The Fighting Retreat To Paris

by Roger Ingpen

The following extract from Sir John French’s first despatch brings it to a conclusion as far as the operations of the British army are concerned:—

During the fighting on the 24th and 25th the Cavalry became a good deal scattered, but by the early morning of the 26th General Allenby had succeeded in concentrating two brigades to the south of Cambrai.

The 4th Division was placed under the orders of the General Officer commanding the Second Army Corps.

On the 24th the French Cavalry Corps, consisting of three divisions, under General Sordêt, had been in billets north of Avesnes. On my way back from Bavai, which was my “Poste de Commandement” during the fighting of the 23rd and 24th, I visited General Sordêt, and earnestly requested his co-operation and support. He promised to obtain sanction from his Army Commander to act on my left flank, but said that his horses were too tired to move before the next day. Although he rendered me valuable assistance later on in the course of the retirement, he was unable for the reasons given to afford me any support on the most critical day of all, viz., the 26th.

At daybreak it became apparent that the enemy was throwing the bulk of his strength against the left of the position occupied by the Second Corps and the 4th Division.

At this time the guns of four German Army Corps were in position against them, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reported to me that he judged it impossible to continue his retirement at daybreak (as ordered) in face of such an attack.

I sent him orders to use his utmost endeavours to break off the action and retire at the earliest possible moment, as it was impossible for me to send him any support, the First Corps being at the moment incapable of movement.

The French Cavalry Corps, under General Sordêt, was coming up on our left rear early in the morning, and I sent an urgent message to him to do his utmost to come up and support the retirement of my left flank; but owing to the fatigue of his horses he found himself unable to intervene in any way.

There had been no time to entrench the position properly, but the troops showed a magnificent front to the terrible fire which confronted them.

The Artillery, although outmatched by at least four to one, made a splendid fight and inflicted heavy losses on their opponents.

At length it became apparent that, if complete annihilation was to be avoided, a retirement must be attempted; and the order was given to commence it about 3.30 p.m. The movement was covered with the most devoted intrepidity and determination by the Artillery, which had itself suffered heavily, and the fine work done by the Cavalry in the further retreat from the position assisted materially in the final completion of this most difficult and dangerous operation.

Fortunately the enemy had himself suffered too heavily to engage in an energetic pursuit.

I cannot close the brief account of this glorious stand of the British troops without putting on record my deep appreciation of the valuable services rendered by General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.

I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the Army under my command on the morning of the 26th August could never have been accomplished unless a commander of rare and unusual coolness, intrepidity, and determination had been present to personally conduct the operation.

The retreat was continued far into the night of the 26th and through the 27th and 28th, on which date the troops halted on the line Noyon—Chauny—La Fère, having then thrown off the weight of the enemy’s pursuit.

On the 27th and 28th I was much indebted to General Sordêt and the French Cavalry Division which he commands for materially assisting my retirement and successfully driving back some of the enemy on Cambrai.

General d’Amade also, with the 61st and 62nd French Reserve Divisions, moved down from the neighbourhood of Arras on the enemy’s right flank and took much pressure off the rear of the British Forces.

This closes the period covering the heavy fighting which commenced at Mons on Sunday afternoon, 23rd August, and which really constituted a four days’ battle.

At this point, therefore, I propose to close the present despatch.

Lord Kitchener pointed out in his first speech to the House of Lords, on August 25, while the battle was still waging, that European fighting causes greater casualties than the campaigns to which we are accustomed in other parts of the world, but in spite of hard marching the British Force was in the best of spirits. The casualties to the British troops were very heavy, but the losses inflicted on the Germans, who were always on the offensive, were enormous.

The battle was beyond all comparison the greatest in which our troops had been engaged; although it is not to be compared in point of duration with the tremendous conflict on the Aisne. No officer or man now with the colours had ever known the sort of warfare as that which was waged on the Belgian and French frontiers.

Correspondents found it difficult to obtain from the French descriptions of the recent hard fighting, and Mr. W. T. Massey, of the Daily Telegraph staff, wrote that great care was exercised that wounded should not meet and discuss the situation with civilians. Here and there one finds, he said, a non-commissioned officer or private who has been in the fighting line, but they tell you they really know little of what is going on. A Hussar he talked to said he had not been in any serious fighting, but he regarded the “charge” as the principal rôle of cavalry, because he admitted that he was frequently within rifle shot of the enemy and had been under fire six times for considerable periods.

The cavalry, the Hussar said, had kept the Germans in a state of great activity, for directly a cavalry brigade was on the move the enemy seemed instantly to prepare for battle. Over and over again our cavalry would change direction and halt to dig trenches which were never meant to be occupied. The Germans did the same, and tired infantry were continually kept on the move. This Hussar described the German field uniform as very difficult to pick up at long ranges, even with field glasses. The French uniform was a much easier target, and khaki did not blend very well with the green of the French landscape.

