Hindus, Parsees, Christians, or Jews, if we wish to live as one nation, the interest of any one of us must be the interest of all. The only deciding consideration can be the justice of a particular cause.
Mohammedan blood had already mixed with that of the Hindus in the tragic massacre of Amritsar. The two people now had to seal their alliance, an unconditional alliance. The Moslems were the most advanced and audacious element in India. And they were the first to announce, at this Khilafat Conference, that they would refuse to cooperate with the Government if their demands were not met. Gandhi approved of this measure, but in his innate horror of going to extremes he refused at the time to advocate the boycott of British goods, for he looked upon the boycott as an expression of weakness or thirst for vengeance. A second Khilafat Conference met at Amritsar in the end of December, 1919, and decided to send a deputation to Europe to inform the English Government and the Supreme Council of India's attitude. It also voted for the sending of an ultimatum to the viceroy, warning him of trouble if the peace terms should prove unsatisfactory. Finally a third conference, meeting in Bombay in February, 1920, issued a manifesto which, in its violent arraignment of Great Britain's policy, was a forerunner of the coming storm.
Gandhi realized the storm was brewing, and instead of trying to call it forth he did all in his power to break its violence.
It seemed as if England also realized the danger. By belated concessions she seemed to be making desperate efforts to avert the consequences of her former attitude. An Indian Reform Act based on the Montagu-Chelmsford report gave the people in India more influence in the Central Government as well as in local administrations. The king approved the act by a proclamation of December 24, 1919, in which he invited the people of India and the functionaries to cooperate with the Government in every way, while he also urged the viceroy to pardon political offenses and recommended a general amnesty. Gandhi, always ready to believe in the adversary's good faith, interpreted these measures as signifying a sort of tacit agreement to deal more justly with India, and he called upon the people to welcome the reforms. He confessed that they were insufficient, but he said they should be accepted as the starting-point for greater victories. He urged the conference to approve them unreservedly. After a heated debate the National Indian Congress adopted his view.
But soon it became evident that Gandhi's hopes were built on illusions. The viceroy did not heed the king's appeal for clemency, and instead of setting prisoners free, the doors of the jails opened only for executions. It became evident that the promised reforms would remain inoperative.
On top of this came the news of the peace conditions imposed on Turkey, May 14, 1920. In a message to the people the viceroy admitted they would prove disappointing, but he advised the Moslems to resign themselves to the inevitable.
Then came the publication of the official report on the Amritsar massacres. It was the last straw.
India's national consciousness was aroused. All ties were broken.
The Khilafat Committee, meeting at Bombay, May 28, 1920, passed a resolution adopting Gandhi's non-cooperation policy, and this resolution was ratified unanimously by the Moslem Conference of Allahabad, June 80, 1920.
Gandhi, in the meantime, wrote an open letter to the viceroy informing him that the movement of non-cooperation would begin. He explained why he had recourse to it, and his arguments are worth studying, for they prove that even then Gandhi was hoping to avoid a break with England. In the bottom of his heart he still hoped that the Government might be brought to mend its ways by purely legal methods: