The choice of Prince Max was plainly a concession to and an acknowledgement of the fact that Germany had become overwhelmingly democratic, and it was at the same time a virtual confession that the military situation was desperate and that peace must soon be sought. Baden had always been one of the most democratic of the German federal states, and the Prince was, despite his rank, a decidedly democratic man. In the first years of the war he had distinguished himself as a humane enemy, and had well earned the tribute paid to him by Ambassador James W. Gerard in the Ambassador's book, My Four Years in Germany. This tribute was paid in connection with a proposal to place Prince Max at the head of a central organization for prisoners of war in Germany. The appointment, said Gerard, would have redounded to the benefit of Germany and the prisoners.
Prince Max had for some years been recognized as the leader of the Delbrück group of moderates, and his name had been considered for the chancellorship when Dr. Michaelis resigned. That he was not then appointed was due chiefly to his own reluctance, based upon dynastic reasons. He had never been in sympathy with Schrecklichkeit in any of its manifestations, and was known to be out of sympathy with the ruling caste in Prussia. Early in 1918 he had made public a semi-official interview outlining his ideas as to what Germany's peace terms should be. These were in general in accordance with the resolution of the majority bloc of the Reichstag of July 19, 1917, and condemned all annexations of foreign territory and all punitive indemnities. He declared also that the interests of Europe and America would be best served by a peace which should not disrupt the Anglo-Saxon-Teutonic peoples, since Germany must be maintained as a bulwark against the spread of Bolshevism to the nations westward. The conclusion seems justified that the government believed that Prince Max, uncompromised and with known democratic leanings, could secure a more favorable peace for Germany than any other man who could be named.
And the government knew that peace must be had. It had heard so on October 2, the day before Prince Max's appointment, from the lips of a man who brought a message from Hindenburg and Ludendorff. What had long been feared had become a reality—an armistice must be requested. The bearer of these calamitous tidings was Major von Busche. Word had been sent that he was coming, and the leaders of the various Reichstag parties assembled to hear his message. Nominally the message came from Hindenburg, as commander-in-chief, but really it was Ludendorff speaking through Hindenburg and his emissary.
The message was brief; Hindenburg, said Major von Busche, had become convinced that a request for an armistice must be made. The General Field Marshal had declared, however, that if the request should be refused, or if dishonoring conditions should be imposed, the fight must and could go on. He had no intention of throwing his rifle into the ditch. If necessary, Germany could continue fighting in enemy territory for months. Von Busche did not admit in so many words that all hope of an eventual victory had been lost, but that was the effect of his message.
The men who heard from the highest military authorities in this blunt manner that the situation was even worse than they had feared were dumfounded. If Hindenburg and Ludendorff had given up, there was nothing to be said. It was decided to ask for an armistice.
Prince Max was inclined to refuse to become Imperial Chancellor if it meant that his first act must be a confession of the impossibility of carrying on the war longer—for that, he perceived clearly, would be the natural and logical deduction from a request for an armistice. He particularly disapproved of making the request as the first act of his chancellorship. This, he pointed out, would give a needless appearance of desperate haste and increase the depressing effect of the action, which would in any event be serious enough.
Prince Max's attitude at this crisis was explained by him in an article in the Preussische Jahrbücher following the armistice. He wrote then:
"My peace policy was gravely hampered by the request for an armistice, which was presented to me completely formulated when I reached Berlin. I opposed it on practical political grounds. It seemed to me to be a great mistake to permit the new government's first step toward peace to be followed by such a surprising confession of German weakness. Neither our own people nor the enemy countries estimated our military situation to be such that a desperate step of this kind was necessary. I made a counter-proposal. The government should as its first act draw up a detailed program of its war-aims, and this program should demonstrate to the whole world our agreement with Wilson's principles and our honest willingness to make heavy national sacrifices for these principles.
"The military authorities replied that it was impossible to await the result of such a declaration. The situation at the front required that a request for an armistice be made within twenty-four hours. If I refused to make it, the old government would make it. I thereupon decided to form a new government and to support the unavoidable request for an armistice with the authority of a cabinet of uncompromised men. A week later the military authorities informed me that they had erred in their estimate of the situation at the front on October 1st."
Dr. Solf, formerly head of the German Colonial Office, became Foreign Minister, and Philip Scheidemann, the Socialist leader, and Deputy Groeber, a Clerical leader, also entered the new ministry. It was the first German ministry to contain a Social-Democrat, and the first which could be said to have strong democratic leanings. Opinion in Washington, according to a cablegram reaching Copenhagen early on October 4th, was that the makeup of the cabinet was regarded in America "as a desperate attempt of German militarists to hoodwink the Entente and the German people into the belief that Germany is being democratized." This opinion was inspired more by the passions of war than by clear thinking. Germany was being democratized. That the democratic concessions attempted by various state rulers were inspired by fear is true, but their motives are of no importance. It is fruits that count, and the time had come when the German people could not longer be hoodwinked themselves by the militarists, nor be used as tools in hoodwinking anybody else. That time, however, had come too late.
On October 6th, Prince Max, addressing the Reichstag, announced that a request for an armistice had been made. This request, which was addressed to President Wilson, said: