Now as to the fact of property in Negroes, without exception to this kingdom or limitation to other countries, I am supported in opinion by the authority of the learned Judge Blackstone; though he ascribes the rise of this property to a source very different from me. In the chapter of, Title to things personal by occupancy, he says, “As in the goods of the enemy, so also in his person, a man may acquire a sort of qualified property, by taking him a prisoner in war, at least till his ransom be paid. And this doctrine seems to have been extended to Negroe servants, who are purchased when captives, of the nations with whom they are at war, and continue therefore in some degree the property of their masters (he should have rather said owners) who buy them.” Here then he refers to the law of nations, for the establishment of that which I appeal to the law of England for. Now, although the law of nations might have been a good ground to rest the municipal law of this country upon, and might have served as a preamble to, or reason for, an act of parliament; yet it is not within my conception, how, in such an internal concern as this is, the law of nations could have been the law itself. For example, if in the return to the writ of Habeas Corpus in this case, it had been set forth, that Negroe servants are purchased when captives of the nations with whom they are at war, and therefore the law of nations gives their masters a property in their persons; would your Lordship have thought this a lawful plea for the remanding of Somerset? If not, your Lordship finds that the fact of property is admitted by the learned Judge, without the proper foundation of law to support it. But he proceeds to say, “though, accurately speaking, that property consists rather in the perpetual service, than in the body or person of the captives.” Accurately speaking, my Lord, I join issue with the learned Judge: but, legally speaking, the law is as he had stated it to be. Those who speak accurately reason from the real nature of Negroes, and draw their conclusions from thence: the Lords Talbot and Hardwick spoke legally, and drew their opinions from the fountain-head of law. Besides, my Lord, I conceive it to be impossible that the law should be as these interpreters or reporters have made it to be; because the result of it is plain—inconsistency, and positive absurdity. If Somerset is protected by the law of England in the enjoyment of his person and property, how, in appeal to common sense, can Mr. Steuart’s right in him remain exactly in the same state as before? “Yes, it may be said, he has a right to the perpetual service of him; for this is no more than the same state of subjection for life, which every apprentice submits to for the space of seven years, or sometimes for a longer time.” But by what mode or method does Mr. Steuart acquire this perpetual right to his service? There is no indenture of apprenticeship on the part of Somerset to him: there is no written contract of any sort or kind whatever, there is no parole agreement between them, to enforce this right of service. How is it to be maintained then? If by the purchase of him, property is the offspring of purchase; and, as such, Mr. Steuart claims him. If he is not his property, he has otherwise no right in him, nor to his services, and, again, if he is his property, who shall disseise him thereof?
As I began, my Lord, with making a distinction between slavery and property, and have persisted in their legal difference relatively to the state and condition of Negroes, some farther explanation on this point may perhaps be looked for and required of me. I am sensible it may objectively be said, that in every kind of slavery there is an included degree of property, more or less limited or extended; and that this kind of property therefore in Negroes is but an accumulated degree of slavery: so that the distinction I have made is a distinction without a difference, and a mere contentiousness about words. But, although I admit the truth of this objection in part, I must deny, in the whole, its application to the principles of my argument. Slavery, my Lord, is that state of subjection, which mankind, by force or otherwise, acquire the one over the other. In every society therefore where this state of subjection prevails, the object and subject of those laws necessary for the regulation thereof are, what? are human nature itself. Let it be considered then whether human nature is either the object or subject of the laws of England, respecting the state and condition of Negroes. And here, my Lord, I beg leave to assert, that the appeal I have already made to those laws maintains the contrary matter of fact, with the undeniable proof of self-evidence. But it may again be urged, that authority, however respectable, is not the test of truth; and therefore, says the disputant, shew me the reason, the Cur, the Quare, the Quamobrem, of these laws. To which, in the language and postulate of the Greek Philosopher, I reply; that, as matter of fact is the Δὸς ϖοῦ ϛῶ of my argument, beyond this, it is not incumbent on me to extend my enquiries. And yet, my Lord, a research of this nature being perhaps founded upon no impertinent or unmeaning curiosity, the suggestions even of fancy and imagination may not be here undeserving your Lordship’s attention; and as such the subject is, in this view, of course not unworthy my notice. It being then evidently the will, it is not to be presumed, till the contrary appears, that it was the effect also of the wisdom of parliament, that Negroes under the law should not be considered as human beings; and therefore I am led to surmise that this determination of the Legislature might have arisen from one or the other of two motives or considerations: the one physical, the other political. With respect then to the physical motive, your Lordship need not be told how much the origin of Negroes, the cause of that remarkable difference in complexion from the rest of mankind, and the woolly covering of their heads so similar to the fleece of sheep, have puzzled and perplexed the Naturalists of all countries for ages past. It was a subject of the deepest reflection to the great and learned Mr. Boyle; and what could engage his divine abilities, without satisfaction either to himself or others, is likely to remain among those arcana of nature that are not to be revealed to human understanding. But, although these phænomena in nature are not to be accounted for, and therefore admit of no principle of law inferible from them; yet their very incomprehensibleness, when compared with other circumstances more known and better understood, may serve to this end, as so many lesser weights in the scales of greater probability. Now, my Lord, it is an opinion universally received, that human nature is universally the same: but I should apprehend that this was a proportion rather taken for granted, than admitted to be proved: for although the proper study of mankind is man, and therefore the universality of such an opinion is prima facie evidence of its truth; yet, it is to be observed, that, of all other studies, the science of man has been least of all cultivated and improved. Man only, who examines all Nature else, stands unexamined by himself. If we look into the vegetable and mineral kingdoms of this world, we shall perceive a scrutiny made in them the most nice, accurate, and comprehensive, we shall find these grand divisions of nature arranged in classes, orders, kinds, and sorts: we shall contemplate systems morally perfect. If we take a view of the animal kingdom below ourselves, we shall be witnesses there also of the same order, regularity, and perfection. Why then is human nature exempt from this disquisition and arrangement? Are men afraid to turn their eyes upon themselves, lest they behold themselves in the mirror of truth? Or is it pride, or vanity, that causes this neglect? Yes, men would be angels, angels would be gods, says Mr. Pope[12]; and yet man, as Dr. Lister observes[13], is as very a quadruped as any animal on earth; and whose actions are most of them resolvable into instinct, notwithstanding the principles which custom and education have superinduced. Of other animals then, it is well known, there are many kinds, each kind having its proper species subordinate thereto: but man is one kind of animal, and yet, without distinction of species, universally the same. Does not this seem to break in upon and unlink that great chain of Heaven, which in due gradation joins and unites the whole with all its parts? May it not be more perfective of the system to say, that human nature is a class, comprehending an order of beings, of which man is the genus, divided into distinct and separate species of men? All other species of the animal kingdom have their marks of distinction: why should man be universally indiscriminate one to the other?
