Furthermore the King had contrived that the responsibility for the proposed league with Cleves should fall almost entirely on his minister’s shoulders, in order that he himself might the more easily renounce it if occasion served. The fact that the new alliance, if accomplished, would from its very nature commit him to far less than the Lutheran league which he had put off in 1538, was not enough for Henry; he must needs have other safeguards, and determined to make Cromwell his scapegoat. All the practical and important parts of the instructions to Mont were given by the King’s minister. The conciliatory expressions with which Henry had directed the ambassador to sound the Elector of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse on the question of theology were merely empty words, as is proved by the utter failure of an attempted agreement four months later. Their sole object was to induce John Frederic more favourably to receive the practical proposals which followed. But the King purposely left to Cromwell the task of framing the vital part of the message, and it is evident that he gave his consent to the proposals it contained only in the most guarded and non-committal manner. We are merely told that as regards the match proposed for the Princess Mary, Cromwell perceived ‘the kinges hieghnes . . . by his graces countenaunce and exterior Visage . . . to be of good Inclinacion[618].’ On the more vital question of the King’s attitude concerning his own marriage, the instructions of Cromwell to Mont give us even vaguer information. The fact was that the King was willing definitely to bind Cromwell, but not himself, to a plan which he had resolved to abandon the moment that any favourable alteration should take place in his relations with France and Spain. From the day that Mont departed on his mission, the fate of the alliance with Cleves and the fate of Thomas Cromwell were joined together beyond the possibility of separation.
We unfortunately do not possess the letter in which Mont and his companion, a certain Thomas Paynell, reported their first reception at the Saxon Court, but the reply of Cromwell on March 10 gives us considerable information about the success of the ambassadors[619]. John Frederic had apparently welcomed the prospect of the two marriages by which Henry proposed to bind himself to Cleves, and had promised, through Burckhard, to do his best to bring them about. Cromwell’s letter goes on to direct Mont to follow up the advantage already gained by telling bad stories about Charles, and to ‘inculcate and persuade vnto the said duke and landisgrave the moment & importance of that grudge, which themperour doth beire, for the Bishop of Romes pleasure against them and other of the avangelik sorte, which they may nowe easely perceive by that he worketh and goeth aboute.’ At the same time, another embassy, headed by a certain Dr. Nicholas Wotton, was sent to Cleves to obtain confirmation of the promises of Burckhard, and further to carry on negotiations for a supply of gunners and artillerymen to be furnished to Henry in case he should need them; and finally to signify the King’s willingness to make an offensive and defensive league with Duke William[620]. The latter was at first less eager to accept the alliance which England offered than his brother-in-law was to promote it: he wanted to postpone a definite answer in the hope that he might yet come to a peaceful solution of his difficulty with the Emperor[621]. But as this prospect daily grew more and more remote, he became correspondingly willing to entertain Henry’s proposals, and the outlook for the accomplishment of the practical part of Cromwell’s plan seemed very favourable. The comparatively unimportant overtures for theological reconciliation with the Elector and the Landgrave were apparently at first received with less enthusiasm by the Lutherans, who had already had some experience of the King’s vacillating policy and evidently thought it a little suspicious that Henry had suddenly become so very urgent. We have seen that the King’s proposals for a religious agreement were chiefly intended as a blind to cover the more practical matrimonial proposals which had followed, but Cromwell evidently thought it worth while to keep up the deception as a precaution. A second letter from the King’s minister directs Mont and Paynell to continue to urge on the Elector and Landgrave the importance of theological unity, and to ‘conduce to haue them somw[hat reproved for] ouersight & slakenes, in shewing [so little] gratuite, and by that for to pryk th[em to] redubb the same and give you more f[avourable] answer.’
