OF MODESTY
(In Two Articles)
We must now consider modesty: and (1) Modesty in general; (2) Each of its species. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether modesty is a part of temperance?
(2) What is the matter of modesty? _______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 160, Art. 1]
Whether Modesty Is a Part of Temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is not a part of temperance. For modesty is denominated from mode. Now mode is requisite in every virtue: since virtue is directed to good; and "good," according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni 3), "consists in mode, species, and order." Therefore modesty is a general virtue, and consequently should not be reckoned a part of temperance.
Obj. 2: Further, temperance would seem to be deserving of praise chiefly on account of its moderation. Now this gives modesty its name. Therefore modesty is the same as temperance, and not one of its parts.
Obj. 3: Further, modesty would seem to regard the correction of our neighbor, according to 2 Tim. 2:24, 25, "The servant of the Lord must not wrangle, but be mild towards all men . . . with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth." Now admonishing wrong-doers is an act of justice or of charity, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 1). Therefore seemingly modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons modesty as a part of temperance.