His Highness left for England in October, 1889, again to confer with the Foreign Office on the Limbang question, and returned in February, 1890, when he at once proceeded to Limbang, which river was annexed to Sarawak by him on March 17. The events that led up to this step being taken, and the reasons that induced the Rajah to take them, have been fully explained in the chapter on Bruni. Though it was evident to all with the smallest acquaintance with Bornean affairs that the Rajah's action was purely protective in the interests of the inhabitants of Limbang, and was taken at their earnest desire; that it was even to the advantage of Bruni itself, menaced as it was by the rebels in the Limbang, the British Government having declined to interfere, yet this action was generally condemned by the English public, who knew nothing of the circumstances, and regarded it as an injustice done to the Sultan, the very person, and about the only person, against whom his subjects needed protection. The British Government had offered the Sultan assistance, but the acceptance of this would have involved the appointment of a British Resident, and the consequent adoption of a just Government; this did not in anywise accord with the views of the Sultan. He then turned to the Rajah, who was willing to assist him in bringing about peace by peaceful means, but this also was not what the Sultan wanted. An agreement exists between Bruni and Sarawak that the latter shall help the former if troubles beset her, but the Sultan's view, that Sarawak should reduce the Limbang people to submission by force of arms and subject them to a crushing tyranny, was not an interpretation of this agreement which the Rajah could or would accept.
Mr. L. V. Helms,[[347]] a Dane, twice visited the Limbang river a short time before its annexation, and he wrote:—
I have come in contact with many of the principal chiefs, and have heard from them a story of misrule which is a scandal even in an Asiatic country, and should disentitle the rulers to be considered a government, or to enjoy the rights and privileges as such. When the subject has to abandon his house and property and seek concealment in the jungle to avoid being robbed of his goods and perhaps of his children by the Sultan and his menials, then they rightly forfeit their position as rulers. The present state of things in this river is very deplorable, and unjust to the natives, who sit on the rail, uncertain who will be their master, anxious to give allegiance to Rajah Brooke's government, but dreading lest they should be handed back to their old taskmasters.
For the sake of humanity it is to be hoped that this suspense may soon be terminated by the transfer of the river to the Sarawak Rajah's government, who may justly point to the history of Sarawak and its position to-day as a good title to the last territory of a Ruler who has long ceased to perform the duties of that office to his subjects.
On July 31, 1891, the Rajah, at a meeting of the Council Negri, proclaimed his son, Vyner, as his successor, whenever it should please God to take him hence; and decreed that seven days after his own death the Rajah Muda should be proclaimed Rajah of Sarawak. This duty he entrusted to the members of Council, both European and native, to see that it was solemnly carried out.
Having bought up some questionable rights over North Borneo, which do not appear to have been utilised, granted by the Sultan to some Americans in 1865, Mr. (now Sir Alfred) Dent and Baron Von Overbeck, an Austrian, in 1877 and 1878, obtained from the Sultans of Sulu and Bruni the cession of North Borneo, from the Sibuku river on the east coast to the Kimanis on the west coast,[[348]] a territory containing some 30,000 square miles, with a population of about 150,000; and this led to the formation of the chartered British North Borneo Company in 1881.
During the first few years of its administration, the Company made such tardy advance towards the realisation of the bright promises that had been held out by its promoters, and the prospects before it being considered by many to offer but little hope of ultimate success, in 1893 it was proposed by some persons interested in North Borneo, that the country should be incorporated with Sarawak, provided that the Rajah would guarantee to the shareholders a small interest upon the capital paid up, to be increased pro rata with the increase of the revenue. The capital invested was to be viewed in the light of a loan to the State, and was to be paid off as the Rajah could find the means to do so. The shareholders, however, had so great a faith in the undeveloped resources of their property that they declined to part with it. But, being sensible of the benefit they would derive from the Rajah's influence and experience in subjecting to order a people not altogether satisfied with the new régime, as also in establishing a form of government adapted to them and to the conditions of the country, they empowered their Directors to offer him the position of Governor-General. Needless to say, the Rajah could not accept this honour, and so the matter dropped.
Had this measure been effected, whatever benefit the northern State might have derived, it is obvious that it might in many ways have proved detrimental to the interests of Sarawak. An union of the two States would have ensured economy in administration to British North Borneo, and probably a more beneficial government to its people. This was the opinion of Lord Brassey, himself a Director of the Company, an opinion which appears to have been shared by other Directors:—
I hold strongly to the opinion, said his Lordship, that the North Borneo Company would do well to hand over its territory to Rajah Brooke. I believe the attempt to administer the affairs of the country by a Board of Directors in London is simply hopeless. The members of the Board have no local knowledge, they are entirely in the hands of their local officers, and the tendency is to increase the staff and create an expensive system of administration, which is not suitable to the circumstances of the country. North Borneo is an exceedingly poor country, and I see very little prospect for it. Rajah Brooke is a man of responsibility and high standing in those parts of Borneo, and would bring to bear upon the Government a life-long personal experience. He has a deep knowledge of the Malay population, with whom he has great influence. He could maintain an adequate authority with a much smaller staff of officials than we now require. He would have no need of a system of police such as we have created, consisting of Sikhs from the Army of India, who are necessarily paid at a high rate. The cost of the Sikh police is far beyond the resources of the country.
