CHAPTER XVII.
The Spartacans Rise Again.
Article xxvi of the armistice of November 11th declared:
"The Allies and the United States have in view the provisioning of Germany during the armistice to the extent deemed necessary." [65]
[ [65] Les Alliés et les États-Unis envisagent le ravitaillement de l'Allemagne, pendant l'armistice, dans la mesure reconnue nécessaire.
Even by the end of November it had become apparent to all intelligent observers on the ground and to many outside Germany that such provisioning was urgently necessary, and that if it did not come at once the result would be a spread of Bolshevism which would endanger all Europe. Allied journalists in Germany were almost a unit in recognizing the dangers and demands of the situation, but they were greatly hampered in their efforts to picture the situation truthfully by the sentiments prevailing in their respective countries as a result of the passions engendered by the conflict so lately ended. This was in the highest degree true as to the Americans, which was especially regrettable and unfortunate in view of the fact that America was the only power possessing a surplus of immediately available foodstuffs. American correspondents, venturing to report actual conditions in Germany, found themselves denounced as "pro-Germans" and traitors by the readers of their papers. More than this: they became the objects of unfavorable reports by officers of the American Military Intelligence, although many of these men themselves were convinced that empty stomachs were breeding Bolshevism with every passing day. One correspondent, who had been so bitterly anti-German from the very beginning of the war that he had had to leave Germany long before America entered the struggle, was denounced in a report to the Military Intelligence at Washington on March 3d as "having shown pro-German leanings throughout the war." An American correspondent with a long and honorable record, who had taken a prominent part in carrying on American propaganda abroad and upon whose reports high diplomatic officials of three of the Allied countries had relied, was astounded to learn that the Military Intelligence, in a report of January 11, 1919, had denounced him as "having gone to Berlin to create sentiment in the United States favorable to furnishing Germany food-supply."
There was less of this sort of thing in England, and many prominent Englishmen were early awake to the dangers that lay in starvation. Early in January Lord Henry Bentinck, writing to the London Daily News, declared there was no sense in maintaining the blockade. It was hindering the development of industry and the employment of the idle in England, and in Middle Europe it was killing children and keeping millions hungry and unemployed. The blockade, said Lord Henry, was the Bolshevists' best friend and had no purpose except to enable England to cut off her own nose in order to spite Germany's face. Many other leaders of thought in England took the same stand.
Despite the (at least inferential) promise in the armistice that Germany should be revictualled, not a step had been taken toward doing this when, on January 13th, more than two months after the signing of the armistice, President Wilson sent a message to administration leaders in Congress urging the appropriation of one hundred million dollars for food-relief in Europe.
"Food-relief is now the key to the whole European situation and to the solution of peace," said the President. "Bolshevism is steadily advancing westward; is poisoning Germany. It cannot be stopped by force, but it can be stopped by food, and all the leaders with whom I am in conference agree that concerted action in this matter is of immediate and vital importance."
So far, so good. This was a step in the right direction. But it had to be qualified. This was done in the next paragraph: