Only an army of two million men could invest the entrenched camp of Paris with its outlying forts. The very worst eventuality to be considered is a successful raid of the vanguard of what may be left of the German advancing column into Paris. The German advance has undoubtedly been very strong, and has not been withstood with success anywhere up till now. The rush may at this moment have been stopped. Should it not be, and should the desperate onrush of a certain number of German army corps break through the French army, the enemy would come up against the forts surrounding Paris.
Should the German advance column reach these forts, it will arrive there already to some extent spent, and certainly with its line of communication cut off. If there is a battle outside the forts of Paris it will be a desperate encounter, and it is not likely that the German force engaged will live to tell the tale.
THE FORTS AROUND PARIS
In describing the fortifications of Paris, he says:—
The defensive works forming the almost impregnable perimeter of forts and earthworks around Paris would be nearly impossible to invest by an invading army with a field army in opposition, or would require an enormous army for the purpose.
There are three lines of defences round Paris—the first is the belt of old fortification encircling the city, and built under the premiership of M. Thiers in the reign of Louis Philippe, and these old walls and earthworks were of little use in 1870. Since 1878 a second ring of fortified positions was built, though it does not form a continuous circumference of defensive positions, but several separate fortresses.
The threatened approach to Paris lies to the north, therefore these may be described first. A number of very strong positions lie between the Oise and the Seine—the middle of these powerful lines resting mostly on hilly eminences in the Forest of Montmorency. The backbone, so to speak, of these defensive works is composed of a number of forts.
Beginning with the defences of the Seine, we have the Fort of Cormeilles, with the Redoubt of Francaville in front, as well as that of Les Cotillons supported throughout by a number of batteries. The strong fortified position of Cormeilles stands at nearly 500 feet above the Seine. The slopes are steep, and for defence these groups are of great power.
The Valley of Ermont lies between the great works of Cormeilles and the Forest of Montmorency, but these forts and those of Montlignon and Montmorency, placed on the south-west fringe of the forest, sweep the valley. At the north-east of the forest is the Fort of Domont, and further on a pile covered with trees, another strong defensive group exists, including the Fort of Ecouen and several connected batteries.
Southwards are the Forts of Stains and the battery of Pincon Hill. This remarkably powerful fortress, with its dependent defences composed of batteries, permanent trenches, timber-cleared expanses for shooting, and barbed wire fences, render it secure against a surprise attack. To the east of St. Denis there is a low-lying plain showing no favourable point for fortification, but which can be flooded by the Rivers Morée and the Trond. This plain is also exposed to the fire of the Fort of Stains and the battery of the “Butte Pincon,” and the defensive works of Vaujours to the south.
The Fort of Vaujours and that of Chelles bar access to Paris in the passage between the “Canal de l’Durque” and the Marne. Higher up the Marne than Chelles, and between that river and the Seine, the Forts of Villiers, Champigny, Sucy, and Villeneuve St. Georges have been constructed. These fortified bulwarks of Paris are exceedingly strong. The defensive lines on the Marne from Chelles to Charenton form a rampart against any surprise rush, and as the positions of Montmorency and between Vaujours and Chelles, the fixed defences, have been greatly strengthened by batteries, felled timber and trenches, wire obstacles, and other devices, a most determined resistance could be made in this “sector” of fortified positions. Some improvised field works have been constructed all round Paris, therefore there is no need to describe them in detail.
Between the Seine and Palaiseau there are no permanent fortifications in the wide plain, but no attack could be made in this direction or in the Plain of St. Denis unless the powerful fortifications which can concentrate their fire on these passages had been silenced. The fortifications of an earlier date are completely free from a possible dash and render these zones literal mouse-traps. Like Montmorency, the forts of Palaiseau, Villiers, Haut Buc, Saint Cyr, and the batteries of the Bois de Verrières to the south of Versailles form a real fortress, of which the Fort de Chatillon is the mainstay behind.
Behind Versailles and St. Germain, the Forest of Marly is literally enclosed by batteries outlying the extreme strong works of “Le Trou de Fer.” Behind this group stands the high and prominent fort of Mont Valérien, which still maintains great military value for defence.
While Paris was waiting for the approach of the enemy, he altered his plans and made an unexpected move. As Sir John French said in his despatch of September 15:—
On Friday, September 4, it became apparent that there was an alteration in the direction of advance of almost the whole of the First Germany Army. That army, since the battle near Mons, on August 23, had been playing its part in the colossal strategic endeavour to create a Sedan for the Allies by outflanking and enveloping the left of their whole line, so as to encircle and drive both British and French to the south. There was now a change in its objective; and it was observed that the German forces opposite the British were beginning to move in a south-easterly direction, instead of continuing south-west on the capital.
Leaving a strong rearguard along the line of the River Ourcq (which flows south, and joins the Marne at Lizy-sur-Ourcq) to keep off the French 6th Army, which by then had been formed, and was to the north-west of Paris, they were evidently executing what amounted to a flank march diagonally across our front. Prepared to ignore the British, as being driven out of the fight, they were initiating an effort to attack the left flank of the French main army, which stretched in a long curved line from our right towards the east, and so to carry out against it alone the envelopment which had so far failed against the combined forces of the Allies.
On Saturday, the 5th, this movement on the part of the Germans was continued, and large advanced parties crossed the Marne, southwards at Trilport, Sammeroy, La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and Château Thierry.
There was considerable fighting with the French 5th Army on the French left, which fell back from its position south of the Marne towards the Seine. On Sunday, the 6th, large hostile forces crossed the Marne and pushed on through Coulommiers past the British right. Farther east they were attacked at night by the French 5th Army, which captured three villages at the point of the bayonet.