And at first Cromwell’s eagerness for the alliance with Cleves seemed to have every justification, for Henry’s policy in other parts of Europe appeared to have failed even more completely than before. Ominous letters were received from Wriothesley, the ambassador in the Netherlands, who did not hesitate to express his fear that war would soon come and that his retreat to England would be cut off[622]. At the same time Chapuys received orders to return to the Court of the Queen Regent, and Cromwell consequently instructed Wriothesley to demand leave to depart[623]. The exchange was finally effected, but that there was deep distrust on both sides is proved by Cromwell’s orders for the detention of Chapuys at Calais, until the safety of Wriothesley was assured, and by the instructions of the Queen Regent to the Provost of Mons to follow the English ambassador to Gravelines[624]. But fortunately these precautions were unnecessary; no open act of hostility took place, and the crisis seemed at least temporarily tided over by the arrival of the Dean of Cambray in London to replace Chapuys, and by the reception of Stephen Vaughan at Brussels in Wriothesley’s stead[625]. But the attitude of France was more disquieting. On February 5 Castillon was recalled, and though he made a vague promise at his departure that another should be sent in his place, the anxiety at the Court was but little relieved thereby. The most that Cromwell could do, was to take care that the French ambassador should carry back to his master full accounts of the excellence of England’s defences, and her readiness for war. So he took him, as he later wrote to the King, to his armoury, showing him a ‘store of harneys and wepens . . . the whiche he semed to esteme moche,’ and telling him that there were twenty more armouries in the realm as well or better equipped; ‘wherat he woundred and sayd that he thought your grace the prince best furnished thereof in Christendom[626].’
But though Cromwell may have exaggerated the security of England’s fortifications, his words to Castillon were by no means empty. Though the King and his minister may have had differences of opinion in regard to the conduct of foreign affairs, in the internal management of the kingdom they were, as always, united. Here Henry suffered himself to be guided at all points by Cromwell. And at no time is the masterfulness of the latter’s domestic administration better exhibited, than by his action at home the moment the first rumours of an invasion reached England. Countless memoranda, lists of men fit for military service, arms, ammunition, provisions, and other necessaries of warfare, all in his hand, or in that of one of his clerks, attest his industry and ability in preparing the country to repel the dreaded invasion. All reports of the state of the coast defences at various places were sent to him. General musters were ordered throughout the realm; every precaution was taken to fortify all vulnerable points. Beacons were placed upon all the hills, and no detail that could add to the strength and efficiency of the defences was left out[627].
But just at this very moment, when everything seemed to point to an open rupture with Charles and Francis, when the schemes which Cromwell had opposed to those of the King seemed to have every justification, an event occurred which totally changed the aspect of affairs, and restored Henry’s badly shaken confidence in his own ability to stave off the threatened crisis without the aid of outside alliances or an appeal to arms. This event was the arrival in England on March 28 of a new French ambassador, Charles de Marillac, who had come to replace Castillon. So long a time had elapsed since the departure of the latter that Henry had probably given up all hope of the fulfilment of the vague prospects that had been held out that a successor might be appointed. But the unexpected appearance of Marillac at once revived the King’s drooping spirits. The letters in which the ambassador reported his reception at the English Court to Francis and Montmorency give us a vivid picture of the universal joy with which this apparent reassurance of friendship with France was hailed[628]. Henry was delighted, and his satisfaction was increased when Marillac, at his master’s command, followed up the advantage already gained by renewed assertions of the cordiality of France. The whole Court seemed ‘to wear a new aspect and to be quite delighted[629].’ Had Henry seen the letter of instructions which Marillac received from the French Court, he would have realized that Francis was only endeavouring ‘to keep him in good humour[630],’ while making a little more certain of his own relations with Charles; and he might have been less encouraged. But Marillac’s cordiality seems to have put him off his guard, and he was led, in his exultation, to welcome the apparent friendship of Francis in ways which very nearly resulted in the permanent stultification of all the laborious efforts of Cromwell to maintain amicable relations in Germany. The events which took place in England in the three months following the arrival of the French ambassador furnish ample proof of this new departure in the royal policy.
