13. General Braddock was a brave man, but had too much self-confidence, too high an opinion of the power of regular troops, and too mean an idea of both Americans and Indians. About one hundred Indians joined him on his march, who might have been of great use to him as guides and scouts, if he had treated them kindly. He neglected and slighted them, however, and they gradually left him.
14. In conversation one day with Franklin, he gave an account of his intended progress. "After taking Fort Duquesne," said he, "I am to proceed to Niagara; and, having taken that, to Frontenac, if the season will allow time, and I suppose it will; for Duquesne can hardly detain me above three or four days; and then I see nothing that can obstruct my march to Niagara."
15. Franklin knew something about marches through the woods, and the tricks of the Indians, and entertained serious doubts in respect to the success of the campaign. He only ventured, however, to say—"To be sure, sir, if you arrive well before Duquesne with the fine troops, so well provided with artillery, the fort, though completely fortified, and assisted with a very strong garrison, can probably make but a short resistance. The only danger I apprehend of obstruction to your march, is from the ambuscades of the Indians, who, by constant practice, are dexterous in laying and executing them; and the slender line, near four miles long, which your army must make, may expose it to be attacked by surprise in its flanks, and to be cut like a thread into several pieces, which, from their distance, cannot come up in time to support each other."
16. Braddock smiled at his ignorance, and replied—"These savages may, indeed, be a formidable enemy to your raw American militia; but upon the king's regular and disciplined troops, sir, it is impossible they should make any impression."
17. The enemy did not take that advantage of the army under Braddock which Franklin anticipated. They suffered it to approach without interruption till within nine miles of Fort Duquesne. The troops had just crossed a river, were in a more open part of the woods than any they passed, and moving forward in a compact form. Their advanced guard was suddenly attacked by a heavy fire from behind trees and bushes. This was the first intelligence which the general had of the approach of an enemy.
18. The guard being disordered, the general hurried the troops up to their assistance. This was done in great confusion, through wagons, baggage, and cattle. They were now attacked also from behind. The officers were on horseback, and easily distinguished and picked out as marks by the enemy. The soldiers were thrown together in great disorder, having or hearing no orders, and standing to be shot at, till two thirds of them were killed; then, being seized with a panic, the remainder fled in precipitation.
19. The wagoners took each a horse out of his team, and scampered. Their example was immediately followed by others, so that all the wagons, provisions, artillery and stores were left to the enemy. The general, being wounded, was brought off with difficulty; out of eighty-six officers, sixty-three were killed or wounded; and seven hundred and fourteen men killed, of eleven hundred.
20. These men had been picked from the whole army; the rest had been left behind with Colonel Dunbar, who was to follow with the heavier parts of the baggage. The fugitives arrived at Dunbar's camp, and communicated their own panic to him and all his people. Though he had now above a thousand men, he determined not to meddle with the enemy, but to make the best of his way to the settlements. Notwithstanding requests from the governor of Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania, that he would post his troops on the frontiers to protect the inhabitants, he continued his hasty and disgraceful march till he had arrived at snug quarters in Philadelphia.
1. Why were commissioners from the colonies ordered to assemble at Albany? Who were sent from Pennsylvania?