Conspiracy of Catiline and the Jurgurthine War

by Sallust

XL. At Rome, in the mean time, Caius Mamilius Limetanus, one of the tribunes, proposed that the people should pass a bill for instituting an inquiry into the conduct of those by whose influence Jugurtha had set at naught the decrees of the senate, as well as of those who, whether as embassadors or commanders, had received money from him, or who had restored to him his elephants and deserters, or had made any compacts with the enemy relative to peace or war. To this bill some, who were conscious of guilt, and others, who apprehended danger from the jealousy of parties, secretly raised obstructions through the agency of friends, and especially of men among the Latins and Italian allies[139], since they could not openly resist it, without admitting that these and similar practices met their approbation. But as to the people, it is incredible what eagerness they displayed, and with what spirit they approved, voted, and passed the bill, though rather from hatred to the nobility, against whom these severe measures were directed, than from concern for the republic; so violent was the fury of party.

While the rest of the delinquents were in trepidation, Marcus Scaurus [140], whom I have previously noticed as Bestia's lieutenant, contrived, amid the exultation of the populace, the dismay of his own party, and the continued agitation in the city, to have himself elected one of the three commissioners who were appointed by the bill of Mamilius to carry it into execution. But the investigation, notwithstanding, was conducted [141] with great rigor and violence, under the influence of common rumor and popular caprice; for the insolence of success, which had often distinguished the nobility, on this occasion characterized the people.

XLI. The prevalence of parties among the people, and of factions in the senate, and of all evil practices attendant on them, had its origin at Rome, a few years before, during a period of tranquillity, and amid the abundance of all that mankind regarded as desirable. For, before the destruction of Carthage, the senate and people managed the affairs of the republic with mutual moderation and forbearance; there were no contests among the citizens for honor or ascendency; but the dread of an enemy kept the state in order. When that fear, however, was removed from their minds, licentiousness and pride, evils which prosperity loves to foster, immediately began to prevail; and thus peace, which they had so eagerly desired in adversity, proved, when they had obtained it, more grievous and fatal than adversity itself. The patricians carried their authority, and the people their liberty, to excess; every man took, snatched, and seized[142] what he could. There was a complete division into two factions, and the republic was torn in pieces between them. Yet the nobility still maintained an ascendency by conspiring together; for the strength of the people, being disunited and dispersed among a multitude, was less able to exert itself. Things were accordingly directed, both at home and in the field, by the will of a small number of men, at whose disposal were the treasury, the provinces, offices, honors, and triumphs; while the people were oppressed with military service and with poverty, and the generals divided the spoils of war with a few of their friends. The parents and children of the soldiers,[143] meantime, if they chanced to dwell near a powerful neighbor, were driven from their homes. Thus avarice, leagued with power, disturbed, violated, and wasted every thing, without moderation or restraint; disregarding alike reason and religion, and rushing headlong, as it were, to its own destruction. For whenever any arose among the nobility[144], who preferred true glory to unjust power, the state was immediately in a tumult, and civil discord spread with as much disturbance as attends a convulsion of the earth.

XLII. Thus when Tiberius and Caius Gracchus, whose forefathers had done much to increase the power of the state in the Punic and other wars, began to vindicate the liberty of the people, and to expose the misconduct of the few, the nobility, conscious of guilt, and seized with alarm, endeavored, sometimes by means of the allies and Latins[145], and sometimes by means of the equestrian order, whom the hope of coalition with the patricians had detached from the people, to put a stop to the proceedings of the Gracchi; and first they killed Tiberius, and a few years after Caius, who pursued the same measures as his brother, the one when he was tribune, and the other when he was one of a triumvirate for settling colonies; and with them they cut off Marcus Fulvius Flaccus. In the Gracchi, indeed, it must be allowed that, from their ardor for victory, there was not sufficient prudence. But to a reasonable man it is more agreeable to submit[146] to injustice than to triumph over it by improper means. The nobility, however, using their victory with wanton extravagance, exterminated numbers of men by the sword or by exile, yet rather increased, for the time to come, the dread with which they were regarded, than their real power. Such proceedings have often ruined powerful states; for of two parties, each strives to suppress the other by any means whatever, and take vengeance with undue severity on the vanquished.

But were I to attempt to treat of the animosities of parties, and of the morals of the state, with minuteness of detail, and suitably to the vastness of the subject, time would fail me sooner than matter. I therefore return to my subject.

