Vermont: A Study of Independence

by Rowland Evans Robinson

There is no record of any subsequent interview of the agents of Vermont and the British commissioners, though there were frequent communications passing between them during the next year. One of the commissioners wrote to Ira Allen in February, 1782, expressing his anxiety to know what effect the surrender of Cornwallis had made upon the people of Vermont. He reminded Allen that it was well to consider the many chances and vicissitudes of war; that, however brilliant the last campaign might appear, the next might wear a very different aspect; and of the probability of the ruin of Vermont by her "haughty neighbors, elated by what they call a signal victory;" and hoped that Allen might see, as he did, that it was more than ever the interest of Vermont to unite with those who would make her a free and happy government.

In April General Haldimand wrote to Sir Henry Clinton that "coercion alone must now decide the part Vermont will take;" that it had made concessions to Congress by relinquishing its claims to the east and west unions, the confirmation of which had been promised by him.

In June Ethan Allen wrote to Haldimand that "the last refusal of Congress to admit the State into the union has done more to awaken common people to a sense of their interest and resentment of their conduct than all which they had done before. By their own account, they declare that Vermont does not and shall not belong to their confederacy; the consequence is, that they may fight their own battles. It is liberty which they are after, but they will not extend it to Vermont; therefore Vermont does not belong to the confederacy or the controversy, but are a neutral republic." He offers to meet General Haldimand on any part of Lake Champlain, and closes in bitterness of spirit: "There is a majority in Congress, and a number of the principal officers of the Continental army continually planning against me. I shall do everything in my power to render this State a British province."

Ira Allen was again sent to Canada early in July with a request from Governor Chittenden for the release of two Vermont officers then prisoners in Canada, a request which was granted. About this time a letter attributed to Ira Allen, though it was a wide departure from his cautious practice of making only verbal communications on such delicate affairs, was written from Quebec to General Haldimand. It begins with the request that a supposed charter to Philip Skene, for a government comprehending Vermonters with the tract of country called the "Western Union," might be produced, as the limits of Vermont would thereby be established according to an act of Congress confirming all royal charters and government lines established before the Declaration of Independence. The writer represents that the people of the Western Union "are mostly in favor of government, and would be of great use in bringing about the wished-for revolution." If General Haldimand advised it, the Vermont leaders would endeavor to raise a regiment or two from the other provinces, to consist of the most loyal or at least moderate men, with no officers but known and tried friends of government, to be stationed in Vermont under pretense of protecting the frontiers; such regiments to be supplied by the king, and always ready to act in or out of Vermont as ordered. "Thus far," he says, "I have not deviated from the principles of my employers, the ruling men of Vermont." But now, unauthorized, he proposes an immediate recognition of Vermont under government; that the principal gentlemen of Vermont promised to abide by any agreement he should enter into, provided it should be kept a profound secret till the British government could protect and assist them; and that they should not be obliged to go out of Vermont to make war with the other States; but if other colonies should invade Canada, they would oppose them as much as possible, but could not consistently go to Canada for its defense and leave their own State exposed to ruin; and also promised never to take arms again in opposition to British government, or assist Congress on any pretense whatever. In conclusion, the writer intimates that some of the king's money will be necessary to carry out these plans. There is only circumstantial evidence that Ira Allen was the author of this letter; although it is probable that he was, yet it contains contradictions hardly consistent with his usual shrewdness. Later in the same month General Haldimand wrote to Sir Guy Carleton: "I have brought it [the negotiation] to a very embarrassing crisis with regard to myself, having urged the people to the declaration in favor of government by a long series of persuasion, and the strongest assurances of support and reward. Uninformed as I am of the intentions of administration, except in general terms that they are pacific, I can no longer act with Vermont upon any certain grounds until I receive instructions for that purpose. In the mean time I shall amuse the messenger, who is very pressing for answers to his proposals, in the best way I can." In August he writes to Governor Chittenden: "You may rest assured that I shall give such orders as will effectually prevent hostilities of any kind being exercised in the district of Vermont until a breach on your part, or some general event, may make the contrary my duty."

After the signing of the preliminary articles of peace between Great Britain and the United States, but before Washington had proclaimed the cessation of hostilities, or the news of the peace, though expected, had reached Canada, General Haldimand dispatched his last letter to Vermont. "While," says this letter, "his Excellency sincerely regrets the happy moment which, it is much to be feared, cannot be recalled, of restoring to you the blessings of the British government, and views with concern the fatal consequences approaching which he had so long and so frequently predicted from your procrastination, he derives some satisfaction from a consciousness of not having omitted a circumstance which could tend to your persuasion and adoption of his desired purpose. If the report now prevailing has any foundation, a very short time will determine the fate of Vermont. Should anything favorable present, you may still depend on his Excellency's utmost endeavor for your salvation."

This closed the negotiations which had been continued for three years between the Vermont leaders and the British in Canada, and which, during that period, had saved the State from invasion on the one hand and disruption on the other. While it may be conceded that in the conduct of this policy the Vermonters did not exhibit the most exalted devotion to the faithless Congress,[85] though in it they did indeed serve it well, it must also be conceded that it was the only course by which they could preserve the autonomy of their State. This, antedating by eight years that of any other colony, could but be more precious to them than mere existence as a part or parts of other colonies, one of whom, and the principal claimant of their territory, had been, and still continued to be, more tyrannical and oppressive than Great Britain.

They had rendered a most valuable service to the cause of America in the capture of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, the first offensive operations of the Americans; on their own soil had fought their country's battles, one of which was largely instrumental in the defeat of Burgoyne; and had contributed a regiment of Green Mountain Boys to the Continental army. But when, after they had declared the independence which they had so long maintained, they asked to be admitted to a union with the sister States, Congress turned a deaf ear to their appeal, and listened only to the dissentient voices of New York and New Hampshire, greedy for spoil, and to the Southern States, jealous even so early of a preponderance of Northern commonwealths.

Abandoned by those to whom they naturally looked for aid when threatened by the common enemy, whose advance upon their wide frontier they were too feeble to oppose, they took advantage of the attempts of that enemy to corrupt them to procure a cessation of hostilities, which saved not only their own State but the frontiers of New York from invasion. If, at any time, they really contemplated more than this, and a wholesome admonition to Congress to respect their rights, they never sought to work injury to the Confederation from which they were excluded; and in the very beginning General Haldimand promised, if Vermont should be admitted an independent State in that Confederation, the "negotiation should cease, and any step that leads to it be forgotten."

There was no treason. The Vermonters could plot no treason against a government in which they had no part. As independent as the United States, their right was as absolute to make terms with Great Britain, even to becoming a province under it, as they boldly declared to Congress they would do rather than submit to the government of New York. Ira Allen did not scruple to carry misrepresentation beyond even the vaguely defined limits of diplomacy, and to him is chiefly due any doubts of the integrity of his associates, the wise and patriotic fathers of the State.

In the necessarily secret conduct of the policy adopted, they incurred the suspicious of friends and foes alike. Their own Warner and Stark, who had led the Green Mountain Boys to victory, suspected them, and General Haldimand complained of treachery; but they steadfastly pursued their course, to the accomplishment of all they desired.[86]