Since, then, some men are especially occupied with the contemplation of the truth while others are especially-occupied with external things, man's life may be conveniently divided into the active and the contemplative.
Some, however, repudiate this division, thus:
1. The soul is by its essence the principle of life; thus the Philosopher says[293]: "For living things, to live is to be." But the same soul with its faculties is the principle both of action and of contemplation. Hence it would seem that life cannot be suitably divided into the active and the contemplative.
But the peculiar nature of every individual thing—that which makes it actually be—is the principle of its own proper action; consequently to live is said to be the very being of living things, and this because living things—by the very fact that they exist through such a nature—act in such a way.
2. Again, when one thing precedes another it is unfitting to divide the former by differences which find place in the latter. But action and contemplation, like speculation and practice, are distinctions in the intellect, as is laid down by the Philosopher.[294] But we live before we understand; for life is primarily in living things by their vegetative soul, as also the Philosopher says.[295] Therefore life is not fittingly divided according to contemplation and action.
But we do not say that life universally considered is divided into the active and the contemplative, but that man's life is so divided. For man derives his species from his intellect, hence the same divisions hold good for human life as hold good for the intellect.
3. Lastly, the word "life" implies motion, as is clear from Denis the Areopagite.[296] But contemplation more especially consists in repose, according to the words: When I go into my house I shall repose myself with her (Wisdom).[297]
But while contemplation implies a certain repose from external occupations, it is still a certain motion of the intellect in the sense that every operation is a motion; in this sense the Philosopher says that to feel and to understand are certain motions in the sense that motion is said to be the act of a perfect thing.[298] It is in this sense, too, that Denis[299] assigns three movements to the soul in contemplation: the direct, the circular, and the oblique.[300]