The great Mr. Locke says[14], that reason is supposed to make the characteristic difference between man and beasts: but, what is the characteristic that distinguishes man from man? That there may and should be such a distinction, I have already endeavoured to shew; and I am apt to think that this is a question not without its answer. The learned Dr. Hutchinson[15] has demonstrated the existence of a moral sense in, and peculiar to, human nature; which as it serves essentially to distinguish man from beasts, and to raise him from the tenth to the ten thousandth link of the chain, so is it, in my humble apprehension, an evident criterion of the specific difference between man and man. Now Mr. Locke, speaking of reason as that faculty whereby man is distinguished from beasts, says, that beasts have reason in common with men; in which however he is to be understood, that beasts possess the faculty, and in some measure have the use, of reason; but man’s superiority over beasts consists in the power of exerting that faculty, and in the compound ratio of its exertion. As beasts therefore have the faculty of reason, and it is the exertion in degree of that faculty (particularly in obtaining abstract ideas) that creates the great difference between man and beasts: so by the same parity of reasoning, the moral sense being a faculty of the human mind common to all men, the capacity of perceiving moral relations, the power of exercising that faculty, and the compound ratio of its exercise, is that which makes the grand difference and distinction between man and man. All nature, my Lord, which is the art of God, is wisely fitted and adapted to that use and purpose for which it was ordained; and the same observation is to be made even in the art of man. A flea is not less perfect than an elephant because of its size: neither is the cup that holds a pint less compleat than the vessel that contains an hundred gallons; when both are full, the end for which both were designed is answered and fulfilled. The use then to be made of this doctrine, my Lord, is, that as experience, observation, and experiment, are the foundations upon which all speculative philosophy is raised; so, from experience and observation, I judge that the truth of this hypothesis may be very clearly proved and demonstrated. Now, in order to this, it is necessary to have recourse to the histories of nations: to read, to examine, and compare them, one with the other. To observe the moral improvements had by them, to remark the social virtues that prevail; and this will bring me to the accounts that have been given of Negroes (for histories they have none of their own) and consequently back to the subject of this address to your Lordship. But, my Lord, forbearing to trouble your Lordship with a detail of these accounts, I shall, referring them to your Lordship’s memory, content myself with the bare mention of a few facts only[16].
Mr. Guthrie, in his account of Africa from the tropic of Cancer to the Cape of Good Hope, says, “The history of this continent is little known, and probably affords no materials which deserve to render it more so. We know from the antients, who sailed a considerable way round the coasts, that the inhabitants were in the same rude situation near 2000 years ago in which they are at present; that is, they had nothing of humanity about them but the form. This may either be accounted for by supposing, that nature has placed some insuperable barrier between the natives of this division of Africa and the inhabitants of Europe; or that the former, being so long accustomed to a savage manner of life, and degenerating from one age to another, at length became altogether incapable of making any progress in civility or science. It is very certain that all the attempts of the Europeans, particularly of the Dutch at the Cape of Good Hope, have been hitherto ineffectual for making the least impression on these savage mortals, or giving them the least inclination or even idea of the European manner of life.”
All other writers on this subject agree in these relations, or furnish others similar to them: nor have I been able to find one author, by whom I could discover that there was any sort of plan or system of morality conceived by these tribes of Africa, or practised among them. Their barbarity to their children debases their nature even below that of brutes. Their cruelty to their aged parents is of a kin to this. They have a religion, it is true: but it is a religion which seems the effect only of outward impressions, and in which neither the head nor the heart have any concern. They have laws founded on principles, which plainly prove the defective use of the moral sense, as appears in this instance among the rest. Their Judges are judges and executioners at one and the same time. When a criminal is condemned by them, the Chief Justice first strikes him with a club, and then all the rest of the Judges fall upon him, and drub him to death; and neither this, nor any other of their customs, can time make any alteration in, nor precept nor example amend. Indeed, if it were otherwise, it would perhaps be unnatural: for the Ethiopian cannot change his skin, nor the Leopard his spots. From this then, my Lord, I infer, that the measure of these beings may be as compleat, as that of any other race of mortals; filling up that space in life beyond the bounds of which they are not capable of passing; differing from other men, not in kind, but in species; and verifying that unerring truth of Mr. Pope, that
“Order is Heaven’s first law; and this confest,
Some are, and must be, greater than the rest:”
The application of what has been said, is, that the Legislature, perceiving the corporeal as well as intellectual differences of Negroes from other people, knowing the irreclaimable savageness of their manners, and of course supposing that they were an inferior race of people, the conclusion was, to follow the commercial genius of this country, in enacting that they should be considered and distinguished (as they are) as articles of its trade and commerce only[17].