent engagements, made independently of it, and on another subject than the Danish Succession, with which the Treaty dealt. Austria and Prussia could hardly be disinterested in coming forward as the champions of Constitutionalism, and “the doctrine of nationalities” in Sleswig and Holstein. The Treaty of London of 1852 was the work of England, and to uphold it by arms was a debt of honour which Englishmen ought to pay. The big-boy-and-the-small-boy argument was founded on a strange misconception of the facts. In Holstein and Sleswig the
