84. The relation of intent to criminal responsibility.—Gulad or intent, is probably the greatest single factor in determining penal responsibility. Thus:
A deed committed without intent, and without carelessness, is excused. One has not, usually, even to make restitution for the injury done. Thus, in the case of a bolo flying out of a man’s hand, and putting out the eye of another, no damages were assessed. An enormous number of men, every year, are injured in the free-for-all scrambles over sacrificed carabaos. Many of these injuries result in stiff joints; some of them in deaths. In no case, not even in the case of death, is a payment demanded. Suppose that in the chase a number of hunters have surrounded a wild boar. The boar charges one of them. This man leaps backward, and, at the same time, draws back his spear to throw it at the boar. In so doing, he stabs a companion behind him with the shod end of the spear handle. This is not an uncommon accident. The others of the party are witnesses that the killing was purely accidental (naloktat). No fine is assessed; but the killer, to show that he is sorry, usually assists in the funeral feast. Of course, if there were no witnesses, and if there were a possible motive to complicate matters, the ending of the case might not be so happy.
Suppose that a number of men are throwing at a target with their spears. A child runs in the way, and is killed. One-half the usual fine for manslaughter is assessed on the ground that the thrower was careless in that he did not make sure before he threw the spear that such an accident could not occur. In this case there was an absence of intent; but carelessness was present.
A man kills a neighbor at night, acting under the impression that he is killing an enemy seeking his life. He is subjected to a much heavier fine than if he had killed him through carelessness, since there is present both the intent to kill, although not criminal, and carelessness in that he did not make sure at whom he was casting his spear.[1]
Other Factors Affecting Liability
85. Alienship.—If the culprit be of a foreign village, the fact that he is a foreigner is a strong aggravating circumstance. If found in delicto, he is almost sure to be killed, in cases of theft or the more serious crimes. In such crimes as insult, the same fine might be demanded of the foreigner as of a co-villager, but not so much effort would be made to arrange matters peaceably. If the fine demanded be not paid and paid quickly, a kidnapping would ensue, or the culprit would be killed. A man committing a minor crime in a foreign village if not killed would be caught, tied, and held prisoner until redeemed.
86. Confession.—Confession before steps have been taken to inflict punishment alleviates to a considerable degree except in murder and adultery. In the latter case, if the adulterer made a voluntary confession of guilt to the offended spouse, without having been confronted with the evidence, it would be taken as brazen boasting, and of the nature of an insult.
87. Kinship.—Kinship is so strong a mitigating circumstance as often to excuse crime altogether. It has already been stated that crimes of one brother or sister against another are not punished. Inasmuch as all procedure is conducted by and between families, and since the family of the two brothers is identical, procedure in such cases is impossible. In the case of relatives of remoter degree, kinship is a strong extenuating circumstance in the event of the more serious crimes. In minor crimes, while the usual amount of the fine might be demanded, it would very frequently not be collected; especially, if the offender were very poor.
It has previously been said that the family is the only organization, political or social, that the Ifugao has, and that, in proportion as it is precious and necessary to him, he cherishes it; that Ifugao law, consequently looks with the greatest disfavor upon anything that would divide a family or destroy its unity.