Reply Obj. 1: Prudence makes us be of good counsel, not as though its immediate act consisted in being of good counsel, but because it perfects the latter act by means of a subordinate virtue, viz. euboulia.
Reply Obj. 2: Judgment about what is to be done is directed to something further: for it may happen in some matter of action that a man's judgment is sound, while his execution is wrong. The matter does not attain to its final complement until the reason has commanded aright in the point of what has to be done.
Reply Obj. 3: Judgment of anything should be based on that thing's proper principles. But inquiry does not reach to the proper principles: because, if we were in possession of these, we should need no more to inquire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence only one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, wheres there are two virtues for good judgment: because difference is based not on common but on proper principles. Consequently, even in speculative matters, there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all matters; whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce judgment, differ according to their different objects. Synesis and gnome differ in respect of the different rules on which judgment is based: for synesis judges of actions according to the common law; while gnome bases its judgment on the natural law, in those cases where the common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on (II-II, Q. 51, A. 4).
Reply Obj. 4: Memory, understanding and foresight, as also caution and docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from prudence: but are, as it were, integral parts thereof, in so far as they are all requisite for perfect prudence. There are, moreover, subjective parts or species of prudence, e.g. domestic and political economy, and the like. But the three first names are, in a fashion, potential parts of prudence; because they are subordinate thereto, as secondary virtues to a principal virtue: and we shall speak of them later (II-II, Q. 48, seqq.). ________________________
QUESTION 58
OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES
(In Five Articles)
We must now consider moral virtues. We shall speak (1) of the difference between them and intellectual virtues; (2) of their distinction, one from another, in respect of their proper matter; (3) of the difference between the chief or cardinal virtues and the others.
Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?
(2) Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?