He had a long talk with a civilian who had been in close touch with one French army corps during the battles in the valley of the Meuse. All through, he was told, it had been a case of fighting against odds, but often bravery and dash overbore superior numbers and caused the German advance to be stayed while a pushed-back line was being strengthened. For instance, at Marville, a French force of 5,000 men of all arms of the 2nd Army Corps not merely stemmed the strong German tide, but rolled back a force of 20,000 men from point to point continuously for twelve hours, and it was not until there was a risk of the French losing touch with their supports that they retired.

All down the Meuse the French destroyed the bridges; this informant said thirty-three bridges had been blown up, and he was given a vivid picture of one of the scenes which followed the destruction of the means of crossing the river. This was at Charleville, an important position on the Meuse, quite close to the fortified town of Mézières, and within a field gun’s call from Sedan. Here the French tactics of Sedan were reversed. The trou of Sedan is engraven on the memory of every French soldier, and the danger of being caught in a hollow is ever present to officers. The Germans, bound up by military history, and confident that what happened in 1870 would occur again, fell into a trap which cost them dear.

Last Tuesday (August 25), he said, the French decided to evacuate Charleville, and sent round to the inhabitants to clear out. Trains took away many civilians, but a number had to travel on foot, and the roads in the early morning were covered with a long line of stragglers toiling under the burden of the few household treasures they had saved from the threatened destruction.

As the civil population left, a small party of French riflemen marched into the town to play a part worthy of the traditions of their army. I did not realise until the action developed that their duty involved enormous risk and that it was almost in the nature of a forlorn hope. They were sent to occupy a few houses which controlled the roads through the town, and though these houses were marked out to the French artillery when the guns began to bark, the lives of the members of this party were always in danger. If any survive they will have earned any decoration for bravery, for their ambush assisted in the complete destruction of a considerable German force of cavalry and infantry.

Around Charleville is a semi-circular sweep of hills. On these the French artillery was posted, the guns being dug in and hidden from the eyes of German scouts. The Germans were seen coming over the three bridges leading into the town. They were not opposed for a long time, and their numbers grew rapidly. Suddenly the three bridges were blown up, and the retreat was cut off. The destruction of the bridges was the signal to the guns on the high ground to begin, while the riflemen in ambush poured a terrible fire into an enemy who had a moment before believed they were occupying a deserted town. They were also raked by an awful fire from half a dozen batteries.

Into all parts of the town, save in the particular quarter in which the gallant French riflemen were doing their country’s work, there was a tornado of bursting shells, houses falling into the streets, and clouds of dust rising from the shrapnel bullets as they rained in a pitiless mass upon broken plaster and bricks. In a few minutes—ten minutes, I should say—the town was destroyed, and the whole German force must have been annihilated. I can imagine how completely the Germans were taken by surprise. Directly they got across the bridges they must have thought they had, indeed, got a prize. Charleville had been made the depôt for captured German cannon, and in the gun park there were, I am told, ninety-five field guns taken at God knows what sacrifice by the Allies. I saw the guns, but though I cannot vouch for the number, I can say there were very many. Twelve had been added just before the town was evacuated.

Of course, the breech blocks and mechanism had been so burred and damaged that the guns, as they stood, were useless, but the recovery of even useless weapons would give encouragement to an enemy, and, no doubt, many German soldiers were contemplating their restoration to their army when the bursting shells cried out, “Not yet.” That scene, so triumphant for French arms, was awful, and I went away before the remnant of the riflemen was collected from the ruined town—that is, if there were any survivors; I devoutly pray there were many—and Charleville and the gun park were left for other German eyes to look upon as an example of what war is.

I asked my informant, who expressed a wish that I would say nothing to give a clue to identification, whether he had seen any German prisoners. He replied, “Yes, a large number. They complain that the transport line is mainly occupied with war material, and that the food supply is neglected. All the enemy’s soldiers, they say, are hungry, and some of the men in the firing-lines have been without food for two days. On the other hand, the French soldiers—I have not been with British troops, but have seen their commissariat columns proceeding regularly and quickly backwards and forwards—have always plenty.”

As the road from Abbeville to Amiens approaches the latter picturesque town, it runs for a considerable distance alongside the railway. Mr. Massey was in the district on Friday afternoon, August 28, and when in the neighbourhood of Picquigny he found the railroad congested and the highway almost full of people proceeding south. Here and there, hidden in hedgerows, were files of French territorial infantry, and dotted over the countryside to the north sentries were vigilant. An officer stated that the latest report which had come in warned him that a Uhlan patrol was less than six kilometres away, and the presence of the enemy so far south suggested that a bold attempt was being made to cut the railway and destroy the utility of Boulogne as a base. The Germans probably did not know that at this time the British had ceased to employ Boulogne as a port for the disembarkation of men and stores, and that no British troops remained at Boulogne.