Is Prayer an Act of the Appetitive Powers?
S. Isidore says[98]: "To pray is the same thing as to speak." Speaking, however, belongs to the intellect. Hence prayer is not an act of the appetitive, but of the intellectual faculties.
According to Cassiodorus, on those words of the Psalmist: Hear my prayer, O Lord, and my supplication, give ear to my tears,[99] prayer means "the lips' reasoning." Now there is this difference between the speculative and the practical reason, that the speculative reason merely apprehends things, while the practical reason not only apprehends things, but actually causes them. But one thing is the cause of another in two ways: in one way, perfectly—namely, as inducing a necessity—as happens when the effect comes entirely under the power of a cause; in another way, imperfectly—namely, by merely disposing to it—as happens when an effect is not entirely under the power of a cause.
And so, too, reason is in two ways the cause of certain things: in one way as imposing a necessity; and in this way it belongs to the reason to command not merely the lower faculties and the bodily members, but even men who are subject to us, and this is done by giving commands. In another way as inducing, and in some sort disposing to, an effect; and in this way the reason asks for something to be done by those who are subject to it, whether they be equals or superiors.
But both of these—namely, to command something, or to ask or beg for something to be done—imply a certain arrangement—as when a man arranges for something to be done by somebody else. And in this respect both of these acts come under the reason whose office it is to arrange. Hence the Philosopher says[100]: "Reason asks for the best things."
Here, then, we speak of prayer as implying a certain asking or petition, for, as S. Augustine says[101]: "Prayer is a certain kind of petition"; so, too, S. John Damascene says[102]: "Prayer is the asking of fitting things from God."
Hence it is clear that the prayer of which we are here speaking is an act of the reason.
Some, however, think that prayer is an act of the appetitive powers, thus:
1. The whole object of prayer is to be heard, and the Psalmist says that it is our desires which are heard: The Lord hath heard the desire of the poor.[103] Prayer, then, is desire; but desire is an act of the appetitive powers.