[122] Russia in July had pledged herself not to meddle with the Suez Canal, or with Egypt, or to menace the Persian Gulf. As to the Dardanelles, the position of the Straits “should,” said Prince Gortschakoff, “be settled by a common agreement upon equitable or efficiently guaranteed bases.” Constantinople, in his opinion, “could not be allowed to belong to any of the European Powers;” and on the 20th of July the Czar further enforced this pledge by telling Colonel Wellesley that he would not occupy Constantinople merely for military prestige, but only if events forced him to do so.—See Russia II. (1877), No. 2; and Turkey III. (1878), No. 2.
[123] Hansard, Vol. CCXXXVII., p. 31.
[124] Sir Stafford Northcote gave another reason. Mr. Layard, on the 24th, telegraphed that the question of the Bosphorus was to be settled between the Czar and a Congress. Next morning, the 25th, it was found that by a blunder the clerk had written “Congress” instead of “Sultan.” It was on this account, said Sir S. Northcote, that the orders to the Fleet were withdrawn. In other words, when on the 24th the Government believed—if by this time they really believed any of Mr. Layard’s telegrams—that the question of the Bosphorus was to be settled in accordance with Russia’s pledges to England, the Fleet was sent to Constantinople. But when they found this to be a mistake, and that the Czar was going to settle the question in defiance of his pledges to England, the Fleet was ordered back to Besika Bay!
[125] His place at the Colonial Office was filled by Sir M. Hicks-Beach, Mr. James Lowther becoming Irish Secretary.
[126] Mr. Bright and Mr. Gladstone were, however, among those who voted against the Grant.
[127] See Sir Stafford Northcote’s statement in the House of Commons, Times, 29th April, 1878.
[128] It is, however, but fair to Lord Derby to say that though all the Tory speakers and writers assumed this to be his object, his obstinacy might be due to another and more honourable motive. He probably persuaded himself that the refusal of Russia implied that she meant to object to the discussion of Articles that in the opinion of the Powers affected their interests as well as hers.
[129] Mr. Charles Greville dwells on one of these ebullitions of patrician rowdyism with much anger. (See Memoirs, Part III.). At the same time, it is but fair to say that the Peelites had given the Tories just provocation. Lord Aberdeen had led the Tory leaders to believe that, whenever they abandoned Protection, they (the Peelites) would return to the Tory fold, and reunite the Conservative Party. Lord Derby and Mr. Disraeli did abandon Protection, incurring great obloquy from their followers. But the Peelites declined to fulfil their part of the implied bargain, and, having got all they wanted out of the Protectionists—a recantation of their principles—not only refused to join them, but attacked them with the Whigs. Mr. Gladstone was supposed to have inspired what Lord Hardwicke, in a letter to Mr. Croker, denounced as a “disgraceful” manœuvre due to “personal pique and hatred.”—See Croker Papers; also an article in the Observer, Feb. 13, 1887, p. 3.
[130] It ought to be said that Lord Derby’s ablest apologist, Mr. T. Wemyss Reid, in an article in Macmillan’s Magazine for June, 1879, advanced a fair defence for his hesitancy to work zealously with the European Powers. Mr. Reid asserts, and in a manner which commands respectful attention, that Lord Derby knew that as far back as 1873 Russia, Germany, and Austria had entered into a secret agreement to upset the status quo in Turkey. No historian can presume to pass a final judgment on Lord Derby’s career at the Foreign Office without carefully studying this remarkable article. It explains much that is otherwise inexplicable in Lord Derby’s policy, and had it been an official communiqué it would have been almost conclusive.
[131] Lord Salisbury said, in reply to Lord Grey, in the House of Lords, that the statements in the Globe were “wholly unauthentic.” Lord Grey said he could not have believed it to be true that Lord Salisbury had agreed to the retrocession of Bessarabia. “It appeared,” he said, “to be too monstrous to be believed that her Majesty’s Government could have made such a stipulation as was agreed to”—an observation which Lord Salisbury ratified by his silence.—Hansard, Vol. CCXL., p. 1061.