XII. That inasmuch as this Act will most deeply affect our societies, whose moral character and loyalty are unimpeachable, we feel it our duty to declare, that we do not believe there exists among them any practice or disposition, to warrant a legislative measure, which would abridge our rights and privileges.
XIII. That the introduction of the present measure is as unseasonable, as it is needless and oppressive. At any time, religious rights form a most delicate subject for legislative interference, but at such a time as this, when not only unanimity, but affection for the government and laws of our country are more than ever essential, for the patient endurance of the pressure of the times, and the repulsion of the bitterest enemy with which this country had to contend, the discussion of these rights is most feelingly to be deprecated. Much irritation,—even worse than political irritation, would be produced, and the ardent affection of many a conscientious and loyal subject would be involuntarily diminished. We are impressed with these sentiments the more deeply, as not a shadow of a charge is brought against our very numerous body, and we can challenge the most rigid enquiry into the moral and political character of our preachers and our people.
XIV. That, abstaining from all observations on the abstract rights of conscience, but with the views and feelings thus expressed, we are most decidedly of opinion that the present measure is radically objectionable, and does not admit of any modification; and we cannot but feel it our duty to oppose the Bill in all its stages by every constitutional means.
XV. That we reflect with high satisfaction on the liberal, enlightened, and religious declaration of our most gracious Sovereign, on the commencement of his Reign. “Born,” said his Majesty, in his first speech from the throne, “and educated in this country, I glory in the name of Briton, and the peculiar happiness of my life will ever consist in promoting the welfare of a people, whose loyalty and warm affection to me I consider as the greatest and most permanent security of my throne; and I doubt not, but their steadiness in those principles will equal the firmness of my invariable resolution to adhere to, and strengthen this excellent constitution in church and state; AND TO MAINTAIN THE TOLERATION INVIOLABLE. The civil and RELIGIOUS RIGHTS OF MY LOVING SUBJECTS ARE EQUALLY DEAR TO ME WITH THE MOST VALUABLE PREROGATIVES OF MY CROWN; and as the surest foundation of the whole, and the best means to draw down the divine favour on my reign, IT IS MY FIXED PURPOSE TO COUNTENANCE AND ENCOURAGE THE PRACTICE OF TRUE RELIGION AND VIRTUE.” This declaration of our beloved Sovereign has been religiously fulfilled during a long and benificent reign, and has been humbly met by our societies with the affection it was calculated to inspire. We have built with confidence upon this gracious declaration, and our confidence has not been misplaced. His Majesty has been a shield to the religious of all persuasions, and he has respected the rights of conscience in all. And we cannot doubt that His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, with those just sentiments of truth and sincerity, which he has graciously declared shall be the guide of his character and every action of his life, will feel it is happiness to recognize the high natural rights of conscience; and should it please the wise disposer of all events to restore his afflicted Father to the personal exercise of his royal functions, His Royal Highness will feel it amongst the many blessings of his benevolent and liberal administration, that he has, agreeably to the ardent wishes of a great portion of His Majesty’s loyal subjects, preserved those sacred rights entire, and returned to his beloved Father the Toleration inviolate. We have too much confidence in the wisdom and justice of Parliament, to imagine that a measure will be adopted so obnoxious to such a large proportion of the nation, as our societies and congregations constitute: but if unhappily we should be disappointed, and in the dernier resort, we should be driven to submit our case to His Royal Highness, we have already the gratification of his royal assurance, that he will “be ready to listen to the complaints of those who may think themselves aggrieved, and regulate his conduct upon the established principles of that ancient and excellent constitution, under which the people of this country have hitherto enjoyed a state of unrivalled prosperity and happiness.”
The following were some of the reasons which induced the committee to adopt the foregoing resolutions:—
I. At present every man may choose his own mode of religious instruction, and every man who is impressed with the belief that it is his duty to preach or teach, has the liberty to do so, on making oath and subscribing certain declarations. These are points fully recognized by the Toleration Laws, and if they were not, religious toleration would, indeed, be confined within narrow bounds. But the proposed Bill is quite a measure of condition and restraint, and would so operate to a very extensive decree.
II. The magistrate now acts ministerially; he will then, we contend, act judicially. This is a point of the very highest consequence to all ranks of christians. At present, the magistrate has no discretion as to the administering the oaths &c.: he is required to administer them to those that offer, &c. But, if the present Bill should pass, he will, of course become the judge of the qualities of the householder who certifies, i. e. how far he is substantial and reputable. It appears to us also, that he might probably be the judge of the truth of the certificate: and, therefore, how far the persons certifying were dissenting Protestants, and were of the same sect or persuasion. This would be a most fruitful source of difference of opinion, and, consequently, the hardship would fall upon the applicant for a qualification, who would be exposed to infinate vexation. The very terms are open to difference of opinion in magistrates, as must every other subject upon which they are to decide judicially. This would be the subversion of a principle which has been acknowledged since the first statute on the subject of toleration. Would the power thus given to the magistrate, be any thing less than that which he has in licensing public houses? and can we suppose this to be fitting in religious matters?
III. At present, the Court of King’s Bench will grant a mandamus to admit a dissenting teacher where the chapel is endowed, as in the case of Rex, v. Barker, 3 Burr. 1264.... But if this Bill passes, it will, it is presumed, deprive the first class of persons, named in the Bill, of the benefit of this writ. At present, a person must shew that he is legally qualified, according to law, to act as a dissenting teacher, before he can have the benefit of the mandamus; but under the present Bill, a person must first be admitted to the peaceable possession and enjoyment of the place of minister of a congregation before he can qualify. Now, if there be a contest between two persons, as was the case above-mentioned, and one of them, who, according to the terms of the deed of endowment, is entitled to the possession of the chapel, has occasion to apply to the court for a mandamus to be admitted, how is it possible that the court can grant it, unless he can shew that he is a legal minister, qualified according to the existing laws? This he could not do for want of a qualification under the Act, and this qualification he could not get, for want of the peaceable possession of the very situation which formed the subject of contest. It is obvious, then, what a situation the congregations of endowed chapels would be placed in. The trustees being in possession of the property, might, in most cases, appoint whom they might think proper, and the congregation, and their chosen minister, would have no redress.
IV. There is a phraseology used in the second section, which we have never yet seen adopted, and the mode of wording adds another trait of character before unknown in the law of toleration. It speaks of the appointment of a person, not only being a Protestant, dissenting from the Church of England, and being in holy orders, or pretended holy orders, or pretending to holy orders; but the applicant must have an additional character to be entitled to the immunities of William and Mary, and of 19th Geo. III, that is, he must be the minister of a separate congregation. This word separate, whatever be its meaning, as applied to this subject, was never used till the 43d of Geo. III.