But, speaking generally, the Foreign Policy of the Government discredited it. In the struggle between France and Germany the Cabinet preserved a cold
General Faure. General Wimpffen. Von Moltke. Von Bismarck.
AFTER SEDAN: DISCUSSING THE CAPITULATION (From the Picture by Georg Bleibtreu.)
neutrality, at a time when popular feeling would have supported it in protesting against the cession of Alsace and Lorraine to the conquering power. For this attitude, however, Lord Granville had a plausible excuse. Though the nation was sulky because an effective protest had not been made, it would not have tolerated any policy that might have led the country into war. Moreover, the Army had yet to be reorganised, and till that was done the voice of England was naturally of little account in the affairs of Europe. At the same time the meek and spiritless expression which Ministers habitually gave to their neutrality, irritated a proud and sensitive democracy who were every day taunted by Tory orators and writers with permitting themselves to be governed by a cowardly Cabinet. It seems just to say, even when one makes every allowance for the difficulties of their position, that in their handling of the diplomacy of the Franco-German War, Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville missed a great opportunity. After the collapse of France at Sedan had been followed by that long series of German victories which ended in the capitulation of Paris, and the Armistice Convention between M. Jules Favre and Count von Bismarck (28th January, 1871), Englishmen were all agreed on one point. To cede Alsace and Lorraine to Germany was, in their opinion, to create a French Poland, or Venetia on the Rhine, whose chronic discontent must permanently imperil the peace of the world. But when the English Government in February attempted to dissuade Germany from exacting terms that inevitably rendered revenge the first duty of every French patriot, England found herself isolated. None of the Powers were prepared to join her in reviewing the conditions of peace which Germany might impose, and the German Chancellor never even deigned to answer the English remonstrance. England, in fact, had moved in the matter too late.
As far back as the 17th of October, 1870, Sir Andrew Buchanan told Lord Granville that the Czar, in his private letters to King William of Prussia, had expressed a hope that no French territory would be annexed. On the 4th of November the Italian Minister informed Lord Granville that whilst Italy admitted that French fortresses must be surrendered to the Germans, yet she held that there should be no cession of territory. Sir A. Paget, writing from Florence, also conveyed to Lord Granville about the same time the views of Signor Visconti to the effect that “the Italian Government had several times expressed the opinion that a peace in which Germany would seek her guarantees by the dismantling of fortresses, &c., would afford better securities for its duration than one which would be likely to create a new question of nationalities.” Here there was a basis for a joint representation on the part of the European Powers—for Austria all through had only been held back through fear of Russia—both to France and Germany. France might have been warned that, in spite of M. Jules Favre’s formula,[22] she, as the defeated aggressor, had no right to object to her menacing strongholds being razed. Germany might have been reminded that, in the interests not of France but of Europe, it was her duty as a great and civilising Power not to demand a cession of territory, the recovery of which must be to France an object of ceaseless striving.
The Queen would gladly have used her personal influence with the German Emperor in urging on the Court of Berlin the policy and justice of this representation. Lord Granville’s subordinates had assured him that France, despite M. Favre’s heroics, would agree to anything if spared the surrender of territory. It is now known that even Bismarck himself was not desirous of the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine against the will of their inhabitants.[23] The German generals had, however, claimed what they deemed a safe, military frontier, and though Von Bismarck induced them not to insist on the cession of Belfort, he could not repel their demand for Alsace, a third part of Lorraine, and Metz and Strasburg. The German Crown Prince was, moreover, understood to be opposed to any irritating and unnecessary annexation. Hence all the chances were in favour of success, if Lord Granville, acting with Russia and Italy, had approached Germany with a cordial and courteous appeal, to reject the advice of her military party, and moderate their demands in the interests of Europe.[24] But the golden opportunity of strengthening Von Bismarck’s hands was lost. Lord Granville not only refused to abandon his attitude of rigid neutrality, but he couched his policy in phrases so ostentatiously deferential to Germany, that they almost justified the half-contemptuous replies which Von Bismarck at this time sent to all despatches from the English Foreign Office, which he did not entirely ignore. In February, 1871, when Lord Granville at last plucked up heart to remonstrate with Germany, her victorious armies had made sacrifices that rendered his tardy protests impertinent. Italy and Russia had sense enough to recognise this fact. They therefore refused to join England when Lord Granville sent his remonstrance to Von Bismarck, who tossed it into his diplomatic waste-paper basket.[25]
It may be readily conceived, then, that, despite its public services, its invincible majority, and the failure of the Tory leaders to put before the country any policy of their own, signs of decay were already visible in the Government. Mr. Bruce had converted every publican into an enemy. The Dissenters had vowed vengeance against the Ministry, because Mr. Forster had increased the grant to denominational schools. The officers of the Army and the upper and upper-middle classes of society had resolved to punish Mr. Gladstone because he had allowed Mr. Cardwell to abolish Purchase. A few Radicals and many Whigs were also alarmed, because it had been abolished by Royal Prerogative, the use of which to coerce the Peers was resented by the aristocracy as an insult. The abolition of Purchase was to have been followed by an effective reorganisation of the Army. Hence the nation was profoundly disappointed to find the question of Army organisation made light of by Ministers during the recess. Mr. Cardwell’s project for autumn manœuvres on a large scale on the Berkshire Downs had to be abandoned, because his Control Department could not feed or supply his troops. When he substituted for this scheme a sham campaign in the neighbourhood of Aldershot, the Transport Service was found to be so bad that the Artillery had to be drawn upon to supply it with horses, carts, and drivers. The disaster to the Agincourt and the wreck of the Megæra, also gave colour to slanders against the Government which had issued from the Admiralty from the day that Mr. Childers began to reform its wasteful administration, and Mr. Goschen had continued his work.[26]
The Duke of Somerset, after the failure of the Berkshire campaign, had scoffed at the Government because they gave the nation “armies that could not march and ships that could not swim,” and the epigram was soon everywhere repeated. Mr. Gladstone’s appointment of Sir Robert Collier, the Attorney-General, to a seat on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was denounced far and wide as a job perpetrated by a tricky evasion of the law.[27] The Prime Minister’s management of the House of Commons had also cost him many friends. As Mr. Disraeli once said, it was like that of a