On April 28 Parliament had met, its assembling being indispensable to carrying on the ‘Kinges busynes.’ Cromwell had practically appointed every member, in order that Henry might have a ‘tractable’ House. His usual methods of ‘ordering’ the elections of members have already been described; suffice it to say that in this case he had completely outdone himself; the Parliament of 1539 was undoubtedly his masterpiece[631]. It will be remembered that it was in this session that he first succeeded in forcing the Lords and Commons to sanction the statute by which royal proclamations were given the force of laws. Cromwell’s ‘remembrance’ for other Acts to be passed in the Parliament of 1539 is also noteworthy. It makes casual mention of the attainders of Exeter, Salisbury, and Pole, of plans for the fortification of the coast, and then designates the scheme out of which the Six Articles were later evolved as ‘A devise in the parliament for the vnitie in religion[632].’ It is very improbable that Cromwell had any really accurate information concerning the King’s real intentions in connexion with this last item. Henry had purposely concealed them under a very non-committal statement. Doubtless the King had long cherished the idea of making use of a declaration that in matters of doctrine England still adhered to the Old Faith, to facilitate a reconciliation with Charles and Francis; for such a statement would remove the main pretext of the Emperor and the French King for an attack on him, namely that they were undertaking a crusade to suppress heresy. But so hopeless had been the outlook in the early part of the year, that Henry had not had the courage to try this experiment. He was rather led to shun all moves which would imperil his friendly relations with Germany, so that he had scrupulously avoided any direct statement which could lead to the belief that a Catholic reaction was possible. But the assurances of Marillac had revived all his enthusiasm for his old policy. He now abandoned all caution, and promptly proceeded to disclose his real ideas in regard to the ‘vnitie in religion.’ When Cromwell discovered the true state of affairs he must have been dismayed; he probably already felt how deeply he had become involved in the German alliance, and saw that the new trend which things had taken boded no good to him. His position was now a very uncomfortable one, and the fact that a committee of bishops under his superintendence was utterly unable to cope with the difficulties of the newly presented religious problem, is very significant. Henry was not to be balked however. He quickly took the matter out of the hands of the incompetent bishops, and placed it before the Lords; finally, to make assurance doubly sure, he came to them in person, ‘and confounded them all with Goddes Lerning[633].’ Henry’s theology was of course as unimpeachable as it was confounding, and his energy was rewarded before the middle of June by the definite passage in Parliament of the Statute of the Six Articles. The doctrine of Transubstantiation was confirmed, communion in both kinds was pronounced unnecessary, the marriage of priests was forbidden, all vows of chastity were to be strictly observed, and private masses and auricular confession were adjudged meet and expedient[634].
In spite of the radically Catholic nature of the doctrines proclaimed in this Act, however, Henry took good care that there should be no mistake about his attitude towards the Pope. He was committed to hostility to the See of Rome beyond the possibility of escape, and he knew it. Though political expediency, internal and foreign, had led him to proclaim the catholicity of the Church of England in matters of doctrine, no consideration whatever could induce him to make the least concession to the Papacy. In fact he took measures to show, simultaneously with the passage of the Six Articles, that his contempt of the See of Rome was stronger than ever. Marillac wrote that on June 15 there was played on the river in the King’s presence ‘a game of poor grace, much less invention, of two galleys, one carrying the King’s arms, the other the Pope’s, with several Cardinals’ hats (so he was told, for he would have deemed it contrary to duty to be a spectator). The galleys fought a long time, and ultimately those of the King were victorious, and threw the Pope and Cardinals and their arms into the water, to show people that this King will entirely confound and abolish the power of the Holy Father[635].’ Demonstrations like this were of course mainly intended to impress people at home. Let us now examine the effect of the Six Articles abroad, first in Germany, and then in France and Spain.