XLIII. After the treaty of Aulus, and the disgraceful flight of our army, Quintus Metellus and Marcus Silanus, the consuls elect, divided the provinces between them; and Numidia fell to Metellus, a man of energy, and, though an opponent of the popular party, yet of a character uniformly irreproachable[147]. He, as soon as he entered on his office, regarded all other things as common to himself and his colleague[148], but directed his chief attention to the war which he was to conduct. Distrusting, therefore, the old army, he began to raise new troops, to procure auxiliaries from all parts, and to provide arms, horses, and other military requisites, besides provisions in abundance, and every thing else which was likely to be of use in a war varied in its character, and demanding great resources. To assist in accomplishing these objects, the allies and Latins, by the appointment of the senate, and different princes[149] of their own accord, sent supplies; and the whole state exerted itself in the cause with the greatest zeal. Having at length prepared and arranged every thing according to his wishes, Metellus set out for Numidia, attended with sanguine expectations on the part of his fellow-citizens, not only because of his other excellent qualities, but especially because his mind was proof against gold; for it was through the avarice of our commanders, that, down to this period, our affairs in Numidia had been ruined, and those of the enemy rendered prosperous.

XLIV. When he arrived in Africa, the command of the army was resigned to him by Albinus, the proconsul[150]; but it was an army spiritless and unwarlike; incapable of encountering either danger or fatigue; more ready with the tongue than with the sword; accustomed to plunder our allies, while itself was the prey of the enemy; unchecked by discipline, and void of all regard to its character. The new general, accordingly, felt more anxiety from the corrupt morals of the men, than confidence or hope from their numbers. He determined, however, though the delay of the comitia had shortened his summer campaign, and though he knew his countrymen to be anxious for the result of his proceedings, not to commence operations, until, by a revival of the old discipline, he had brought the soldiers to bear fatigue. For Albinus, dispirited by the disaster of his brother Aulus and his army, and having resolved not to leave the province during the portion of the summer that he was to command, had kept the soldiers, for the most part, in a stationary camp[151], except when stench, or want of forage, obliged them to remove. But neither had the camp been fortified[152], nor the watches kept, according to military usage; every one had been allowed to leave his post when he pleased. The camp-followers, mingled with the soldiers, wandered about day and night, ravaging the country, robbing the houses, and vying with each other in carrying off cattle and slaves, which they exchanged with traders for foreign wine[153] and other luxuries; they even sold the corn, which was given them from the public store, and bought bread from day to day; and, in a word, whatever abominations, arising from idleness and licentiousness, can be expressed or imagined, and even more, were to be seen in that army.

XLV. But I am assured that Metellus, in these difficult circumstances, no less than in his operations against the enemy, proved himself a great and wise man; so just a medium did he observe between an affectation of popularity and an excessive enforcement of discipline. His first measure was to remove incentives to idleness, by a general order that no one should sell bread, or any other dressed provisions, in the camp; that no sutlers should follow the army; and that no common soldier should have a servant, or beast of burden, either in a camp or on a march. He made the strictest regulations, too, with regard to other things.[154] He moved his camp daily, exercising the soldiers by marches across the country; he fortified it with a rampart and a trench, exactly as if the enemy had been at hand; he placed numerous sentinels[155] by night, and went the rounds with his officers; and, when the army was on the march; he would be at one time in the front, at another in the rear, and at another in the center, to see that none quitted their ranks, that the men kept close to their standards, and that every soldier carried his provisions and his arms. Thus by preventing rather than punishing irregularities, he in a short time rendered his army effective.

XLVI. Jugurtha, meantime, having learned from his emissaries how Metellus was proceeding, and having heard, when he was in Rome, of the integrity of the consul's character, began to despair of his plans, and at length actually endeavored to effect a capitulation. He therefore sent deputies to the consul with proposals of submission, stipulating only for his own life and that of his children, and offering to surrender every thing else to the Romans. But Metellus had already learned by experience, that the Numidians were a faithless race, of unsettled disposition, and fond of change; and he accordingly applied himself to each of the deputies separately, and after gradually sounding them, and finding them proper instruments for his purpose, prevailed on them, by large promises, to deliver Jugurtha into his hands; bringing him alive, if they could, or dead, if to take him alive was impracticable. In public, however, he directed that such an answer should be given to the king as would be agreeable to his wishes.

A few days afterward, he led the army, which was now vigorous and resolute, into Numidia, where, instead of any appearance of war, he found the cottages full of people, and the cattle and laborers in the fields, while the officers of Jugurtha came from the towns and villages[156] to meet him, offering to supply him with corn, to convey provisions for him, and to do whatever might be required of them. Metellus, notwithstanding, made no diminution in the caution with which he marched, but kept as much upon the defensive as if an enemy had been at hand; and he dispatched scouts to explore the country, thinking that these signs of submission were but pretense, and that the Numidians were watching an opportunity for treachery. He himself, with some light-armed cohorts, and a select body of slingers and archers, advanced always in the front; while Caius Marius, his lieutenant-general, at the head of the cavalry, had charge of the rear. The auxiliary horse, distributed among the tribunes of the legions and prefects of the cohorts, he placed on the flanks, so that, with the aid of the light troops mixed with them, they might repel the enemy whenever an approach should be made. For such was the subtlety of Jugurtha, and such his knowledge of the country and the art of war, that it was doubtful whether he was more formidable absent or present, offering peace or threatening hostilities.