At the Burgundian court the duke's friends thought that he would play the part of wisdom did he keep an army within call, and refrain from implicitly trusting the king's promises. There was, moreover, an impression abroad that the latter was not in a position to be very formidable.
"Once [says Commines][15] I was present when the Seigneur d'Ursé [envoy from the Duke of Guienne] was talking in this wise and urging the duke to mobilise his forces with all diligence. The duke called me to a window and said, 'Here is the Seigneur d'Ursé urging me to make my army as big as possible, and tells me that we would do well for the realm. Do you think that I should wage a war of benefit if I should lead my troops thither?' Smiling I answered that I thought not and he uttered these words: 'I love the welfare of France more than Mons. d' Ursé imagines, for instead of the one king that there is I would fain see six.'"
The animus of this expression is clear. It implies a wish to see the duke's friends, the French nobles, exalted, Burgundy at the head, until the titular monarch had no more power than half a dozen of his peers. Yet Commines states in unequivocal terms that Charles's next moves were to disregard his friendship for the peers, to discard their alliance, and to sign a treaty with Louis whose terms were wholly to his own advantage and implied complete desertion of the allied interest.
"This peace did the Duke of Burgundy swear and I was present[16] and to it swore the Seigneur de Craon and the Chancellor of France[17] in behalf of the king. When they departed they advised the duke not to disband his army but to increase it, so that the king their master might be the more inclined to cede promptly the two places mentioned above. They took with them Simon de Quingey to witness the king's oath and confirmation of his ambassadors' work. The king delayed this confirmation for several days. Meanwhile occurred the death of his brother, the Duke of Guienne ... shortly afterwards the said Simon returned, dismissed by the king with very meagre phrases and without any oath being taken. The duke felt mocked and insulted by this treatment and was very indignant about it."[18]
This story involves so serious a charge against Charles of Burgundy that the fact of his setting his signature to the treaty has been indignantly denied. Certain authorities impugn the historian's truthfulness rather than accept the duke's betrayal of his friends. It is true that only a few months later than this negotiation, Commines himself forsook the duke's service for the king's, a change of base that might well throw suspicion on his estimate of his deserted master.
Yet it must be remembered that he does not gloss over Louis's actions, even though he had an admiration for the success of his political methods, methods which Commines believed to be essential in dealing with national affairs. In many respects he gives more credit to the duke than to the king even while he prefers the cleverer chief. That there is no documentary evidence of such a treaty is mere negative evidence and of little importance.
The fact seems fairly clear that Charles of Burgundy was at a parting of the ways, in character as in action. His natural bent was to tell the truth and to adhere strictly to his given word. He felt that he owed it to his own dignity. He felt, too, that he was a person to command obedience to a promise whether pledged to him by king or commoner. In the years 1469-1472 several severe shocks had been dealt him. He had lost all faith in Louis, a faith that had really been founded on the duke's own self-esteem, on a conviction that the weak king must respect the redoubtable cousin of Burgundy.
The effect on Charles of his suspicions was to make him adopt the tools used by his rival, or at least to attempt to do so. At the moment of the negotiation of 1471-1472, the duke's preoccupation was to regain the towns on the Somme. That accomplished, it is not probable that he would have abandoned his friends, the French peers, whom he desired to see become petty monarchs each in his own territory. There seems no doubt that words were used with singular disregard of their meaning. It is surprising that time was wasted in concocting elaborate phrases that dropped into nothingness at the slightest touch. In citing the above passage from Commines referring to the treaty, the close of the negotiations has been anticipated. Whether or not any draft of a treaty received the duke's signature, the king's yearning for peace ceased abruptly when his brother's death freed him from the dread of dangerous alliance between Charles of France and Charles of Burgundy. As late as May 8th, he was still uncertain as to the decree of fate and wrote as follows to the Governor of Rousillon:[19]
"Keep cool for the present I implore you. If the Duke of Burgundy declares war against me, I will set out immediately for that quarter [Brittany], and in a week we will finish the matter. On the other hand, if peace be made we shall have everything without a blow or without any risk of restoration. However, if you can get hold of anything by negotiating and manoeuvring, why do it. As to the artillery, it is close by you, and when it is time, and I shall have heard from my ambassador, you shall have it at once."
Ten days later he is more hopeful.[20]