We must now consider consent; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive power?
(2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?
(3) Whether it is directed to the end or to the means?
(4) Whether consent to an act belongs to the higher part of the soul only? ________________________
FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 15, Art. 1]
Whether Consent Is an Act of the Appetitive or of the Apprehensive
Power?
Objection 1: It would seem that consent belongs only to the apprehensive part of the soul. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) ascribes consent to the higher reason. But the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent belongs to an apprehensive power.
Obj. 2: Further, consent is "co-sense." But sense is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent is the act of an apprehensive power.
Obj. 3: Further, just as assent is an application of the intellect to something, so is consent. But assent belongs to the intellect, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent also belongs to an apprehensive power.