(6) Whether there is only one aeviternity, as there is one time, and one eternity? _______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 10, Art. 1]
Whether This Is a Good Definition of Eternity, "The Simultaneously-
Whole and Perfect Possession of Interminable Life"?
Objection 1: It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: "Eternity is the simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life." For the word "interminable" is a negative one. But negation only belongs to what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore in the definition of eternity the word "interminable" ought not to be found.
Obj. 2: Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration. But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word "life" ought not to come into the definition of eternity; but rather the word "existence."
Obj. 3: Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to eternity which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be "whole."
Obj. 4: Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist all at once. But in eternity, days and times are in the plural, for it is said, "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity" (Micah 5:2); and also it is said, "According to the revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity" (Rom. 16:25). Therefore eternity is not omni-simultaneous.
Obj. 5: Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing. Supposing, therefore, that it is "whole," it is superfluously described as "perfect."
Obj. 6: Further, duration does not imply "possession." But eternity is a kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession.
I answer that, As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by means of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by before and after. For since succession occurs in every movement, and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in movement, makes us apprehend time, which is nothing else but the measure of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft of movement, which is always the same, there is no before or after. As therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering of before and after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is outside of movement, consists the idea of eternity.