Site of Fort Henry
Our camp that night was made at the landing which, owing to the high waters, was nearly overflowed. The landing was upon the north side of a deep slough extending from the Cumberland River to the Tennessee, about twelve or fifteen miles above Paducah. The slough was about forty rods wide where we were, and in order to proceed to Fort Henry, we were obliged to cross it, which we did early upon the following morning. The water was icy cold and came well up to the sides of our horses. The Regulars were in advance and their commanding officer evidently considered it an opportune time for showing the supreme importance of discipline. The four men who went to the assistance of their drowning comrade, were compelled to walk, lead their horses and carry their arms through the slough. They wore high cavalry boots which were filled with water, and in this condition the poor fellows were forced to walk with their horses in the deep mud during the entire day.
Brutality and fatality have not infrequently been associated in war with subsequent engagements. Our sympathies instinctively turn to that crude method of obtaining justice. It is surprising that it was not resorted to in this case.
There had been much rain, the streams were overflowing and the deep mud greatly impeded our progress. We had hoped to arrive at the fort on the fifth; but the condition of the roads made it impossible. General Grant, more than anybody, realized the great strategic importance of Forts Henry and Donelson and knew how highly they were prized by the enemy. In his "Memoirs" he says:
"The two positions were so important to the enemy, as he saw his interest, that it was natural to suppose that reinforcements would come from every quarter from which they could be got. Prompt action on our part was imperative."
Accordingly, on the 6th, without waiting for more troops, Grant ordered an attack upon Fort Henry. We heard the firing and used every effort to get there but without avail. Upon our arrival we found that the fort had been reduced by the gun-boats, that the greater portion of the garrison had retreated to Fort Donelson before the battle commenced and that only ninety, who had been left to man the guns and cover the retreat, had been captured.
Fort Heiman was on the west bank of the Tennessee and commanded Fort Henry. It had been evacuated before the attack upon the latter and the garrisons of the two forts had gone to re-enforce that of Fort Donelson. Grant's problem, then, was to capture that stronghold, defended by twenty-one thousand men, with an available force at hand, of only fifteen thousand and that in mid-winter, with no alternative for his army but to move and fight and sleep in mud and rain and snow until victory brought them shelter. He has stated his view as follows:
"I was impatient to get to Fort Donelson because I knew the importance of the place to the enemy and supposed he would re-enforce it rapidly. I felt that 15,000 men on the 8th, would be more effective than 50,000, a month later."
He did not falter. Mud and rain and snow it must be; and he went on, inspiring his men with his splendid confidence.
After our arrival at Fort Henry, Captain Hotaling went out with a platoon of sixteen men to reconnoiter Fort Donelson, eleven miles distant. They encountered some of Forrest's cavalry and drove them in. Several of the confederates were wounded in the conflict, one frightfully so, from a saber-stroke from the captain. Nicholas Hotaling received a buck-shot wound in the cheek and George Taylor, two shots in the jaw, resulting in a painful wound.