The British Empire in India, in its extent, power, wealth, and future possibilities, stands an enduring monument of the courage, energy, and wisdom of the British people. Whether actual possession has secured the reversionary benefit, time alone can show.
That wealth, power, and dominion follow oriental traffic, is now patent to the world. It is no longer the object of secret diplomatic intrigue; it has become an open question, to be solved by the general competition of commercial nations.
In the pursuit of this object, the leader in the Pansclavonic movement is pushing her outposts past India to the wall of China. The United States, conscious of her natural advantage, is awakening to the importance of a systematic policy.
The French Emperor seems at present, by the aid of the [Suez Canal], likely to appropriate the lion’s share. While American commerce is disappearing from the seas—fifty per cent. of her exports and imports being carried in foreign ships—the flag of France may be seen by the side of England in every sea. The hereditary policy and commercial instinct of the British may prove to be more than a match for the astuteness of one man. Who will ultimately bear off the prize, is a question admitting three possible solutions.
Russia, as has been said, rapidly extending her frontier eastward, stretches out her hand to grasp the trade of the East. The Suez and Darien Canals—the one an unsolved problem, the other an accomplished fact—represent the two other contestants. One of the most constant objects of war and diplomacy has been for the possession of the highway through Egypt for the trade of the East.
It was designated by the Portuguese conqueror, Albuquerque, as one of the three important points essential to the “command and monopoly” of this trade. England, anticipating the day when it might be important for her to have the military control of this highway, has persistently established military ports, beginning at Gibraltar and ending at Aiden. She has secured strong posts at Malta and Beb el Mandeb. The Great Leibnitz called the attention of Louis XIV to the commercial and political advantages of a conquest and colonization of this country. Napoleon, flushed with the conquest of Italy, took the initiative in this bold design. By his order, M. Lepere, “a distinguished engineer,” completed an examination in 1801. The results of this examination have been published by the Imperial Government.
M. Lepere asserted the practicability of a ship canal along the line of the ancient canal from Suez to the Nile, as far as the Bitter Lakes. From thence its course has to proceed to the Pelusiac branch of the Nile. Here, on the sea, it encounters the accumulating banks and bars of the Nile, one of the two very serious obstacles to the execution and permanent value of a ship canal between the two seas.
The project of a canal uniting the Red Sea and the Mediterranean appears to have been suggested by M. de Lesseps to Said Pacha, the Viceroy of Egypt, in 1854. The company was definitely formed in 1869.
It is not very easy to estimate the important effects of opening this route to the maritime States of Europe.
Lord Palmerston, acting in the interest of England, constantly opposed the design. He at once perceived that the restoration of trade to the Levantine ports would seriously disturb the commercial equilibrium. All the ingenious devices of a clever lawyer in conducting a bad case were employed by English diplomacy in order to arrest the operations of M. de Lesseps.