The rather large hopes of a religious agreement which Henry had held out to the leaders of the Schmalkaldic League early in the year, merely as a bait to induce them to favour the political alliance with Cleves, had finally, owing to Cromwell’s representations, been accepted in all seriousness by John Frederic of Saxony and Philip of Hesse. They soon sent over another embassy under the leadership of Burckhard and Ludwig von Baumbach, a councillor of the Landgrave, which arrived in London on April 23. Henry was not yet quite sure of his ground with Marillac, and had not fully decided what note should be struck in the ‘devise in the parliament for the vnitie in religion,’ so at first he received the Germans cordially[636]. On April 29 they were granted an audience, in which Henry, though he carefully avoided committing himself to any definite promises of an alliance, spoke in the warmest terms of the Elector and Landgrave, cautioned the Lutherans against the treachery of the Emperor, and boasted long and loud because of the recent collapse of an expedition against England which, according to Wriothesley’s report, had been preparing in Flanders since the previous February[637]. A subsequent interview of the ambassadors with Cromwell and other members of the Privy Council was equally satisfactory, and Burckhard and Baumbach were convinced that their mission would ultimately be crowned with success. Had they understood the meaning of the many excuses which were offered for the failure to begin definite negotiations at once, the opening of Parliament and the difficulty of gaining access to the King, they might have been less encouraged. Henry merely wished to detain them until he had made perfectly sure that they could be of no more use to him. His relations with France were improving every day, but he had not yet made sure of the state of affairs in the dominions of the Emperor. On February 24, at Frankfort, the Electors of Brandenburg and the Palatinate had opened negotiations with the Imperial plenipotentiary, the Archbishop of Lund, in the hope of mediating between Charles and the princes of the Schmalkaldic League[638]; Henry had determined to learn the result of this meeting before giving the ambassadors a definite answer. The news of the truce concluded between the Emperor and the Lutherans on the 19th of April was finally announced in London towards the middle of May: it at once decided the King to send the envoys home empty-handed again, for it was obviously useless to continue negotiations for an alliance, which was primarily to have been directed against the very power with which the Schmalkaldner had just made a temporary peace. So much had Henry been encouraged by the favourable signs of the past few weeks, that he would probably have succeeded in finding an excuse for dismissing Burckhard and Baumbach, even if the result of the negotiations between the Emperor and the Schmalkaldner had been reversed; as it was he was spared the trouble of exercising much ingenuity, for, most unfortunately for the ambassadors, one of the clauses in the Frankfort agreement contained a provision which in itself was quite sufficient to stultify all their efforts. In the seventh article of their treaty with the Emperor, the Schmalkaldner had agreed not to admit any new members into their league during the period of the truce. There is every reason to think that this provision was especially directed against the English negotiations, for both Brandenburg and the Count Palatine had always looked with disfavour on the attempts of Saxony and Hesse to gain the alliance of Henry, and doubtless availed themselves of this opportunity to persuade the Schmalkaldner to put an end to them. In any case the King lost no time in acting upon the intelligence he had received, and at once complained to Burckhard and Baumbach, whose excuses and explanations were of no avail. Wearisome disputes and attempts at a compromise ensued: the question of reciprocity was discussed at length; the envoys insisting that England was sure to derive quite as much benefit from the proposed alliance as the Lutherans, the King and his ministers in turn demanding concessions which they knew that the ambassadors were not authorized to grant. So reluctant were the latter to return without having accomplished anything however, that it was only with the utmost difficulty that Henry finally succeeded in getting rid of them. To a blunt request that they depart the envoys only replied with continued petitions for a more favourable answer to their demands: finally, with pleasing frankness, they begged that His Majesty would let himself be guided by the truth alone in directing the religious controversies then in progress in Parliament. Henry made no effort to conceal from Burckhard and Baumbach the anger which this ill-timed and incautious request aroused in him, for he probably realized that his best chance of hastening the departure of the Lutherans lay in involving himself in some sort of an altercation with them. We are not surprised to read that both parties immediately became engaged in a violent discussion concerning the celibacy of the clergy—in the midst of which the ambassadors apparently beat a somewhat precipitate