Two Wars: An Autobiography of General Samuel G. French / Mexican War; War between the States, a Diary; Reconstruction Period, His Experience; Incidents, Reminiscences, etc.

by Samuel Gibbs French

Gen. Corse's Report.

... I directed Col. Rowett to hold the spur on which the Thirty-Ninth Iowa and the Seventh Illinois were formed, ... and taking two companies of the Ninety-Third Illinois down a spur parallel with the railroad and along the bank of the cut, so disposed them as to hold the north side as long as possible. Three companies of the Ninety-Third, which had been driven from the west end of the ridge, were distributed in the ditch south of the redoubt, with instructions to keep the town well covered by their fire, and to watch the depot where the rations were stored. The remaining battalion of the Ninety-Third, under Maj. Fisher, lay between the redoubt and Rowett's line, ready to reënforce wherever most needed.

I had barely issued the orders when the storm broke in all its fury on the Thirty-Ninth Iowa and the Seventh Illinois. Young's Brigade of Texans had gained the west end of the ridge, and moved with great impetuosity along its crest till they struck Rowett's command, when they received a severe check, but, undaunted, came again and again. Rowett, reënforced by the gallant Redfield, encouraged me to hope that we were safe here, when I observed Gen. Sears's Brigade moving from the north, its left extending across the railroad (opposite Tourtellotte). I rushed to the two companies of the Ninety-Third Illinois, which were on the brink of the crest running north from the redoubt, they having been reënforced by the retreating pickets, and urged them to hold on to the spur; but it was of no avail; the enemy's line of battle swept us back like so much chaff, and struck the Thirty-Ninth Iowa in flank, threatening to ingulf our little band without further ado. Fortunately for us, Col. Tourtellotte's fire caught Sears in flank, and broke him so badly as to enable me to get a staff officer over the cut with orders to bring the Fiftieth Illinois over to reënforce Rowett, who had lost very heavily. However, before the regiment sent for could arrive, Sears and Young both rallied, and made their assaults in front and on the flank with so much vigor and in such force as to break Rowett's line, and had not the Thirty-Ninth Iowa fought with the desperation it did, I never should have been able to get a man back inside the redoubt; as it was, their hand-to-hand conflict broke the enemy to that extent that he must stop and re-form before undertaking the assault on the fort. Under cover of the blows they gave the enemy the Seventh and Ninety-Third Illinois, and what remained of the Thirty-Ninth Iowa, fell back into the fort.

The fighting up to this time, about 11 A.M., was of the most extraordinary character. Attacked from the north, from the west, and from the south, these three regiments (the Thirty-Ninth Iowa and the Seventh and Ninety-Third Illinois) held Young's and a portion of Sears's and Cockrell's Brigades at bay for nearly two hours and a half. The gallant Col. Redfield, of the Thirty-Ninth Iowa, fell shot in four places, and the extraordinary valor of the men and officers of this regiment and the Seventh Illinois saved to us Allatoona.

So completely disorganized were the enemy that no regular assault could be made on the fort till I had the trenches all filled and the parapets lined with men. The Twelfth and Fiftieth Illinois, arriving from the east hill, enabled us to occupy every foot of trench, and keep up a line of fire that, as long as our ammunition lasted, would render our little fort impregnable. The broken pieces of the enemy enabled them to fill every hollow, and take every advantage of the rough ground surrounding the fort, filling every hole and trench, seeking shelter behind every stump and log that lay within musket range of the fort. We received their fire from the north, south, and west of the redoubt, completely enfilading our ditches and rendering it almost impracticable for a man to expose his person above the parapet. An effort was made to carry our works by assault; but the battery (Twelfth Missouri) was so ably manned, and so gallantly fought, as to render it impossible for a column to live within a hundred yards of the work. Officers labored constantly to stimulate the men to expose themselves above the parapet, and nobly set them the example.

The enemy kept a constant and intense fire, gradually closing around us, and rapidly filling our little fort with the dead and dying. About 1 P.M. I was wounded by a rifle ball that rendered me insensible for some thirty or forty minutes, but managed to rally on hearing some persons cry "Cease firing!" which conveyed to me the impression that they were trying to surrender the fort.

Again I urged my staff, the few officers unhurt, and the men around me to renewed exertions, assuring them that Sherman would soon be here with reënforcements. The gallant fellows struggled to keep their heads above the ditch and parapets in the face of the murderous fire of the enemy now concentrated upon us. The artillery was silent, and a brave fellow, whose name I regret having forgotten, volunteered to cross the railway cut, which was under fire of the enemy, and go to the fort on the east hill to procure ammunition. Having executed his mission successfully, he returned in a short time with an arm load of canister and case shot. About 2:30 P.M. the enemy were observed massing a force behind a small house and the ridge on which the house was located, distant northwest from the fort about one hundred and fifty yards. The dead and wounded were moved aside so as to enable us to move a piece of artillery to an embrasure commanding the house and ridge. A few shots from the gun threw the enemy's column into great confusion, which, being observed by our men, caused them to rush to the parapet and open such a fire that it was impossible for the enemy to rally. From this time until near 4 P.M. we had the advantage of the enemy, and maintained it with such success that they were driven from every position, and finally fled in great confusion, leaving their dead and wounded, and our little garrison in possession of the field. [See War Records.]

The above extracts from Gen. Corse's report are taken from an address made by Col. William Ludlow, United States army, to the Michigan Commandery, at Detroit, April 2, 1891, and I desire it to be borne in mind that he is a graduate of the Military Academy and was with Gen. Corse at Allatoona during the battle, for I shall have cause to refer to his address after a while.

There have been so many erroneous accounts given to the public of this battle, impugning of motives, guessing at the controlling objects that influence action, falsifying of numbers, glorifying dispatches, and complimentary orders, that won the admiration even of a Confederate lieutenant general, that I purpose, as well as I am able, to give an impartial account of it.

To do justice to the troops engaged on either side in the conflict, it will be necessary: 1. To have a knowledge of the ground or topography of the field of action. 2. The strength of the fortifications, and the time and labor bestowed on them. 3. The strength of the respective forces. 4. The ratio of inequality between men in strong fortifications and men attacking from without, immediately on arrival. 5. The inspiring inducement to the garrison not to surrender when relief is at hand; and the advantage to be gained, if successful, compared with the risk of remaining after ascertaining that the enemy was converging on the place from every point.