retreat: they seem at last to have had the wit to realize that they had to do with a theologian, with whom it was extremely dangerous to disagree. A fruitless interview with Cromwell followed, and on May 31 the envoys finally departed[639]. In the meantime the Elector and the Landgrave had continued to show touching but unwarranted confidence in the sincerity of Henry’s professions, and had remained in utter ignorance of the true state of affairs in England. Their hopes of a speedy settlement of religious differences had doubtless received considerable encouragement through the efforts of Dr. Barnes, who had been earnestly labouring to remove the disagreeable impression which Henry had made on Christian III. by his blundering Lübeck policy in 1534. Barnes had been sent to Hamburg for this purpose early in the year. He was himself an ardent Protestant who never once suspected the possibility of a Catholic reaction in England; and as his zeal more than supplied the lack of diplomatic skill, his efforts seem to have met with great success[640]. The King of Denmark was now in close alliance with John Frederic, and Barnes was soon enabled to persuade them to arrange to send a joint embassy to the King of England to treat of the political league which was to follow a theological agreement[641]. But at this juncture Burckhard and Baumbach returned with a very discouraging report, which obtained full confirmation by the news which arrived a week later, that the Six Articles had actually been passed[642]. The enthusiasm of the Lutherans was of course considerably dampened, and they wrote to Henry that if a league was to be treated of at all, he would have to be the one to send ambassadors; they could not themselves venture to visit England because of the machinations against the Evangelical cause there[643]. Even in Cleves, where Henry and Cromwell had sought an alliance of a purely political nature, unhampered by religious restrictions, the news of the passage of the Six Articles created profound distrust, and we may well believe that John Frederic discouraged his brother-in-law from continuing negotiations with England, after the proof of Henry’s perfidy that he had just received. We are not surprised to find that the matrimonial projects which formed the basis of the alliance with Cleves came to a complete standstill during the month of July. The proposals for a match between Duke William and the Princess Mary had apparently never been very popular: they were now definitely abandoned and never revived. To the other plan, for a marriage of Henry and the Duchess Anne, an unexpected objection had arisen. It appears that ever since 1527 a plan for a marriage between the King’s intended bride and the son of Duke Anthony of Lorraine had been under discussion. For twelve years the form of continuing the negotiations for this union had been kept up on both sides, with the idea of bringing pressure on the Emperor, though all hope of an actual completion of the match must have been abandoned long before this time. But now that the union with England seemed less desirable, the Duke of Cleves of course made the most of the opportunity of evading the requests of Henry that was afforded by the Lorraine affair. The claims of Duke Anthony and his son would have to be satisfied, he said, before his sister could be offered to Henry[644].
Altogether it looked as if the German alliance would be abandoned, and Cromwell, who of all people was most deeply involved in it, must have been roused to a sense of his danger. But the threatened reversal of his policy was destined to be postponed once more. For it soon appeared that the exultation of the King at the apparent success of his own plans was premature. We have seen that it was largely in the hope of conciliating Francis and Charles by removing their main pretext for an attack on England that Henry had caused the Six Articles to be passed. But the Act did not accomplish what was expected of it. The courtesy of Marillac had given Henry a very exaggerated idea of the cordiality of France. He did not see that Francis was merely dallying with him, and had no idea of a permanent friendship. The fact that Charles had refused to listen to the proposals of Cardinal Pole had also been regarded as a good omen[645]. But when it appeared that dread of the Turks, who had advanced up the Adriatic, was the sole cause of the Emperor’s apparent unwillingness to offend England, and it was rumoured that there was immediate prospect of another interview between him and Francis, Henry discovered his mistake[646]. All the fair hopes he had entertained of preventing the dreaded coalition against England were apparently blasted. The doctrinal statement from which he had expected so much had proved but a feeble weapon with which to arrest the current of continental politics. He could consider himself fortunate if the Six Articles and his own personal rudeness to the German ambassadors had not been sufficient to preclude all hope of a return to the alliance, which a few months before he had abandoned as useless, but which now seemed to offer the one chance for England’s safety. Once more the policy of Cromwell seemed justified, and Henry was forced to acknowledge it.